 
 Immigration and  Refugee Board Immigration Appeal Division  
 Commission de l’immigration  et du statut de réfugiéSection d’appel de l’immigration
 IAD File No. / N
o de dossier de la SAI : MA7-02632 Client ID No. / N
o ID client : 3538-2769  
Reasons and Decision − Motifs et décision Sponsorship Appeal  
 Appellant(s)  Appelant(s)
Djoni  XXXXXXX 
Respondent   Intimé
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Ministre de la CitoyennetéXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
Date(s) of Hearing   Date(s) de l’audience
September 22, 2008  
Place of Hearing   Lieu de l’audience
Montréal 
Date of Decision   Date de la décision
January 6, 2009 
Panel   Tribunal
XXXXXXXXXXX 
Appellant’s Counsel   Conseil de l’appelant
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
Minister’s Counsel   Conseil de l’intimé
Me XXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
2009 CanLII 35655 (CA IRB)
IAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAI : MA7-02632 Client ID No. / N
o ID client : 3538-2769 2   
 Reasons for Decision 
[1] XXXXXXXXXXXXX (the appellant) is appealing, under subsection 63(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
1 (the Act), from the refusal of the application for permanent residence filed by his wife, XXXXXXXXXXXXX (the applicant). [2] In his letter of refusal, the counsellor at the Ca nadian Embassy in Moscow (Russia) stated that, in his opinion, the marriage between the appellant and the applicant was not genuine and was entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiri ng a status or privilege under the Act. [3] In order for the appeal to be allowed, the ap pellant must show, based on a balance of the evidence, that the applicant is not a person referred to in section 4 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations
2 (the Regulations), which reads as follows: 
4. For the purposes of these Regulations, a forei gn national shall not be considered a spouse, a common-law partner, a conjugal partner or an adopted child of a person if the marriage, common-law partnership, conjugal partnership or adoption is not genuine and was entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring any status or privilege under the Act. 
[4] The panel heard the appellant’s testimony. The ap plicant testified by telephone from Russia. [5] The appellant is a 52-year-old man and the applicant is a 51-year-old woman. They were married in 1977 and divorced in Ap ril 1997. They have two sons together, aged 30 and 27. The appellant arrived in Canada via the United States  in March 1998 and claimed refugee status. In January 1999, while in Montréal, he met the wo man he would marry on September 12, 1999. They were separated in 2000 and divorced on March 6, 2003. The appellant returned to Russia and married the applicant on April 11, 2003. They have kept in contact by telephone and, since 2004, through annual visits by the appellant to Russia that last several months at a time. 
                                                           
1  Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , S.C. 2001, c. 27. 
2  Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations , SOR/2002-227, as amended. 
2009 CanLII 35655 (CA IRB)
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 [6] In his letter of refusal, the counsellor not ed the applicant’s limited knowledge when interviewed of the appellant’s personal life and her confusion regarding important dates and facts about their relationship, the discrepancies between  the answers she provided in the interview and those she provided on the forms, as well as the lack  of documentary evidence of her contact with the appellant over the years. [7] When asked how he became a permanent resident of Canada, the appellant answered that he became a permanent resident when his second wife sponsored him in October 1999. The panel notes that, according to the appellant, his claim for refug ee protection was rejected in the summer of 1999. He married his second wife soon after, in September 1999. He was granted permanent resident status on August 7, 2000, and was separated from his second wife during the same year, according to his testimony. As soon as his divorce was final on March 6, 2003, the appellant went to Russia. He proposed to the applicant on March 31, 2003,
3 and they were married on April 11, 2003. The panel is of the opinion that the chronology of these events is  not fortuitous and that it seems to indicate a well-organized plan: a second, short-term marriage to  obtain legal status in Canada, a separation as soon as this status was obtained, and a marriage to th e applicant as soon as the divorce was final. The circumstances surrounding the marriage between the appellant and the applicant, as well as their testimony regarding their relationship, highlight the couple’s lack of credibility. [8] Four days after his divorce, the appellant a rrived in Russia on March 10, 2003. He testified that it was to visit his sick mother and that he had stayed with his sister. However, he added that, while visiting his sons two or three weeks later, he  renewed his acquaintance with the applicant, who was living with his sons. The panel finds it implausibl e that after having no contact for five years the appellant and the applicant decided to resume coha bitation after only a few days. This is even more implausible given that, according to the appellant, he had neither seen nor spoken to the applicant between 1997 (date they were divorced) and 2003 (date they were reunited), even when he spoke by telephone to his sons, who were living with their mother. Despite five years of absolutely no communication, they were married after only a few days of contact. The panel does not believe that the couple’s relationship is genuine but that it is intended to bring the applicant to Canada. 
                                                           
