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o de dossier de la SAI:  TA8-14619 Client ID No. / N
o ID client:  5337-4340 
 
   
Reasons and Decision − Motifs et décision 
 
REMOVAL ORDER   
 Appellant(s) 
RXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Appelant(e)(s)                Respondent 
The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Intimé(e)  
Le ministre de la Sécurité publique et de la Protection civile        Date(s) and Place of Hearing 
 Date(s) et lieu de l’audience  
November 25, 2009 Toronto, Ontario   
   
  Date of Decision 
 Date de la décision  
February 3, 2010   
   
  Panel 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  Tribunal  
   
  Counsel for the Appellant(s) 
 Conseil(s) de l’appelant(e) / des appelant(e)(s)  
LoXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX    
    
  Counsel for the Minister 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXX  Conseil du ministre  
     
 
2010 CanLII 89134 (CA IRB)
 
 
 
Reasons for Decision   Introduction  [1] RaXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (the “Appellant”) brings this appeal under Section 63(3) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act  (the “IRPA”).
1  She seeks to quash the Exclusion Order made against her by Member XXXXXXXXXXX  of the Immigration Division by Notice of Appeal dated June 26, 2008.
2  In his Reasons for Decision of June 26, 2008, Member XXXX found that the Appellant is a person described under Section 40(1)(a) of IRPA.  Specifically, he found that the Appellant is inadmissible for misreprese ntation within the meaning of Section 40(1)(a) of IRPA because she directly or indirectly misreprese nted or withheld “material facts relating to a relevant matter that induce[d] an error in the administration of this Act”.
3  The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (the “Respon dent”) asks that the appeal be dismissed.  Issues  [2] The Appellant challenges the legal validity of  the Exclusion Order on the basis that she was still a dependent of her parents when sh e landed in Canada on March 3, 2005.  She admits that she was married and had given birth to a ch ild before landing in Canada.  She admits that she did not report this new information to an immigration officer, but her non-disclosure was not intentional.  In the alternative, she asks that  the Immigration Appeal Division (“IAD”) exercises its discretionary power to grant her specia l relief on humanitarian and compassionate considerations grounds.
4  Thus, the issues before the panel are whether the Exclusion Order is valid in law and fact; and whether, best interest s of a child directly affected b the decision, sufficient humanitarian and compassionate consider ations exist to warrant the granting of special relief, in light of all the circumstances of this case.                                                  
 
1 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , S.C. 2001, c.27 
2 Record, p.66 
3 Section 40(1)(a) of IRPA 
4 Section 67(1)(c) of IRPA 
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Background  [3] The Appellant is approximately 28-year-old fe male citizen of the Philippines.  She was granted permanent resident status in Cana da and was landed on March 3, 2005, as an accompanying dependent of her father.  Also acco mpanying her father were her older sister and her son, her younger brother and sister.  Her moth er had emigrated from the Philippines earlier and had sponsored her family.  [4] Before the Appellant was granted permanent resi dence status to Canada, she gave birth to a son.  Two days before she emigrated from the Philippines to Canada, she married the father of her son.  On April 4, 2005, a month after the Appellant arrived in Canada, she sent a letter and a sponsorship application to immigration Canada, in which she disclosed and gave details about her son and her husband.
5  Decision  [5] The appeal is dismissed.  The panel finds that, having considered all the evidence in the context of this case, on the balance of probabilities, the Exclusion Order is valid in law and fact.  Further, having weighed all the factors, taking account the best interests of a child directly affected by the decision, the panel is satisfied  that, sufficient humanitarian and compassionate considerations do not exist to warrant special relief, in light of all the circumstances of the case.  The panel reasons are set out below.  Analysis and Findings of Fact  [6] In taking its decision and giving reasons for the disposition of this appeal, the panel considers the Record, which includes the judge ment, the transcript of the Appellant’s inadmissibility hearing before Member XXXX of the Immigration Division, and the documents adduced at that hearing; the Appellant’s oral  testimony; and the oral submissions of both                                                 
 
