this report is submitted to the attorney general pursuant to 28 c.f.r. § 600.8(c), which




states that, “[a]t the conclusion of the special counsel’s work, he . . . shall provide the attorney




general a confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions [the special




counsel] reached.”




the russian government interfered in the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and




systematic fashion. evidence of russian government operations began to surface in mid-2016. in




june, the democratic national committee and its cyber response team publicly announced that




russian hackers had compromised its computer network. releases of hacked materials—hacks




that public reporting soon attributed to the russian government—began that same month.




additional releases followed in july through the organization wikileaks, with further releases in




october and november.




in late july 2016, soon after wikileaks’s first release of stolen documents, a foreign




government contacted the fbi about a may 2016 encounter with trump campaign foreign policy




advisor george papadopoulos. papadopoulos had suggested to a representative of that foreign




government that the trump campaign had received indications from the russian government that




it could assist the campaign through the anonymous release of information damaging to




democratic presidential candidate hillary clinton. that information prompted the fbi on july




31, 2016, to open an investigation into whether individuals associated with the trump campaign




were coordinating with the russian government in its interference activities.




that fall, two federal agencies jointly announced that the russian government “directed




recent compromises of e-mails from us persons and institutions, including us political




organizations,” and, “[t]hese thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the us election




process.” after the election, in late december 2016, the united states imposed sanctions on russia




for having interfered in the election. by early 2017, several congressional committees were




examining russia’s interference in the election.




within the executive branch, these investigatory efforts ultimately led to the may 2017




appointment of special counsel robert s. mueller, iii. the order appointing the special counsel




authorized him to investigate “the russian government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016




presidential election,” including any links or coordination between the russian government and




individuals associated with the trump campaign.




as set forth in detail in this report, the special counsel’s investigation established that




russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election principally through two operations. first, a




russian entity carried out a social media campaign that favored presidential candidate donald j.




trump and disparaged presidential candidate hillary clinton. second, a russian intelligence




service conducted computer-intrusion operations against entities, employees, and volunteers




working on the clinton campaign and then released stolen documents. the investigation also




identified numerous links between the russian government and the trump campaign. although




the investigation established that the russian government perceived it would benefit from a trump




presidency and worked to secure that outcome, and that the campaign expected it would benefit




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electorally from information stolen and released through russian efforts, the investigation did not




establish that members of the trump campaign conspired or coordinated with the russian




government in its election interference activities.




below we describe the evidentiary considerations underpinning statements about the




results of our investigation and the special counsel’s charging decisions, and we then provide an




overview of the two volumes of our report.




the report describes actions and events that the special counsel’s office found to be




supported by the evidence collected in our investigation. in some instances, the report points out




the absence of evidence or conflicts in the evidence about a particular fact or event. in other




instances, when substantial, credible evidence enabled the office to reach a conclusion with




confidence, the report states that the investigation established that certain actions or events




occurred. a statement that the investigation did not establish particular facts does not mean there




was no evidence of those facts.




in evaluating whether evidence about collective action of multiple individuals constituted




a crime, we applied the framework of conspiracy law, not the concept of “collusion.” in so doing,




the office recognized that the word “collud[e]” was used in communications with the acting




attorney general confirming certain aspects of the investigation’s scope and that the term has




frequently been invoked in public reporting about the investigation. but collusion is not a specific




offense or theory of liability found in the united states code, nor is it a term of art in federal




criminal law. for those reasons, the office’s focus in analyzing questions of joint criminal liability




was on conspiracy as defined in federal law. in connection with that analysis, we addressed the




factual question whether members of the trump campaign “coordinat[ed]”—a term that appears




in the appointment order—with russian election interference activities. like collusion,




“coordination” does not have a settled definition in federal criminal law. we understood




coordination to require an agreement—tacit or express—between the trump campaign and the




russian government on election interference. that requires more than the two parties taking




actions that were informed by or responsive to the other’s actions or interests. we applied the term




coordination in that sense when stating in the report that the investigation did not establish that the




trump campaign coordinated with the russian government in its election interference activities.




