 
 
 
Immigration and  
Refugee Board of Canada  
 
Immigration Appeal Division  
  
Commission de l’immigration  
et du statut de réfugié du Canada  
 
Section d’appel de l’immigration  
 
IAD File No. /  No de dossier  de la SAI:  TB7 -12191  
Client ID No. / No ID client:  8784 -0334  
 
 
Reasons and Decision  Motifs et décision  
 
REMOVAL ORDER  
 
 
Appellant(s)  XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  Appelant(e)(s)  
   
and   et 
 The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration   
Respondent  Le ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l’Immigration  Intimé(e)  
   
   
Date(s) of Hearing  November 20, 2018  
August 7, 2018  
 Date(s ) de l’audience  
   
Place of Hearing  Toronto, Ontario  
 Lieu de l’audience  
   
Date of Decision  December 10, 2018  Date de la décision  
   
   
Panel  XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  Tribunal  
   
Counsel for the 
Appellant(s)  Maria DXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  Conseil(s) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX / 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
 Barrister and Solicitor   
   
Designated 
Representative(s)  N/A  Représentant(e)(s) 
désigné(e)(s)  
   
Counsel for the Minister  XXXXXXXXXXXX   Conseil du ministre  
     
2018 CanLII 139462 (CA IRB)
IAD File No. / No de dossier  de la SAI:  TB7 -12191  
Client ID No. / No ID client:  8784 -0334  
 
 
  
REASONS FOR DECISION  
 
[1] XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (the appellant), a permanent resident and a citizen of the Republic of the 
Philippines by birth, appeals pursuant to ss. 63(3) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
(the Act ) from a removal order made against him on June 16, 2017 by  the Immigration Division 
at Toronto for reasons of misrepresentation.  
 
[2] I received the oral evidence of the appellant and his current common -law partner in 
English at a hearing on August 7, 2018.  I received the oral evidence of a co -worker of the 
appellan t in English on November 20, 2018. All of the oral testimony was given in person.  A 
sworn interpreter in the Tagalog language was present on a standby basis throughout both 
sittings.  At no time was any difficulty in communication apparent or alleged.  
 
[3] The appellant never disputed the legal validity of the removal order made against him.  
At the conclusion of oral testimony on November 20, 2018, counsel for the appellant asked that 
the appeal be allowed on humanitarian grounds or, in the alternative that s pecial relief by way of 
a stay of removal be granted, subject to proscribed terms and conditions.  The Minister held that 
insufficient humanitarian considerations were present to justify granting special relief and asked 
that the appeal be dismissed accord ingly.  
 
[4] After considering the evidence, the oral testimony and the positions of the parties, I am 
satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that the removal order made against the appellant is valid 
in law.  I am further satisfied, taking into account the best interest of a child directly affected, 
that sufficient humanitarian and compassionate considerations do not exist, in all the 
circumstances of the case, to justify granting special relief.  I would accordingly dismiss the 
appeal for the following reas ons.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2018 CanLII 139462 (CA IRB)
IAD  File No. / No de dossier  de la SAI:  TB7 -12191  
Client ID No. / No ID client:  8784 -0334  
 
 
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ANALYSIS  
 
Legal Validity  
 
[5] The appellant did not dispute the legal validity of the removal order before the 
Immigration Division, nor did he do so in the context of the prese nt appeal.  Upon review of the 
Record, and taking into account the posi tion of the appellant, I am satisfied, on a balance of 
probabilities that the removal order made against the appellant is valid in law.  
 
Humanitarian Considerations  
 
[6] With respect to the existence of humanitarian and compassionate (H&C) considerations, I 
am guided by the Wang1 decision in which the Federal Court endorsed the following 
modifications of the Ribic2 factors which usually inform a decision in removal order appeals;  
 
 The seriousness of the misrepresentation leading to the removal order and 
the circumstances surrounding it;  
 The remorsefulness of the appellant;  
 The length of time spent in Canada and the degree to which the appellant is 
established in Canada;  
 The appellant’s family in Canada;  
 The impact on that family that removal would cause;  
 The best interest of a child directly affected by the decision;  
 The support available to the appellant and the family in the community;  
 The degree of hardship that would be caused by the appellant’s removal 
from Canada, including the conditions in the likely c ountry of removal, in 
this case Nigeria.  
 