5 Record, p.61 
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counsel.  Neither the Appellant nor the Respondent adduces any material or relevant documentary evidence.  In addition, the panel relies on several guiding principles enunciated in the jurisprudence of the Immigration Appeal Division and various Courts.  Some of those principles are explained below.  Guiding Principles and Legal Considerations   [7] This appeal is a hearing de novo in its broadest sense.
6  In addition to the Appellant’s viva voce evidence, the panel admits into evidence documentary evidence that was not before Member XXXX in the inadmissibility hearing.  [8] In deciding whether sufficient humanitarian an d compassionate considerations exist, the panel takes into account the standard and onus of proof and the credibility and trustworthiness of the Appellant.  In addition, the panel is guided  by and takes into account the greatest possible factors including, the non-exhaustive factors, or a modification of them, set out in Ribic
7 and endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Chieu
8.  The panel is alive to, and has regard for all the relevant Ribic factors that flow from the factual underpinnings of the Appellant’s case,
9 and is aware that none in itself is determinative of this case.  The weight ascribed to each factor may vary.  In addition, the panel takes into consideration the provision under which the sanction was imposed and its place in the overall scheme of IRPA; the objective of IRPA, and Parliament’s intent both in enacting the IRPA as a whole, and the particular provision at issue.  In addition, the panel is guided by the principle set out in the Chirwa
10 case:                                                  
 
6 Kahlan v. Minister of Employment and Immigration ) (1989), 7 Imm. L.R. (2D) 91 (F.C.A.).  That is, the IAD should conduct its hearing as if the matter is before it for the first time.  The issue is not how the visa officer came to her conclusion, but whether the Applican t is a member of the family class. 
7 XXXXX v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) , [1985] I.A.B.D. No. 4 (QL).  These factors include:  the seriousness of the Appellant’s misrepresentation; the length of time the Appellant has been in Canada and the degree of establishment in Canada; the family and community support available to the Appellant; the possibility of his rehabilitation; the impact the Appellant’s removal from Canada would have on members of the Appellant’s family in Canada; and the hardship the Appellant would face in the country to which he would likely be removed. 
8 XXXXX v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration ), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84, 2002 3 CanLII, paras. 57, 66, 90 and 91.  The Court set out three other principl es on the scope of conducting an appeal. 
9 XXXXXX v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration ) (F.C.A.), 2007 FCA 315 (CanLII), para. 3 
10 XXXXXX v. Canada (Minister of Manpower and Immigration ) (1970), 4 I.A.C. 338 (I.A.B.) 
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“Those facts, established by the evidence, which would excite in a reasonable [person] in a civilized community a desire to relieve the misfortunes of another.”  [9] It is clear that an appellant subject to such a removal order seeks to obtain a discretionary privilege.
11  The broad discretion conferred on the IAD allows permanent resident facing removal to remain in Canada only if  it would be equitable to do so.
12  If the Appellant fails to satisfy the panel that her circumstances warrant special relief, she must be removed.  That is because a non-citizen, who is ordered to be rem oved lawfully from Canada does not have a right to remain in Canada.
13  Generally, immigration is a privilege  not a right, and it is clear in case law that the removal of a person from Canada is not contrary to the principles of fundamental justice and that the enforcement of a de portation order is not contrary to the Charter.
14  [10] In exercising its discretion, the panel strives to  balance the maintaining of the integrity of the immigration system and the public interest in ensuring the lawful conduct of government, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, protecting the privilege, which may flow from the exercise of the discretion and fundamental human rights.  In the circumstances of this case, the panel takes into account the type of the administrative unlawfulness; the seriousness of the Appellant’s misrepresentation and the extent to which it can undermines the immigration system; the importance of the individual rights affected; a nd the likely impact upon the Appellant if the Exclusion Order is allowed to stand.  These factors merge or supplement the Ribic factors adopted by the Court in XXXXX.
15  Standard and Onus of Proof                                                  
 