the report on our investigation consists of two volumes:




volume i describes the factual results of the special counsel’s investigation of russia’s




interference in the 2016 presidential election and its interactions with the trump campaign.




section i describes the scope of the investigation. sections ii and iii describe the principal ways




russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election. section iv describes links between the russian




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government and individuals associated with the trump campaign. section v sets forth the special




counsel’s charging decisions.




volume ii addresses the president’s actions towards the fbi’s investigation into russia’s




interference in the 2016 presidential election and related matters, and his actions towards the




special counsel’s investigation. volume ii separately states its framework and the considerations




that guided that investigation.




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executive summary to volume i




russian social media campaign




the internet research agency (ira) carried out the earliest russian interference




operations identified by the investigation—a social media campaign designed to provoke and




amplify political and social discord in the united states. the ira was based in st. petersburg,




russia, and received funding from russian oligarch yevgeniy prigozhin and companies he




controlled. prigozhin is widely reported to have ties to russian president vladimir putin,




harm to ongoing matter




in mid-2014, the ira sent employees to the united states on an intelligence-gathering




mission with instructions




harm to ongoing matter




the ira later used social media accounts and interest groups to sow discord in the u.s.




political system through what it termed “information warfare.” the campaign evolved from a




generalized program designed in 2014 and 2015 to undermine the u.s. electoral system, to a




targeted operation that by early 2016 favored candidate trump and disparaged candidate clinton.




the ira’s operation also included the purchase of political advertisements on social media in the




names of u.s. persons and entities, as well as the staging of political rallies inside the united




states. to organize those rallies, ira employees posed as u.s. grassroots entities and persons and




made contact with trump supporters and trump campaign officials in the united states. the




investigation did not identify evidence that any u.s. persons conspired or coordinated with the




ira. section ii of this report details the office’s investigation of the russian social media




campaign.




russian hacking operations




at the same time that the ira operation began to focus on supporting candidate trump in




early 2016, the russian government employed a second form of interference: cyber intrusions




(hacking) and releases of hacked materials damaging to the clinton campaign. the russian




intelligence service known as the main intelligence directorate of the general staff of the russian




army (gru) carried out these operations.




in march 2016, the gru began hacking the email accounts of clinton campaign




volunteers and employees, including campaign chairman john podesta. in april 2016, the gru




hacked into the computer networks of the democratic congressional campaign committee




(dccc) and the democratic national committee (dnc). the gru stole hundreds of thousands




of documents from the compromised email accounts and networks. around the time that the dnc




announced in mid-june 2016 the russian government’s role in hacking its network, the gru




began disseminating stolen materials through the fictitious online personas “dcleaks” and




“guccifer 2.0.” the gru later released additional materials through the organization wikileaks.




the presidential campaign of donald j. trump (“trump campaign” or “campaign”)




showed interest in wikileaks’s releases of documents and welcomed their potential to damage




candidate clinton. beginning in june 2016,




harm to ongoing matter




forecast to




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senior campaign officials that wikileaks would release information damaging to candidate




clinton. wikileaks’s first release came in july 2016. around the same time, candidate trump




announced that he hoped russia would recover emails described as missing from a private server




used by clinton when she was secretary of state (he later said that he was speaking sarcastically).




wikileaks began releasing




harm to ongoing matter




podesta’s stolen emails on october 7, 2016, less than one hour after a u.s. media outlet released




video considered damaging to candidate trump. section iii of this report details the office’s




investigation into the russian hacking operations, as well as other efforts by trump campaign




supporters to obtain clinton-related emails.




russian contacts with the campaign




the social media campaign and the gru hacking operations coincided with a series of




contacts between trump campaign officials and individuals with ties to the russian government.