[7] The exercise of discretion must also be consistent with the objectives of the Act  
throughout the court, one of which is set out in section 3(1)(h) which recognizes the need to 
protect the health and the safety of C anadians, and to maintain the security of Canadian society. 
                                                 
1 XXXX, XXXXXXXXXX  v. M.C.I.  (F.C., no. IMM -5815 -04), O’Keefe, August 3, 2005, 2005 FC 1059.  
2 XXXXX, Marida v. M.E.I. , IAB 84 -9623, D. Davey, XXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXX, August 20, 1985.  
2018 CanLII 139462 (CA IRB)
IAD  File No. / No de dossier  de la SAI:  TB7 -12191  
Client ID No. / No ID client:  8784 -0334  
 
 
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This objective includes the maintenance of the integrity of the immigration system in the face of 
misrepresentations made by potential immigrants.3   
 
The Seriousness of the Misrepresentation leading to the Removal Order and the 
Circumstances surrounding it  
[8] The appellant  and his sponsor were both expatriate workers from the Philippines.  The 
sponsor graduated as a nurse in the Philippines but before obtaining her license she left to be a 
live -in caregiver in the Republic of China.  The appellant graduated as an engineer in the 
Philippines and went to work in the Sultanate of Brunei.  The couple maintained a long -distance 
relationship, in part by sharing each other’s email and social media accoun t credentials. In the 
course of scrutinizing his wife’s email, the appellant testified that he came across an exchange 
between his sponsor (still his girlfriend) and her sister, where she outlined a brief dalliance she 
had had with another man, which had e nded some months before the email exchange.  When he 
confronted his  girlfriend, she  initially denied it, but eventually confessed.  The appellant testified 
that he forgave his girlfriend, but in reality he had not done so.  He proceeded to enter into a 
clandestine relationship with another woman from the Philippines working in Brunei.  That 
relationship was ongoing at the time he met his sponsor to marry her in Hong Kong SAR. A 
child was born to the couple, left in the Philippines to be cared for by grandpa rents, while the 
parents were both working abroad. The woman in Brunei later became pregnant from the 
appellant and threatened to kill herself and her unborn child unless the appellant married her.  
The appellant complied, solemnizing a bigamous marriage i n Brunei.  
 
[9] The appellant continued working in Brunei until he was made aware that his permanent 
resident visa was ready to be issued, included with his first daughter as overseas dependents of 
the appellant ’s wife, granted permanent residence in Canada und er the Live -in Caregiver Class, 
as it then was.  
 
[10]  The appellant did not tell his sponsoring wife about his bigamous marriage or the child 
born of that marriage.  He did not declare the existence of his other daughter when he was 
                                                 
3 XXXX v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration ), 2005 FC 1059, O’Keefe J, 03 August 2005, a t para 11.  
2018 CanLII 139462 (CA IRB)
IAD  File No. / No de dossier  de la SAI:  TB7 -12191  
Client ID No. / No ID client:  8784 -0334  
 
 
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granted permanent residence.4 The appellant’s evidence testimony was contradictory. In response 
to counsel’s often leading questions, the appellant declared that he prepared to tell his wife face 
to face in the hopes he would forgive her.  Under cross -examination, the appellant allow ed that if 
he had told his wife and sponsor about the other relationship and child that he was afraid he 
might lose his chance to be in Canada.  I find the appellant’s second answer to be closer to the 
truth. It was open to him to confess to his wife, part icularly having previously extracted one from 
her y ears earlier.  He did not do so  because it would have almost certainly meant an end to the 
future he wanted in Canada.  
 
[11]  I am satisfied that the appellant deceived his wife for almost 10 years about the existence 
of his second relationship and child.  According to his application for divorce from his bigamous 
wife, he only became separated from her in November 2013,5 some tw o months before arriving 
as a permanent resident.  He deceived immigration authorities about the bigamous relationship, 
which apart from potential inadmissibility on criminal grounds, cast the genuineness and primary 
purpose of the relationship between the appellant and his sponsor in serious doubt.  I find that the 
misrepresentation falls at the very serious end of the scale, and constitutes an aggravating factor 
in my evaluation.  
 
Remorsefulness of the Appellant  
 
[12]  Under questioning from his counsel, the app ellant declared that he knew what he done 
was wrong and asked for a second chance to be allowed to remain in Canada with his current 
common -law partner.  
 
[13]  About one week after he arrived as a permanent resident, the appellant confessed the 
details of his un disclosed marriage and child.  He was promptly ejected from the conjugal home.  
He found sanctuary in a home filled with compatriots from the Philippines, including his current 
common -law partner, with whom he promptly entered into a romantic relationship.  Although he 
said he tried to reconcile with his sponsor, it came to naught.  Given the speed with which he 
                                                 
4 Appeal Record, at page 65 . 
5 Exhibit A -1, at page 50  
2018 CanLII 139462 (CA IRB)
IAD  File No. / No de dossier  de la SAI:  TB7 -12191  
Client ID No. / No ID client:  8784 -0334  
 
 
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entered into another romantic relationship, I determine that any efforts he made to reconcile were 
half -hearted, at best. Given the whole of his tes timony and actions over the years, I find that his 
remorsefulness is motivated more by the consequences of the removal order before me than any 
genuine regret for the people whose lives he has crossed outside his extended family. I find that 
the remorseful ness of the appellant is at best a neutral element in my consideration.  
 
