here<u+2019>s a question very few people expected to be asking this year: does the democratic party have a future? the defeat of hillary clinton has revived with new intensity the conflict between proponents of identity politics <u+2014> focusing electoral attention on african-americans, hispanics, women and the l.g.b.t. community <u+2014> and those who advocate what they describe as a more universal strategy. this intraparty debate has become bitter, escalating to new levels after mark lilla, an intellectual historian at columbia, published <u+201c> the end of identity liberalism <u+201d> on these pages two weeks ago. in recent years, lilla wrote, american liberalism has slipped into a kind of moral panic about racial, gender and sexual identity that has distorted liberalism<u+2019>s message and prevented it from becoming a unifying force capable of governing. lilla called for a <u+201c>post-identity liberalism<u+201d> that would concentrate on widening its base by appealing to americans as americans and emphasizing the issues that affect a vast majority of them. the reaction was swift and fierce. on nov. 21, katherine franke, a law professor at columbia, published <u+201c> making white supremacy respectable. again <u+201d> in the los angeles review of books. she does not hold back, going so far as to link lilla to the fervent white supremacist david duke: in the new political climate we now inhabit, duke and lilla were contributing to the same ideological project, the former cloaked in a kkk hood, the latter in an academic gown. both men are underwriting the whitening of american nationalism, and the re-centering of white lives as lives that matter most in the u.s. duke is happy to own the white supremacy of his statements, while lilla<u+2019>s op-ed does the more nefarious background work of making white supremacy respectable. again. damon young, the editor in chief of very smart brothas and a columnist for gq.com and ebony magazine, describes lilla<u+2019>s essay as <u+201c>avant garde white obliviousness. he is the pablo picasso of performative sobriety. the frank lloyd wright of whitesplaining.<u+201d> on the surface, it looks as if there is no way to find common ground between these warring camps. but in fact it is not an either/or choice; it<u+2019>s really a matter of emphasis. democrats struggling to find a path to recruiting support from a diverse electorate could profit by taking a look at an unexpected source: nick timothy, a british conservative party strategist and speechwriter who is the son of a steelworker in birmingham. timothy , who is sometimes described as <u+201c>theresa may<u+2019>s brain,<u+201d> has helped may, britain<u+2019>s new tory prime minister, devise rhetoric to appeal both to minority identity groups and to working and middle class voters generally. this is not to suggest that democrats should look to the substance of may<u+2019>s policies: she has already begun to renege on some of her promises, including a proposal to require worker representation on corporate boards. earlier this year, however, may successfully channeled nick timothy<u+2019>s rhetorical skills, first when she formally accepted her new position and subsequently in a more detailed keynote address . in her brief public statement at 10 downing street on july 13, may broached britain<u+2019>s version of identity politics. she declared her commitment to battle <u+201c>burning injustices<u+201d>: if you are born poor, you will die on average nine years earlier than others. if you<u+2019>re black, you<u+2019>re treated more harshly by the criminal justice system than if you are white. if you<u+2019>re a white, working-class boy, you<u+2019>re less likely than anyone else in britain to go to university. if you<u+2019>re at a state school, you<u+2019>re less likely to reach the top professions than if you were educated privately. if you are a woman, you will earn less than a man. if you suffer from mental health problems, there<u+2019>s not enough help to hand. while acknowledging the legitimacy of these deep and abiding problems, may made the case that the larger issue facing british society is the struggle of all those trying to make ends meet: the mission to make britain a country that works for everyone means more than just fighting these injustices. if you<u+2019>re from an ordinary working-class family, life is much harder than many people in westminster realize. you have the job, but you don<u+2019>t always have the job security. you have your own home, but you worry about paying the mortgage. you can just about manage, but you worry about the cost of living and getting your kids into a good school. the core mission of the may government, she promised. would be to lighten the burdens on such <u+201c>ordinary working class<u+201d> families: we will do everything we can to give you more control over your lives. when we take the big calls, we<u+2019>ll think not of the powerful but you. when we pass new laws, we<u+2019>ll listen not to the mighty, but you. when it comes to taxes we<u+2019>ll prioritize not the wealthy, but you. when it comes to opportunity, we won<u+2019>t entrench the advantages of the fortunate few. we will do everything we can to help anybody, whatever your background, to