the office investigated whether those contacts reflected or resulted in the campaign conspiring




or coordinating with russia in its election-interference activities. although the investigation




established that the russian government perceived it would benefit from a trump presidency and




worked to secure that outcome, and that the campaign expected it would benefit electorally from




information stolen and released through russian efforts, the investigation did not establish that




members of the trump campaign conspired or coordinated with the russian government in its




election interference activities.




the russian contacts consisted of business connections, offers of assistance to the




campaign, invitations for candidate trump and putin to meet in person, invitations for campaign




officials and representatives of the russian government to meet, and policy positions seeking




improved u.s.-russian relations. section iv of this report details the contacts between russia




and the trump campaign during the campaign and transition periods, the most salient of which




are summarized below in chronological order.




2015. some of the earliest contacts were made in connection with a trump organization




real-estate project in russia known as trump tower moscow. candidate trump signed a letter




of intent for trump tower moscow by november 2015, and in january 2016 trump organization




executive michael cohen emailed and spoke about the project with the office of russian




government press secretary dmitry peskov. the trump organization pursued the project through




at least june 2016, including by considering travel to russia by cohen and candidate trump.




spring 2016. campaign foreign policy advisor george papadopoulos made early contact




with joseph mifsud, a london-based professor who had connections to russia and traveled to




moscow in april 2016. immediately upon his return to london from that trip, mifsud told




papadopoulos that the russian government had “dirt” on hillary clinton in the form of thousands




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of emails. one week later, in the first week of may 2016, papadopoulos suggested to a




representative of a foreign government that the trump campaign had received indications from




the russian government that it could assist the campaign through the anonymous release of




information damaging to candidate clinton. throughout that period of time and for several months




thereafter, papadopoulos worked with mifsud and two russian nationals to arrange a meeting




between the campaign and the russian government. no meeting took place.




summer 2016. russian outreach to the trump campaign continued into the summer of




2016, as candidate trump was becoming the presumptive republican nominee for president. on




june 9, 2016, for example, a russian lawyer met with senior trump campaign officials donald




trump jr., jared kushner, and campaign chairman paul manafort to deliver what the email




proposing the meeting had described as “official documents and information that would




incriminate hillary.” the materials were offered to trump jr. as “part of russia and its




government’s support for mr. trump.” the written communications setting up the meeting




showed that the campaign anticipated receiving information from russia that could assist




candidate trump’s electoral prospects, but the russian lawyer’s presentation did not provide such




information.




days after the june 9 meeting, on june 14, 2016, a cybersecurity firm and the dnc




announced that russian government hackers had infiltrated the dnc and obtained access to




opposition research on candidate trump, among other documents.




in july 2016, campaign foreign policy advisor carter page traveled in his personal capacity




to moscow and gave the keynote address at the new economic school. page had lived and worked




in russia between 2003 and 2007. after returning to the united states, page became acquainted




with at least two russian intelligence officers, one of whom was later charged in 2015 with




conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent of russia. page’s july 2016 trip to moscow and his




advocacy for pro-russian foreign policy drew media attention. the campaign then distanced itself




from page and, by late september 2016, removed him from the campaign.




july 2016 was also the month wikileaks first released emails stolen by the gru from the




dnc. on july 22, 2016, wikileaks posted thousands of internal dnc documents revealing




information about the clinton campaign. within days, there was public reporting that u.s.




intelligence agencies had “high confidence” that the russian government was behind the theft of




emails and documents from the dnc. and within a week of the release, a foreign government




informed the fbi about its may 2016 interaction with papadopoulos and his statement that the




russian government could assist the trump campaign. on july 31, 2016, based on the foreign




government reporting, the fbi opened an investigation into potential coordination between the




russian government and individuals associated with the trump campaign.




separately, on august 2, 2016, trump campaign chairman paul manafort met in new york




city with his long-time business associate konstantin kilimnik, who the fbi assesses to have ties




to russian intelligence. kilimnik requested the meeting to deliver in person a peace plan for




ukraine that manafort acknowledged to the special counsel’s office was a “backdoor” way for




russia to control part of eastern ukraine; both men believed the plan would require candidate




trump’s assent to succeed (were he to be elected president). they also discussed the status of the