The Length of time spent in Canada and the Degree of Establishment  
 
[14]  The appellant is approaching five  years, since arriving in Canada as a permanent resident 
in January  2014.  He grew  up and completed post -secondary studies in the Philippines.  He 
worked almost 10 years in Brunei.  The length of time spent in Canada does not constitute a 
significant period in his life by comparison.  
 
[15]  The appellant has been steadily employed since comin g to Canada.  He disclosed 
evidence of regular income tax filings.6 He has been promoted to a supervisory position at his 
workplace.  A colleague testified how the appellant is valued at work.  In response to counsel’s 
questions, she declared that it would be very hard to replace him if he were removed.  Under 
cross -examination from the Minister, however, she allowed that while it only took one month for 
the appellant to be trained up, that it would normally take two months of on -the-job training to 
bring so meone to standard.  He also disclosed evidence of community service outside the 
workplace.7 
 
[16]  The Federal Court has provided divergent guidance on how the IAD is to consider 
establishment in the context of a removal order for reason of misrepresentation.  I  am guided by 
the decision of the Federal Court in XXX , wherein Mr. Justice XXXX declared in part:  
‘I agree with the Minister’s submission that the decision is unreasonable because 
the IAD, in considering the issue of establishment did not feel [Ms. XXX’s]  
misrepresentation was a relevant factor.”   In my view, it is a relevant factor 
when considering a person’s degree of establishment.  To do otherwise is to 
place the immigration cheat on an equal footing with the person who has 
                                                 
6 XXXX  A-1, pages 18 -27. 
7 XXXX, at page 37 . 
2018 CanLII 139462 (CA IRB)
IAD  File No. / No de dossier  de la SAI:  TB7 -12191  
Client ID No. / No ID client:  8784 -0334  
 
 
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complied with the law.   Whet her the impact of the fraud is to reduce the 
establishment to zero or to something more is a question for the discretion of the 
decision -maker based on the particular facts before him or her.   But it must be 
considered.’8 
 
[17]  I find that the degree of the appellant’s establishment falls in the moderate range.  I find 
the weight I can attribute to it is diminished by the fact that the appellant earned that 
establishment through serious misrepresentation.  It constitutes a mitigating element, but one to 
which  I attribute little favourable weight in the circumstances before me.  
 
The appellant’s family in Canada  
 
[18]  The appellant and his sponsoring wife are divorced.9 His daughter from the marriage 
remains in the custody and care of his former spouse.  Although there is no evidence of court -
ordered child custody or support arrangements in place, the appellant testified that he has not 
seen his daughter in person since September 2017 and the former spouse is refusing his informal 
offers of financial support.  
 
[19]  He has a common -law partner, with whom he has filed joint tax returns since the 
effective date of their common -law relationship.  She is now pregnant with a child d ue in 
January 2019.  The appellant’s fathering of the child is not in dispute.  
 
[20]  The appellant has his mother and siblings in the Philippines, together with his daughter 
from his bigamous wife.  He has made an application to divorce his bigamous wife, which  is 
pending before the Superior Court of Ontario.10 
 
[21]  The appellant’s family ties to Canada are limited, compared to those in the Philippines.  
They , nevertheless , constitute a mitigating factor in my assessment.  
 
Impact on the Family of Removal of the Appel lant to the Philippines  
                                                 
8 Canada (MCI) v. XXX, XXXX , 2016 FC 460, Zinn J, April 25, 2016, at paragraph 29.  
9 Exhibit A -1, at page 47 . 
10 Ibid, pages 48 -52. 
2018 CanLII 139462 (CA IRB)
IAD  File No. / No de dossier  de la SAI:  TB7 -12191  
Client ID No. / No ID client:  8784 -0334  
 
 
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[22]  Given the current state of relations with his former wife, and the lack of physical or 
material contact with his daughter for over one year, the impact of the appellant’s removal in my 
opinion is limited to the appellant’ s common -law partner and their child to be born in January 
2019.  
 