11 Prata v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration , 1975 CanLII 7 (S.C.C.), [1976] 1 S.C.R. 376, p.380 
12 XXXXX v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration ), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84, 2002 3 CanLII 
13 Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration ) v. XXXXXXXXX, 1992 CanLII 87 (S.C.C.), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711, pp.733-735 
14 See, e.g., Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. XXXXXXXXX , 1992 CanLII 87 (S.C.C.), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711, pp. 733-735; and XXXXXXXXXX v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration ), 2005 SCC 51 (CanLII), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 539 at para. 46 
15 XXXXX v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration ), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84, 2002 3 CanLII , at paras. 57, 66, 90 and 91 
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[11] The Appellant bears the onus to establish why she should be allowed to remain in Canada.
16   The Appellant must prove, on the ba lance of probabilities that sufficient humanitarian and compassionate considerations  exist to warrant the exercise of such extraordinary power.  To meet that onus, the Appe llant is required to give clear, cogent and convincing evidence on material issues.
17  Thus, the panel considers all of the evidence in determining the impact of any inconsistency in the evidence on questions of credibility and reliability pertaining to the material issues in the case.
18  The material issues are set out in Section 40(1)(a) of IRPA.
19  Is the Exclusion Order valid in law or in fact or both?   [12] The panel find that the Exclusion Order is valid  in law and fact.  Further, the panel finds that based on all the evidence in the context of this case, on the balance of probabilities, the Appellant was wilfully blind or intentionally direc tly or indirectly withheld from an immigration officer in Manila that she had given birth to a child, before she was granted permanent residence status and that she was married before she left the Philippines on March 2004.  In addition, the Appellant failed to inform the immigration offi cer upon arriving at the Port-of-Entry, Lester B. Pearson International airport, that her civil status had changed and that she had given birth to a son.  [13] The Appellant's testimony is that she did not inform the immigration officer in Manila or in Canada upon landing that she was married and had given birth to a son.  The Appellant admits that she is aware that the law required her to di sclose information.  She testifies also that she found out she was pregnant as a result of her immigration medical examination.  Therefore, she                                                 
 