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trump campaign and manafort’s strategy for winning democratic votes in midwestern states.




months before that meeting, manafort had caused internal polling data to be shared with kilimnik,




and the sharing continued for some period of time after their august meeting.




fall 2016. on october 7, 2016, the media released video of candidate trump speaking in




graphic terms about women years earlier, which was considered damaging to his candidacy. less




than an hour later, wikileaks made its second release: thousands of john podesta’s emails that




had been stolen by the gru in late march 2016. the fbi and other u.s. government institutions




were at the time continuing their investigation of suspected russian government efforts to interfere




in the presidential election. that same day, october 7, the department of homeland security and




the office of the director of national intelligence issued a joint public statement “that the russian




government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from us persons and institutions,




including from us political organizations.” those “thefts” and the “disclosures” of the hacked




materials through online platforms such as wikileaks, the statement continued, “are intended to




interfere with the us election process.”




post-2016 election. immediately after the november 8 election, russian government




officials and prominent russian businessmen began trying to make inroads into the new




administration. the most senior levels of the russian government encouraged these efforts. the




russian embassy made contact hours after the election to congratulate the president-elect and to




arrange a call with president putin. several russian businessmen picked up the effort from there.




kirill dmitriev, the chief executive officer of russia’s sovereign wealth fund, was among




the russians who tried to make contact with the incoming administration. in early december, a




business associate steered dmitriev to erik prince, a supporter of the trump campaign and an




associate of senior trump advisor steve bannon. dmitriev and prince later met face-to-face in




january 2017 in the seychelles and discussed u.s.-russia relations. during the same period,




another business associate introduced dmitriev to a friend of jared kushner who had not served




on the campaign or the transition team. dmitriev and kushner’s friend collaborated on a short




written reconciliation plan for the united states and russia, which dmitriev implied had been




cleared through putin. the friend gave that proposal to kushner before the inauguration, and




kushner later gave copies to bannon and incoming secretary of state rex tillerson.




on december 29, 2016, then-president obama imposed sanctions on russia for having




interfered in the election. incoming national security advisor michael flynn called russian




ambassador sergey kislyak and asked russia not to escalate the situation in response to the




sanctions. the following day, putin announced that russia would not take retaliatory measures in




response to the sanctions at that time. hours later, president-elect trump tweeted, “great move




on delay (by v. putin).” the next day, on december 31, 2016, kislyak called flynn and told him




the request had been received at the highest levels and russia had chosen not to retaliate as a result




of flynn’s request.




on january 6, 2017, members of the intelligence community briefed president-elect trump




on a joint assessment—drafted and coordinated among the central intelligence agency, fbi, and




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national security agency—that concluded with high confidence that russia had intervened in the




election through a variety of means to assist trump’s candidacy and harm clinton’s. a




declassified version of the assessment was publicly released that same day.




between mid-january 2017 and early february 2017, three congressional committees—the




house permanent select committee on intelligence (hpsci), the senate select committee on




intelligence (ssci), and the senate judiciary committee (sjc)—announced that they would




conduct inquiries, or had already been conducting inquiries, into russian interference in the




election. then-fbi director james comey later confirmed to congress the existence of the fbi’s




investigation into russian interference that had begun before the election. on march 20, 2017, in




open-session testimony before hpsci, comey stated:




i have been authorized by the department of justice to confirm that the fbi, as part




of our counterintelligence mission, is investigating the russian government’s efforts




to interfere in the 2016 presidential election, and that includes investigating the




nature of any links between individuals associated with the trump campaign and




the russian government and whether there was any coordination between the




campaign and russia’s efforts. . . . as with any counterintelligence investigation,




this will also include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed.




the investigation continued under then-director comey for the next seven weeks until may 9,