go as far as your talents will take you. in other words, may attempted to address the specific problems of key identity groups, but emphasized that her top priority would be the concerns of all workers regardless of race, sex or ethnicity. the challenge for democrats in this country going forward is to self-monitor more assiduously for divergence from the may-timothy strategy. successful democratic candidates have often done just that. may<u+2019>s speeches are reminiscent of the approach of an american democratic politician who self-consciously resisted identity politics and defied political correctness 25 years ago, bill clinton. i suspect may<u+2019>s staff read through bill clinton<u+2019>s speeches while preparing her major addresses. on dec. 12, 1991, two months after formally announcing his bid for the presidency, clinton famously pointed out that taxes were lowered on the wealthiest people whose incomes were rising, and raised on middle class families as their incomes fell. and through it all, millions of decent, ordinary people who worked hard, played by the rules, and took responsibility for their own actions, were falling more and more behind, living a life of struggle without reward or security. on oct. 5 this year, may told members of her party : i want to set our party and our country on the path toward the new center ground of british politics built on the values of fairness and opportunity where everyone plays by the same rules and where every single person <u+2014> regardless of their background or that of their parents <u+2014> is given the chance to be all they want to be. on oct. 3, 1991, when bill clinton declared his candidacy , he said: in a clinton administration, we are going to create opportunity for all. we<u+2019>ve got to grow this economy, not shrink it. we need to give people incentives to make long <u+2014> term investment in america and reward people who produce goods and services, not those who speculate with other people<u+2019>s money. we<u+2019>ve got to invest more money in emerging technologies to help keep high-paying jobs here at home. two and a half decades later, may said: we also value something else: the spirit of citizenship. that spirit that means you respect the bonds and obligations that make our society work. that means a commitment to the men and women who live around you, who work for you, who buy the goods and services you sell. that spirit that means recognizing the social contract that says you train up local young people before you take on cheap labor from overseas. that spirit that means you do as others do, and pay your fair share of tax. a random examination of obama<u+2019>s speeches during the 2008 campaign reveals his sensitivity to the concerns of the white working class <u+2014> from which his maternal grandparents, with whom he lived for many years, came. he rarely turned to an explicit <u+201c>identity politics<u+201d> strategy. even when speaking before civil rights and women<u+2019>s rights groups, obama took pains to avoid particularistic appeals. at the july 14 naacp convention , obama declared: when any human being is denied a life of dignity and respect, no matter whether they live in anacostia or appalachia or a village in africa; when people are trapped in extreme poverty we know how to curb or suffering from diseases we know how to prevent; when they<u+2019>re going without the medicines that they so desperately need <u+2014> we have more work to do. that<u+2019>s what this election is all about. it<u+2019>s about the responsibilities we all share for the future we hold in common. <u+201c>our march is a march for america,<u+201d> obama said three weeks later at the urban league convention . not black america or white america. not rich america or poor america, rural america or urban america, but all america. an america where no child<u+2019>s destiny is determined before she<u+2019>s born <u+2014> and no one<u+2019>s future is confined to the neighborhood he<u+2019>s born into. an america where hard work is still a ticket to the middle class <u+2014> and you can make it if you try. interestingly, hillary clinton, in her major speeches, often tried to use language similar to that of obama or her husband. when she announced her bid for the presidency in june, she told her supporters: you see corporations making record profits, with ceos making record pay, but your paychecks have barely budged. while many of you are working multiple jobs to make ends meet, you see the top 25 hedge fund managers making more than all of america<u+2019>s kindergarten teachers combined. and, often paying a lower tax rate. so, you have to wonder: "when does my hard work pay off? when does my family get ahead?<u+201d> the difference in the rhetorical strategy of hillary clinton and theresa may is one of stress and underscoring. while may made sure her identity group stands were secondary to her pronounced commitment to the working men and women of england generally, clinton frequently placed her focus on identity groups. take her speech in nevada a week before the state<u+2019>s caucuses in february: <u+201c>not everything is about an economic theory, right?