16 XXXXX v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration ), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84, 2002 3 CanLII. paras. 57, 66, 90 and 91.  The Court set out three other principl es on the scope of conducting an appeal. 
17  F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53, para. 46 
18 F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53, para. 58 
19 40.(1) Misrepresentation - A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible for misrepresentation 
(a) for directly or indirectly misrepresenting or withholding material facts relating to a relevant matter that 
induces or could induce an error in the administration of this Act; 
[Emphasis added] 
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believed that immigration in Manila knew that she had a son.  She admits that she did not make any attempt to inform Canadian immigration officer in Manila.  She claims that she "did not have the chance" to inform Manila.  She does not gi ve any cogent answer why she did not do so by telephone.  Later in direct evidence, the Appellant claims that she did not notify Manila because she thought because she was 22 years of age at that  time, and "was relying on her parents to tell them what to do" she did not need to inform the immigration authorities.  Still she testifies that upon arriving in Canada "they did not ask about her status".  She avers that upon arrival in Canada, her father had spoken to the immigration officer on their behalf.  She testifies that had the immigration officer asked her about her status she would have told them.  She claims that up to the hearing day, she had never discussed with he r father what he told the immigration officer or what the immigration officer had asked him.  She testifies that upon arriving in Canada, her mother told her that she could sponsor her husband and son.  Considering the Appellant's evidence as a whole, the panel has concerns about her credibility and the trustworthiness of her evidence.  [14] In direct evidence the Appellant admits that  when her mother, the sponsor, found out that she was pregnant she was "mad".  Her mother had expressed concerns about the XXXXXXXXX's eligibility to be sponsored as a dependent child.  She testifies that her mother told her she would find out whether she still is able to sponsor her.  She claims that her mother never got back to her nor did she make any enquiry about it from her mother.  Notably, the XXXXXXXXX's older sister was similarly situated.  Both had a child before receiving permanent resident status and were married a couple days before emigrating from the Phili ppines to Canada.  Both failed to inform an immigration officer in Manila and upon landing in Canada that they were no longer unmarried and that they had a child.  The Appellant testifies that she wrote the letter dated April 4, 2004 and filed a sponsorship application for her son and husband because her "mother told her she could sponsor her family back home".  The pa nel notes that the Appellant's mother gained permanent resident and was landed under the "care giver class".  She then sought to sponsor a family of five, her spouse and four children.  Th e panel does not find it plausible that in those circumstances, "mad" because her two daughters got pregnant and later both marrying, before landing the Appellant's mother did not enquire d iligently and had informed them of the likely 
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outcome should they disclose their status to immigration officer before receiving permanent resident visa and landing.  [15] An immigration officer interviewed the A ppellant on July 18, 2007 to prepare a Report 44(1) and make recommendation wh ether to hold an inadmissibility hearing.  In a Statutory Declaration signed by the Appellant she states the following:
20 
 I asked Ms. XXXXX why did she not advise the Immigr ation Officer at the Port of Entry at the time of landing, that she was married and also that she has a dependant child back in the Philippines.  Ms. XXXXX stated that she was afraid that she woul d not be granted landed status.  She stated that she thought that it would be best to advise us about her change in status after she arrived in Canada, but she failed to advise us of this information.  [Typed as per original document with errors and/or omissions] 
 [16] At the appeal hearing, the Appellant denies making that statement.  She did not deny signing the Declaration.  The Appellant had indicated on the D eclaration that the content of the form had been explained to her in the English language and she "fully understand the nature and effect of these forms".
21  It is apposite to state at this juncture that the Appellant is formally educated with a bachelor degree.  The Appellant evidence at this appeal hearing is the same as "sworn testimony", yet the panel can not accept it  as truthful because the contents of the Declaration is a cogent reason to doubt its veracity.
22  The Appellant made that Declaration over two years before the hearing.  She has had time to  reflect on it and understand the extent of the repercussions of her admission.  [17] Based on all the evidence, in the context of this case, the panel finds that it has no confidence in the Appellant's credibility and the trustworthiness of her evidence.  Further, the panel finds, on the balance of probabilities, that the Appellant's conduct and her admissions from the time of her giving birth to her son, up to th e appeal hearing, do not support a finding of "good faith" on her part.  The panel can not accept that  the Appellant acted in good faith and did not willingly or at least, through wilful blindness wit hheld relevant information from the Canadian                                                 
 
20 Record, p.59 
21 Record, p.60 
22 Maldonado v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration ), [1980] 2 F.C. 302 (C.A.) 
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Embassy in Manila and from an immigration officer  at the Port-of-Entry In the context of all the evidence.  [18] It is clear that the Appellant owes a duty of candour to immigration officer to disclose the change in her civic status.
23  The duty of candour is unqualified:  it is not subject to being asked.  Further, having admitted that she was aware that th e law required her to disclose the change in her civic status, her failure to disclose the info rmation at the Port-of-Entry, constitutes indirect misrepresentation.
24  The panel finds that based on all th e evidence in the context of this case, objectively, one would not believe that the A ppellant reasonably believed that she was not withholding information relevant to her admission.
25   Even if the Appellant had failed to disclose this information unintentionally, or wa s honestly ignorant, such omission is captured by the broad language of Section 40(1) of IRPA.  [19] The panel finds, based on the totality of the evidence in the context of this case, on the balance of probabilities, the Appellant misreprese ntation was withholding her civic status and the fact that she had a son from the immigration offi cer.  More so, the Appellant's civic status is material and relevant because it relates directly to the Appellant's eligibility to be a sponsored dependent child:  whether she is still admissible.  It is clear that a sponsored dependent must remain eligible from the moment the application is filed up to the instant of landing.  Any change in status must be reported to an immigration o fficer.  The Appellant's failure to disclose her son precluded an immigration officer from exam ining him or determining whether he was admissible, although having a son alone would not have rendered him inadmissible.  Also, she did not disclose that she was married.  Likely, an immigration officer, at the very least, may have wished to decide whether to examine the Appellant's spouse to determine his admissibility.  Further, an immigration officer was precl uded from deciding whether the Appellant was inadmissible and therefore, her family unit too wa s inadmissible, within the meaning of Section                                                 
 