2017, when president trump fired comey as fbi director—an action which is analyzed in




volume ii of the report.




on may 17, 2017, acting attorney general rod rosenstein appointed the special counsel




and authorized him to conduct the investigation that comey had confirmed in his congressional




testimony, as well as matters arising directly from the investigation, and any other matters within




the scope of 28 c.f.r. § 600.4(a), which generally covers efforts to interfere with or obstruct the




investigation.




president trump reacted negatively to the special counsel’s appointment. he told advisors




that it was the end of his presidency, sought to have attorney general jefferson (jeff) sessions




unrecuse from the russia investigation and to have the special counsel removed, and engaged in




efforts to curtail the special counsel’s investigation and prevent the disclosure of evidence to it,




including through public and private contacts with potential witnesses. those and related actions




are described and analyzed in volume ii of the report.




the special counsel’s charging decisions




in reaching the charging decisions described in volume i of the report, the office




determined whether the conduct it found amounted to a violation of federal criminal law




chargeable under the principles of federal prosecution. see justice manual § 9-27.000 et seq.




(2018). the standard set forth in the justice manual is whether the conduct constitutes a crime; if




so, whether admissible evidence would probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction;




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and whether prosecution would serve a substantial federal interest that could not be adequately




served by prosecution elsewhere or through non-criminal alternatives. see justice manual § 9-




27.220.




section v of the report provides detailed explanations of the office’s charging decisions,




which contain three main components.




first, the office determined that russia’s two principal interference operations in the 2016




u.s. presidential election—the social media campaign and the hacking-and-dumping operations—




violated u.s. criminal law. many of the individuals and entities involved in the social media




campaign have been charged with participating in a conspiracy to defraud the united states by




undermining through deceptive acts the work of federal agencies charged with regulating foreign




influence in u.s. elections, as well as related counts of identity theft. see united states v. internet




research agency, et al., no. 18-cr-32 (d.d.c.). separately, russian intelligence officers who




carried out the hacking into democratic party computers and the personal email accounts of




individuals affiliated with the clinton campaign conspired to violate, among other federal laws,




the federal computer-intrusion statute, and they have been so charged. see united states v.




netyksho, et al., no. 18-cr-215 (d.d.c.).




harm to ongoing matter




personal privacy




second, while the investigation identified numerous links between individuals with ties to




the russian government and individuals associated with the trump campaign, the evidence was




not sufficient to support criminal charges. among other things, the evidence was not sufficient to




charge any campaign official as an unregistered agent of the russian government or other russian




principal. and our evidence about the june 9, 2016 meeting and wikileaks’s releases of hacked




materials was not sufficient to charge a criminal campaign-finance violation. further, the evidence




was not sufficient to charge that any member of the trump campaign conspired with




representatives of the russian government to interfere in the 2016 election.




third, the investigation established that several individuals affiliated with the trump




campaign lied to the office, and to congress, about their interactions with russian-affiliated




individuals and related matters. those lies materially impaired the investigation of russian




election interference. the office charged some of those lies as violations of the federal falsestatements statute. former national security advisor michael flynn pleaded guilty to lying about




his interactions with russian ambassador kislyak during the transition period. george




papadopoulos, a foreign policy advisor during the campaign period, pleaded guilty to lying to




investigators about, inter alia, the nature and timing of his interactions with joseph mifsud, the




professor who told papadopoulos that the russians had dirt on candidate clinton in the form of




thousands of emails. former trump organization attorney michael cohen pleaded guilty to




making false statements to congress about the trump moscow project.




harm to ongoing




matter




 and in february 2019, the u.s. district court for the district of columbia found that




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manafort lied to the office and the grand jury concerning his interactions and communications




with konstantin kilimnik about trump campaign polling data and a peace plan for ukraine.




the office investigated several other events that have been publicly reported to involve




potential russia-related contacts. for example, the investigation established that interactions




between russian ambassador kislyak and trump campaign officials both at the candidate’s april