3  Appeal Book, page 27. 
2009 CanLII 35655 (CA IRB)
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 [9] The appellant testified that he divorced the applicant in 1997, owing to his difficult relationship with his father-in-law, which had existe d since his marriage in 1977, and the fact that his wife was taking care of her father. Yet, when he remarried the applicant in April 2003, the situation had not changed, as his father-in-law was still living with her. When asked whether in 1997 he and the applicant had considered other alternatives to divor ce to ensure that his father-in-law would be cared for, the appellant simply answered that according to their traditions, children take care of their parents. The appellant’s answer is not credible; if children traditionally take care of their parents, the appellant should have anticipated that at some point the applicant would have to provide care for her father. The panel notes that the appellant did not provide any evidence of his father-in-law’s illness. [10] The applicant’s statements during her inte rview on November 2, 2006, contradict the appellant’s testimony. She stated that they had kept  in contact by mail and by telephone after he left for Canada and that he had sent money both to her and to their sons.
4 The appellant attempted to explain this contradiction by saying that she was probably referring to his contact with their sons. The panel does not find him credible, since in her inte rview, the applicant mentioned letters that the appellant had sent her. The appellant explained that th ey were letters to his sons. In any event, there is no evidence to substantiate their claims, since they did not submit the letters, though they were at the applicant’s home. The appellant also testified more than once that during the family dinner at their 2003 wedding, his father-in-law was not in the same r oom but in the next room, as he was bedridden. The applicant, however, testified that her father was in the same room as the other family members during the wedding dinner. They did not provide a photograph of the event as evidence, whereas the appellant submitted photographs from his aunt’s 70th birthday. [11] When asked to explain why he had waited three years to sponsor the applicant, the appellant replied that it was the consultant’s fault, as he  had done nothing for a year. The panel does not find him credible, since the immigration procedure and forms to fill out are not unknown to the appellant; he has filled out forms in the past as part of his claim for refugee protection and his permanent resident status. Also, the applicant contradicts his testimony. She claimed in her interview that she had a small business to sell and that she needed time to  think about her future. She did not mention having any problems with a consultant, although the appella nt alleged that he had told her of them. The 
                                                           
4  Appeal Book, page 21. 
2009 CanLII 35655 (CA IRB)
IAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAI : MA7-02632 Client ID No. / N
o ID client : 3538-2769 5   
 applicant also testified that she had decided to liv e with the appellant in Canada after they were married, which contradicts what she said in her inte rview. At the hearing, the appellant added another reason for the three-year delay: the applicant was afraid of leaving their sons but he had reassured her, saying that their sons could join them in Canada . The panel does not find him credible. Their sons applied for Canadian visitor’s visas in Ma y 2006, which were refused on grounds of misrepresentation.
5 The appellant testified that between 1998 and 2003, he was receiving welfare benefits and was not working. He explained th at, in 2003, he had found seasonal employment and spent several months a year in Russia, leaving Canada with a Russian passport and returning to Canada with a Canadian passport. [12] When the appellant alleged that the applican t stopped working in 1994 to take care of her father, he was confronted with his perm anent resident status application form,
6 which states that she worked until September 2002, and then again from January 2003 to January 2004. He adjusted his testimony to state that she had worked part- time while she was caring for her father. When interviewed in 2006, the applicant twice showed total ignorance of the appellant’s marriage in Canada, whereas according to him, he had told  her about it in 2003, when they renewed their acquaintance. The appellant sent her money once or tw ice a year; yet, according to the applicant, it was once a month. [13] The telephone statements submitted as evidence by the appellant are mostly untranslated,
7 and the panel does not give them any probative value.  In addition, according to the appellant’s testimony, the telephone numbers highlighted on the statemen ts belonged to his sons’ cellphone. When asked why he had not submitted statements of his calls to the applicant, since she owns her own cellphone, the appellant replied that she would forget to rechar ge it and would not take it with her when she went out, whereas the applicant testified that she ha d lost her cellphone. The calling cards submitted as evidence do not show the identity or the telephone number of the person who placed or received the call, the date the call was made or the place it or iginated from. The panel cannot give them any probative value. 
                                                           
5  Appeal Book, page 21. 
6  Appeal Book, page 10. 
7  Exhibits A-1 and A-2. 
2009 CanLII 35655 (CA IRB)
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 [14] Considering the foregoing, the panel does not find either the appellant or the applicant credible. In his conclusions, counsel for the appella nt argues that there was a miscarriage of justice because the person who interviewed the applicant at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow is not the same person who signed the refusal letter. The fact that the person who wrote the letter of refusal based their decision on the notes taken by the person who interviewed the applicant is not a miscarriage of justice. Moreover, the appellant has made use of the recourse available to him by filing an appeal. He has been heard and has called the app licant to testify. His rights have in no way been infringed and the panel can find no breach of natural justice. [15] The appellant has not shown, based on a balance of the evidence, that his marriage to the applicant is genuine or that it was not entered into  primarily for the purpose of acquiring a status or privilege under the Act.  Conclusion [16] The refusal of the application is valid in law. [17] The applicant is a person referred to in section 4 of the Regulations. [18] The appeal is dismissed. 
2009 CanLII 35655 (CA IRB)
IAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAI : MA7-02632 Client ID No. / N
o ID client : 3538-2769 7   
  
NOTICE OF DECISION 
 The appeal is dismissed.    XXXXXXXXXXX  XXXXXXXXXXX 
 Janua ry 6, 2009  Date 
 
2009 CanLII 35655 (CA IRB)