23 XXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXXX v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (F.C., no. IMM-4736-07) XXXXXXX, Jul 9, 2008; 2008 FC 848 
24 XXXX, XXXXXXXXXX v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (F.C., no. IMM-5815-04), XXXXXXX, August 3, 2005; 2005 FC 1059 
25 XXXXX v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration  ), [1990] F.C. 435 (C.A.) 
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42 of IRPA.  The Appellant's misrepresentation preclud ed the immigration officer from carrying out further statutory enquiries or examination.
26  The panel finds, on the balance of probabilities, based on all the evidence in this case, that the Appellant's failure to inform an immigration officer that she had a son and that she was married before she was landed on March 3, 2005, induced or could have induced an error in the administration of IRPA.  [20] Based on all the evidence in the context of th is case, on the balance or probabilities, the panel finds that the Appellant is a permanent re sident who is inadmissible for misrepresentation because she directly or indirectly withheld material facts relating to her civic status and admissibility that induced or could have induced an error in the administration of IRPA.  Therefore, the Exclusion Order is valid in law and fact.  Are there sufficient humanitarian and compassion ate considerations to warrant special relief in light of in all the circumstances of the case?  [21] The panel considers next the sufficiency of humanitarian and compassionate considerations by a factual evaluation of the Ribic factors.  The Seriousness of the Appellant’s Conduct that Resulted in the Exclusion Order   [22] Implicitly, to preserve the integrity of th e immigration system, Parliament created a structure by enacting IRPA, and through the Regulations.  By inference, Parliament intends that priority be given to protect the integrity of the im migration system.  Consistent with that priority scheme and objectives, Parliament created a new statutory scheme where persons found to have misrepresented or withheld material information are inadmissible:  Section 40(1).  Parliament's commitment to upholding that schema is evince d by the blunt and irrevocable sanctions it has imposed for such misrepresentation, intent ional or not, under Section 117(9)(d) of the Regulations.
27  One found to have contravened Secti on 40(1) is excluded from Canada for two                                                 
 
26 XXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration , (F.C., no. IMM-309-07, O'Reilly, December 11, 2007; 2007 FC 1299 
27 Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations made under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , and 
the Financial Administration Act SOR/2002-227, as am. S.C. 2002, c. 8 
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years.  And in the case as here, where the Appe llant had not disclosed to an immigration officer that she had a son or a spouse, she is barred for life from sponsoring them.  [23] Generally, everyone who seeks to obtain permanent resident status in Canada must satisfy an officer that he or she is not  inadmissible and meets the requirement of IRPA.
28  In extending the privilege to a foreign national to immigrate to Canada, significant trust is placed in an applicant to provide accurate information through a strong self-reporting scheme.  The admissibility of an applicant is assessed on the contents of the application.  That observation is buttressed by the fact that, of the millions of a pplications made to visa posts for entry into Canada, only a small sampling is required to attend in-person interviews regarding the bona fides of the content of their application.  Given the strong self-reporting scheme, Parliament enacted several provisions to help preserve th e integrity of the immigration system.
29  Thus, the exercise of the discretionary power must be tethered to the entire statutory scheme, especially the preservation of the integrity of the system.  Thus, the threshold for the application of humanitarian and compassionate considerati ons where the Appellant is found to have intentionally misrepresented material facts must be at a very highest spectrum of the threshold.  [24] The panel finds, on the balance of probabilities, in the context of all the evidence in this case, that the Appellant intentionally misrep resented her civic status to the immigration authorities.  That the XXXXXXXXX married her husband after she received her permanent resident visa and couple days before emigrating from the Ph ilippines to Canada is not happenstance.  It                                                                                                                                                             
 