[23]  The partner testified that she does not want to return to the Philippines because she has 
always dreamt of Canada as the best country in the world.  She further declares that she could 
not find work in the Philippines as a nurse without first undertaking licensing. She is concerned 
about the conditions in the Philippines and the impact upon a young child.  Although the 
appellant disclosed a number of reports concerning country conditions in the Philip pines,11 I 
agree with the Minister that there was no nexus established to the appellant and his family, in the 
event they choose to join him in that country.  It is a given that conditions in Canada will be 
superior to many other countries in the world.  Bo th the appellant and his partner, however, have 
family networks to rely upon if needed, both for support and infant care.  I find the impact on the 
appellant’s family is a neutral element in my consideration.  
 
The Support available in the broader c ommunity  
 
[24]  The appellant introduced a number of letters of support, primaril y from his workplace of 
almost five  years.  Many of those letters described the appellant as an honest or honourable 
man,12 prompting me to ask if any of the authors were aware of the circum stances giving rise to 
immigration enforcement action being taken against the appellant.  He replied that they did not.  
This diminishes the weight I can give these expressions of support.  Counsel asks that I consider 
them as work references, but that is addressed under my assessment of establishment.  If the 
referees do not know about the reason for the letter, I give the letter little weight.  I find that the 
support available in the broader community is a neutral element in my consideration.  
 
Hardship arising to the Appellant from a Removal to the Philippines  
                                                 
11 Exhibit A -5, pages 10 -18. 
12 Exhibit A -1, pages 77 -87. 
2018 CanLII 139462 (CA IRB)
IAD  File No. / No de dossier  de la SAI:  TB7 -12191  
Client ID No. / No ID client:  8784 -0334  
 
 
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[25]  The appellant was raised and schooled in the Philippines  to the undergraduate level.  He 
left to find better e conomic opportunities in Brunei  and now Canada.  He has extensive family in 
the countr y, where his mother and nephews benefit from remittances he sends regularly to 
support the former’s medical needs and the latter’s schooling.  He does not think he could get as 
well -paying a job in the Philippines.  That would leave open a return to Brunei  or other 
opportunities in the region.  The hardship arising to the appellant is not significant in nature and 
is entirely of his own making.  I find it to be a neutral element in my consideration.  
Best Interest of a Child  
 
[26]  The appellant has two children, one in Canada and the other in the Philippines.  A third 
child is expected to be born in January 2019.  The appellant does not have ongoing relations with 
his living children.  The offers of material support have been declined by both mothers.  They 
will c ontinue to be raised by their respective mothers.  Their best interests are a neutral element 
in my consideration.  
 
[27]  With respect to the unborn child, as the XXXXXXX notes, the child was conceived whilst the 
appellant was already under removal order.  The c onsequences of bring ing  a child into those 
circumstances were well known to the appellant and his partner from the beginning.  It is trite 
law to understand that the Canadian to be born child’s interest are to be found in Canada, raised 
by both parents.  I f the app ellant is, on the other hand, removed and the partner chooses not to 
follow, that will be a parental decision.  The best interest of the child expected in January 2019 
remains a mitigating element in my consideration.  
 
Stay of Removal  
 
[28]  Counsel for  the appellant asked, in the alternative, that a stay of removal be granted.  I 
find no merit to the proposal.  My understanding of stays of removal are to afford the appellant 
an opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation and avoid recidivism, leading to a  reintegration as a 
good member of society.  Rehabilitation , while it is a Ribic  factor , is not included in Wang , as the 
2018 CanLII 139462 (CA IRB)
IAD  File No. / No de dossier  de la SAI:  TB7 -12191  
Client ID No. / No ID client:  8784 -0334  
 
 
 9 
appellant in a misrepresentation removal order appeal already has the desired outcome, namely 
permanent residence fraudulently obtained .  To grant a stay of removal would only serve to give 
the appellant more time in Canada to which he has no legitimate claim from the beginning.  
 
CONCLUSION  
 
[29]  The removal order made against the appellant is valid in law.  The mitigating 
considerations of the appellant’s family in Canada and the best interest of a child, particularly  the 
one expected to be born in January 2019, do not outweigh the aggravating or neutral elements 
outlined in the foregoing analysis.  I find on a balance of probabilities, taking into account the 
best interest of a child directly affected, that sufficient humanitarian considerations do not exist, 
in all the circumstances of the case, to justify granting special relief.  
 
[30]  The appeal is dismissed.  
 
 
 
 
NOTICE OF DECISION  
 
 
The appeal is dismissed.  
 
   XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX    
   XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
 
 
   December 10, 2018    
   Date  
 
 
 
 
Judicial Review – Under section 72 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , you may make an application to 
the Federal Court for judicial review of this decision, with leave of that Court.  You may wish to get advice from 
counsel as soon as possible, since there are time limits for this application.  
2018 CanLII 139462 (CA IRB)