<u+201d> clinton told a gathering in henderson : <u+201c>if we broke up the big banks tomorrow <u+2014> and i will, if they deserve it, if they pose a systemic risk, i will <u+2014> would that end racism?<u+201d> <u+201c>no,<u+201d> the audience replied. <u+201c>would that end sexism?<u+201d> <u+201c>no.<u+201d> <u+201c>would that end discrimination against the lgbt community?<u+201d> <u+201c>no.<u+201d> <u+201c>would that make people feel more welcoming to immigrants overnight?<u+201d> <u+201c>no.<u+201d> earlier, at a primary debate on cnn, anderson cooper asked her: <u+201c>secretary clinton, how would you not be a third term of president obama?<u+201d> clinton replied: well, i think that<u+2019>s pretty obvious. i think being the first woman president would be quite a change from the presidents we<u+2019>ve had up until this point, including president obama. clinton<u+2019>s comments at the debate and in nevada were accurate but told voters nothing about how a clinton presidency would improve their lives in ways that the obama presidency had not. every campaign seeks to mobilize specific constituencies. identity politics are, and have always been, a fact of life . the issue is what takes precedence: those constituency-specific appeals or a sustained emphasis on a more encompassing appeal to a broad economic class. donald trump won the presidency on an identity politics counterpunch: the mobilization of angry white voters, most of them men. white men supported trump over hillary clinton 62 percent to 31 percent, while white women supported trump by a more modest margin, 52 to 43. clinton<u+2019>s emphasis on her gender appears to have helped trump in key battlegrounds. the approach developed by may and her staff, and by the obama and bill clinton campaigns before her, addresses a question that nags at democratic strategists: how do you establish a commonweal when everyone is looking to have his or her own concerns ratified? the tried and true way for a politician to market a coalitional regime amid a cacophony of particularistic demands is to forcefully assert the primacy of the whole. this worked for the obama insurgency in 2008 because his coalition members were willing to temporarily suspend their immediate demands in favor of a more encompassing victory. looking toward the future, democrats might turn the tables on the republicans and explicitly demonize trump and his party as proponents of an exclusionary politics of white male identity. but it is also legitimate to ask whether the age of identity politics is coming to an end. one lesson of 2016 is that opposition to multiculturalism has become an extraordinarily powerful mobilizing tool for the right. it has spurred the emergence of a white lower- and middle-income republican party while simultaneously invigorating the formerly insignificant alt-right and white supremacists generally. it would be simplistic to make identity politics the sole culprit of this year<u+2019>s democratic defeat, especially in light of clinton<u+2019>s 2.4 million popular vote margin. while universalistic appeals have a certain allure in the face of particularistic clamor, it is unlikely that either identity politics or its hyperactive watchdog, political correctness <u+2014> the current whipping boys of postelection analysis <u+2014> will disappear anytime soon. europe has had centuries of nationalistic, identity-based conflict from which to draw lessons, and it is clearly headed back in that direction. damir banovi<u+0107> of the university of sarajevo writes on this topic cogently, with clear relevance to the situation that obtains in america: earlier, traditional societies imposed clear frameworks and roles upon individuals, but with postindustrial modernization, identity became individualized and pluralized. individuals became more focused on self-determination and self-expression. an individual<u+2019>s identity is neither a stable nor a finished entity. contemporary societies generate possibilities of creating new identities. the last ten years have been dominated by incomplete, ever more fragmented identities composed of multiplied and individualized persons. the world we live in creates new forms and breeds fragmentedness. pluralization of forms of agency, the many sources of authority an individual can invoke and the chance to choose a lifestyle have become increasingly important in creating an identity. this has been such a profound transformation that now the meaning of the concept of identity is ambivalent and presupposes both a positive identification with other people, groups, collectives, cultures and a negative identification (differentiation) with all a person is not. identity as a key aspect of human and thus political behavior is a reality. should the democrats strive for more subtle, sophisticated and ingenious appeals to their party<u+2019>s cross-section of identities, including a revivification of the idea of the commonweal? i would say emphatically yes. trump<u+2019>s recent victory notwithstanding, the debate over how to do this needs to move forward on a higher plane, without the name calling, if it is to have any chance of success. follow the new york times opinion section on facebook and twitter (@nytopinion) , and sign up for the opinion today newsletter .
who can tell the future of the democratic party?
noauthor