117.(1) Member - A foreign national is a member of the family class if, with respect to a sponsor, the foreign 
national is 
(9) Excluded relationships - A foreign national shall not be consider ed a member of the family class by 
virtue of their relationship to a sponsor if 
(d) subject to subsection (10), the sponsor previously  made an application for permanent residence and 
became a permanent resident and, at the time of that application, the foreign national was a non-
accompanying family member of th e sponsor and was not examined. 
(10) Exception - Subject to subsection (11), paragraph (9)( d) does not apply in respect of a foreign national 
referred to in that paragraph who was not examined becau se an officer determined that they were not required 
by the Act or the former Act, as applicable, to be examined. 
28 Section 11(1) of IRPA 
29 In XXXXXX v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration ), 2008 FC 307 (CanLII), the Federal Court held that misrepresentation engages public policy consider ations of the integrity of the immigration system.  
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seems like a calculated plan.  The Appellant was unde r a clear positive obligation to disclose to an immigration officer that her civic status had changed after the permanent resident visa was issued.
30  She did not.  An aggravating factor is that the Appellant has not been forthcoming about her actions.  Up to the day of the hearing,  she contends that she was not asked about her status, but had she been asked she would have di sclosed her status.  That position came after she had executed a Statutory Declaration admitting th at she had withheld the information because she was afraid she would not be granted landing.  In assessing the Appellant’s conduct, the panel notes that it was deliberate and had a specific pur pose, to enter and remain in Canada.  That is still the Appellant's overarching purpose to day.  The Appellant did not confess her misrepresentation.  Rather it was disclosed, only  after she was landed and felt confident that she was safe to sponsor her husband and son.  [25] It is clear that section 40(1)(a) and 45(d) of IRPA were enacted to help preserve the integrity of the system.  The Appellant’s con duct is, in particular the manner in which she entered Canada and remained in Canada is critical against the exercise of humanitarian and compassionate considerations in this case.  To adopt XXXXXXXXXXX reasoning,
31 the Appellant’s misrepresentation engaged a key public policy of the integrity of the immigration system.  In light of all the circumstances in this case, the Appellant has a very high hurdle to overcome to be successful in this appeal.                                                  
 
30 51. Examination — permanent residents -  A foreign national who holds a permanent resident visa and is 
seeking to become a permanent resident mu st, at the time of their examination,  
(a) inform the officer if 
(i) the foreign national has become a spouse or common-law partner or has ceased to be a spouse, 
common-law partner or conjugal partner after the visa was issued, or 
(ii) material facts relevant to the issuance of the vi sa have changed since the visa was issued or were not 
divulged when it was issued; and 
(b) establish that they and their fa mily members, whether accompanying or not, meet the requirements of the 
Act and these Regulations. 
31 XXXXXX v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration ), 2008 FC 307 (CanLII) 
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The Possibility of Rehabilitation and Likelihood of Repeat Behaviour   [26] Whether the Appellant has shown real contri tion is an apt equivalent factor to the possibility of rehabilitation.  [27] As noted above, during the appeal hearing, the Appellant does not admit that she has done anything wrong.  She argues that even though she was married, she was still a dependent of her parents because she was still attending school.  However, she admits that her mother had instructed her to keep attending school after she gr aduated, so that she could remain eligible as a dependent.  During that time, he mother paid her tuition fees.  The Appellant's overarching priority is to come to Canada and remain, even  if it means that she will not be with her son because she cannot sponsor him.  The panel is no t satisfied that the Appellant would not do the same thing again if given the opportunity.  This  factor weighs heavily against exercise of humanitarian and compassionate grounds.  The Appellant’s Establishment in Canada   [28] In determining the degree of the Appellant's  arriving establishment in Canada, the panel considers the length of time the Appellant has spent in Canada and his economic and social factors.
32  (a) Length of Time the Appellant has spent in Canada
  [29] The Appellant has been in Canada since March 3, 2005.  She has spent four of her 27 years in Canada.  She was born, raised and educated and started her own family in the Philippines.  In her four years in Canada, she has been employed during this time at a baguette cafe, all of which she has gained because of her misrepresentation.  The Appellant’s immigration history and the way in which she entered and remained in Canada are important factors.
33  It is                                                 
 