2016 foreign policy speech in washington, d.c., and during the week of the republican national




convention were brief, public, and non-substantive. and the investigation did not establish that




one campaign official’s efforts to dilute a portion of the republican party platform on providing




assistance to ukraine were undertaken at the behest of candidate trump or russia. the




investigation also did not establish that a meeting between kislyak and sessions in september




2016 at sessions’s senate office included any more than a passing mention of the presidential




campaign.




the investigation did not always yield admissible information or testimony, or a complete




picture of the activities undertaken by subjects of the investigation. some individuals invoked




their fifth amendment right against compelled self-incrimination and were not, in the office’s




judgment, appropriate candidates for grants of immunity. the office limited its pursuit of other




witnesses and information—such as information known to attorneys or individuals claiming to be




members of the media—in light of internal department of justice policies. see, e.g., justice




manual §§ 9-13.400, 13.410. some of the information obtained via court process, moreover, was




presumptively covered by legal privilege and was screened from investigators by a filter (or




“taint”) team. even when individuals testified or agreed to be interviewed, they sometimes




provided information that was false or incomplete, leading to some of the false-statements charges




described above. and the office faced practical limits on its ability to access relevant evidence as




well—numerous witnesses and subjects lived abroad, and documents were held outside the united




states.




further, the office learned that some of the individuals we interviewed or whose conduct




we investigated—including some associated with the trump campaign—deleted relevant




communications or communicated during the relevant period using applications that feature




encryption or that do not provide for long-term retention of data or communications records. in




such cases, the office was not able to corroborate witness statements through comparison to




contemporaneous communications or fully question witnesses about statements that appeared




inconsistent with other known facts.




accordingly, while this report embodies factual and legal determinations that the office




believes to be accurate and complete to the greatest extent possible, given these identified gaps,




the office cannot rule out the possibility that the unavailable information would shed additional




light on (or cast in a new light) the events described in the report.




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i. the special counsel’s investigation




on may 17, 2017, deputy attorney general rod j. rosenstein—then serving as acting




attorney general for the russia investigation following the recusal of former attorney general




jeff sessions on march 2, 2016—appointed the special counsel “to investigate russian




interference with the 2016 presidential election and related matters.” office of the deputy att’y




gen., order no. 3915-2017, appointment of special counsel to investigate russian interference




with the 2016 presidential election and related matters, may 17, 2017) (“appointment order”).




relying on “the authority vested” in the acting attorney general, “including 28 u.s.c. §§ 509,




510, and 515,” the acting attorney general ordered the appointment of a special counsel “in




order to discharge [the acting attorney general’s] responsibility to provide supervision and




management of the department of justice, and to ensure a full and thorough investigation of the




russian government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election.” appointment order




(introduction). “the special counsel,” the order stated, “is authorized to conduct the investigation




confirmed by then-fbi director james b. comey in testimony before the house permanent select




committee on intelligence on march 20, 2017,” including:




(i) any links and/or coordination between the russian government and individuals




associated with the campaign of president donald trump; and




(ii) any matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation; and




(iii) any other matters within the scope of 28 c.f.r. § 600.4(a).




appointment order ¶ (b). section 600.4 affords the special counsel “the authority to investigate




and prosecute federal crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to interfere with, the




special counsel’s investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence,




and intimidation of witnesses.” 28 c.f.r. § 600.4(a). the authority to investigate “any matters




that arose . . . directly from the investigation,” appointment order ¶ (b)(ii), covers similar crimes




that may have occurred during the course of the fbi’s confirmed investigation before the special




counsel’s appointment. ““if the special counsel believes it is necessary and appropriate,” the




order further provided, “the special counsel is authorized to prosecute federal crimes arising from




the investigation of these
report on the investigation into russian interference in the 2016 presidential election volume i of ii special counsel robert s. mueller, iii submitted pursuant to 28 c.f.r. § 600.8(c)