as the european commission prepares to negotiate britain<u+2019>s exit from the european union, each of the 27 non-u.k. member states will have its own distinct interests to defend. but two crucial european elections, above all else, will help shape the first phase of the brexit talks. britain<u+2019>s prime minister theresa may has pledged to invoke article 50, the lisbon treaty<u+2019>s formal mechanism for leaving the eu, early next year. this would coincide with campaigning for france<u+2019>s presidential election, in april and may, followed by germany<u+2019>s general election in september. france will be the most striking example of how election forces will shape brexit stances on the continent. president fran<u+00e7>ois hollande is expected to fail in his bid for a second term in the face of a resurgent center-right and the euroskeptic national front, whose leader, marine le pen, has been waging a donald trump -style populist campaign. polls indicate ms. le pen could cruise through april<u+2019>s first round, knocking out the socialist candidate (whether that is mr. hollande or someone else), to face off the following month against the winner of sunday<u+2019>s center-right primary run-off election, either fran<u+00e7>ois fillon or alain jupp<u+00e9>. both mr. fillon and mr. jupp<u+00e9> have said that the 2003 le touquet migration agreement, which allows the united kingdom to operate border controls on the french side of the english channel, is broken and, post-brexit, needs to be scrapped. mr. fillon, who, like mr. jupp<u+00e9>, has called for brexit to be resolved quickly, has also said that u.k. members of the european parliament should no longer take part in european parliamentary votes and u.k. officials shouldn<u+2019>t be permitted to participate in key brussels decisions. these election-year dynamics explain mr. hollande<u+2019>s tough stance on brexit lately. he has argued that the u.k. must pay a <u+201c>price<u+201d> for leaving, because otherwise <u+201c>we would jeopardize the fundamental principles of the eu<u+201d> and <u+201c>other countries would want to leave . . . to get the supposed advantages without the obligations.<u+201d> mr. hollande wants to avoid any major concessions that would give further momentum to ms. le pen, who has promised a referendum on france<u+2019>s eu membership should she come into power. election pressures aside, mr. hollande<u+2019>s stance, including his position on future u.k. access to the single market, is fortified by wider ambitions to promote paris as a financial-center alternative to london. already, finance minister michel sapin and brexit special envoy christian noyer have been promoting paris to the major banks. mr. sapin insists that london cannot, post-brexit, remain the main euro clearing center, a position also advocated by mr. fillon. meanwhile, chancellor angela merkel <u+2019>s prospects of re-election may be better than mr. hollande<u+2019>s but her coalition government is under increasing pressure, both foreign and domestic, which will limit her flexibility on brexit. fellow eu members, including, notably, france, have been lobbying germany to take a harder stance on brexit. the u.k. must suffer detrimental consequences, the argument goes, if the eu is to survive what could be an existential crisis. and so the rhetoric from berlin has been getting tougher lately, as exemplified by finance minister wolfgang sch<u+00e4>uble <u+2019>s recent assertion that britain could face eu budget bills for more than a decade; must be bound by tax rules restricting it from granting incentives to keep investors in the country; and must lose its euro-clearing business post-brexit. this despite mrs. merkel<u+2019>s own hints at potential for compromise. ultimately, berlin perceives eu stability to be more important to germany<u+2019>s national interest, and is wary of any brexit contagion. domestically, mrs. merkel<u+2019>s approval ratings leave her less room to maneuver. one survey last month had her down to 53% from the 70% she enjoyed in the summer of 2015. meanwhile, her christian democratic union party is polling around 30% after securing more than 40% in the 2013 federal election. mrs. merkel could therefore be facing a tough election fight. one poll earlier this month found that around 40% of germans wished she wouldn<u+2019>t seek a fourth term at all. she has also been troubled by the rise of the right-wing alternative for germany. this party, founded less than half a decade ago as an anti-euro group, has tapped into the discontent toward mrs. merkel<u+2019>s immigration policies and is polling at almost 15% nationally, with seats in more than half of the state legislatures. this has sharpened tensions within mrs. merkel<u+2019>s coalition government and complicated the development of a consistent stance on brexit. after the election, even if mrs. merkel wins power again, it<u+2019>s likely her christian democrats will lose ground to opposition parties. such a decline in influence could, once again, limit her scope for advocating compromise on the u.k.<u+2019>s terms of departure. taken together, election-year pressures in france and germany will be powerful drivers of the eu<u+2019>s brexit stance next year, potentially making for a more complex and difficult set of negotiations than many anticipate. u.k. officials will therefore be intensifying diplomatic engagement in the run-up to brexit negotiations, to try and shape positions not just in berlin and paris but also other eu capitals that could be central to securing its negotiating objectives on immigration and trade. mr. hammond is an associate at the centre for international affairs, diplomacy and strategy at the london school of economics.
europe faces its next brexit elections - wsj
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