32 XXXXXXXXX v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration ) (1995), 29 Imm. L.R. (2d) 259 (F.C.T.D.) 
33 XXXXXXX v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 4 F.C. 358 (C.A.), p.2 
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clear from his evidence that she and her family came to Canada to improve their economic status.  This element weighs very little in the Appellant's favour.  (b) The Extent of the Appellant’s Economic Establishment
  [30] As noted earlier the Appellant has worked steadily since she came to Canada.  She testifies that she works two jobs:  one full-time and one part-time.  She claims she has little savings because she remits her money to the Philippines to support her son and her husband, when he was alive.  Her testimony is she has pa rtial ownership in a house her parents bought in September 2009.  The Appellant claims that sh e contributed less than $1,000.  Her contribution to the mortgage is $500 per month.  Notably, this  was done after she had received the Exclusion Order.  This evidence was not supported by any documentary evidence.  It is reasonable to ask why the Appellant would purchase a house when she is aware she is under an Exclusion Order.  Her interest in real property is a product of her misrepresentation.
34 The panel does not consider these extraordinary achievements to excite th e exercise of humanitarian and compassionate relief.  (c) The Extent of the Appellant’s Social Establishment
  [31] As noted above, the Appellant's mother came to Canada under the care-giver class.  She sponsored the remaining family members:  her husband, three daughters and a son.  These are the extent of the XXXXXXXXX's family in Canada.  The XXXXXXXXX adduces no cogent evidence regarding any form of community support.  At the hear ing, her employer attended, ready and willing to give evidence that she is employed by his company and is a hard worker.  That is not being contested.  Based on all the evidence in the context of this case, the panel finds that this element weighs moderately in the Appellant's favour.                                                  
 
34 Asuncion, XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration  (F.C., no. IMM-10231-04) Rouleau, July 20, 2005; 2005 FC 1002 
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[32] In sum, looking at the three elements of th is factor, based on all the evidence in the context of this case, on the balance or probabilities, this factor weighs moderately in the Appellant's favour.  Family and Community Support in  Canada and Dislocation to them if the Appellant is Removed  [33] The Appellant testifies that she lives with her parents.  She did not give any cogent evidence about the emotional support she gives or receives from them or her siblings.  As noted above, she claims that she contributes $500 per mont h to the mortgage, which she claims is half the mortgage payment.  However, she testifies that both parents work.  She has one sibling who still attends school.  The panel finds that the A ppellant's relative will experience hardship if removed.  However, the Appellant does not addu ce any cogent evidence on which the panel can assess whether her relatives will suffer disproportionate hardship is she is excluded.  In the circumstance, the panel gives little weight to this factor.  Extent of Hardship the Appellant may suffer if  he Returns to his Country of Nationality   [34] It appears from all the evidence, the A ppellant's sole ground for humanitarian and compassionate considerations is family reuni fication, but only in Canada, although she has a young son in the Philippines who she has not seen  since he was four months old.  Family reunification in Canada is an objective of IRPA.  Implicitly, in the objectives enunciated in Section 3 of IRPA, Parliament intends to give importance to  family reunification, but that is not an unqualified importance.  Family reunificati on does not take priority over the other the objectives, or, the preservation of the integrity of the immigration system.  By inference, the Appellant's position is that she and her son would face hardship if she is removed from Canada.  To adopt the ruling of XXXXX, J. in Ibraheem, humanitarian and compassionate considerations exemption is not designed to eliminate hardship ; rather, it is designed to provide relief from "unusual, undeserved and disproportionate hardship".
35  To iterate, the Appellant adduces no                                                 
 
35 Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Ibraheem, XXXXXXXXXXXX  (F.C., no. IMM-1658-06), Blais, October 6, 2006; 2006 FCC 1197, citing with approval (Irimie) 
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cogent evidence to satisfy the panel that she would experience undue hardship if removed to the Philippines.  [35] The Appellant was born, raised and educated in  the Philippines.  Notably, she has degree from a university in the Philippines.  She speak s the language and understands the culture.  She testifies that she has relatives still living there:  three maternal two paternal aunts.  She testifies that her mother makes remittances to them from tim e to time.  Her in-laws still reside there; they are the principal caregiver for her five-year-old son since he was four months.  Before the Appellant came to Canada, her mother supported her even to extent for her to remain eligible for sponsorship.  There is no cogent evidence before the panel that the Appellant would be able to find work in the Philippines and her family in Ca nada would not continue to support her and her son as they did before.  Based on all the evidence in the context of this case, this factor weighs moderately in the Appellant's favour.  Best Interests of a Child affected directly by the Decision  [36] To iterate, before the Appellant received her permanent resident visa she gave birth to a son.  She married just two days before she emig rated to Canada.  She left behind a four-month- old child and her spouse.  Regrettably, her spous e died, leaving her son to be raised by his paternal grandparents.  Despite the demise of her spouse, the Appellant has not returned to the Philippines.  She states that her in-laws take care of her son and she is content with the quality of care that he received.  She claims that her in-l aws are not well off and she is the only support for her son.  The panel notes that for four months afte r the birth of her son, the XXXXXXXXX lived in the Philippines and was supported by her parents.  [37] Likely, the Appellant son would be affected by this decision, perhaps economically.  The XXXXXXXXX testimony is that she is his sole support.   She claims that her greatest concern is her son's wellbeing.  Oddly though, she hastens to add st ridently that although it is "hard, painful and depressing" to leave her son, she chose to stay in Canada rather than return to care for him, to ensure that he has a brighter future.  Doing so, she argues, would enable her to send her son to a "better school and ensure a brighter future" for hi m, even if she is never allowed to sponsor him 
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to join her in Canada.  The panel can not appreciate this from the Appellant's perspective.  The panel finds, based on all the evidence in the context of this case, on the balance of probabilities, it is in the best interests of the Appellant's ch ild having his mother return to the Philippines to nurture him.  There is no cogent evidence before  the panel that the child would not receive the necessaries of life if the XXXXXXXXX is removed from Canada.  Further, the likelihood of the child immigrating to Canada is slim given the fact that he is a non-accompanying family member who an immigration officer did not examine because  he was not disclosed.  Adopting Barnes J. Finding in XXXXXXXXXXXX,
36 it is reasonable to conclude that the best interest of the Appellant's child would be served if the Appellant is removed.  Her removal likely will facilitate family reunion with her young son as oppose to hardship.  [38] After evaluating all the evidence in the cont ext of this case, the panel finds, on the balance of probabilities, the removal order is valid in law and fact.  The Appellant’s circumstances are not compelling or present any unique or special circumstances to meet the XXXXXX standard for equitable relief.  Having assesse d all the evidence and balanced the factors, the panel concludes, taking into account the best  interests of a child directly affected b the decision, in light of all the circumstances of th is case, sufficient humanitarian and compassionate considerations do not exist to warrant special relief.  [39] For all the reasons stated above, the panel dismisses the appeal.  
 
                                                
 
36 XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX v. (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness ), (F.C., no. IMM- 1151-07), Barnes, December 14, 2007; F.C. 1325 
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NOTICE OF DECISION   The appeal is dismissed
.         “ Patricia E. DeGuire”  
    XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX       February 3, 2010  
    Date      
Judicial Review – Under section 72 of the Immigration an d Refugee Protection Act, you may make an application to 
the Federal Court for judicial review of this decision, with  leave of that Court.  You may wish to get advice from 
counsel as soon as possible, since there are time limits for this application. 
 
2010 CanLII 89134 (CA IRB)

