hillary clinton won the popular vote by more than two million, and she would probably be president-elect if the director of the f.b.i. hadn<u+2019>t laid such a heavy thumb on the scales, just days before the election. but it shouldn<u+2019>t even have been close; what put donald trump in striking distance was overwhelming support from whites without college degrees. so what can democrats do to win back at least some of those voters? recently bernie sanders offered an answer: democrats should <u+201c>go beyond identity politics.<u+201d> what<u+2019>s needed, he said, are candidates who understand that working-class incomes are down, who will <u+201c>stand up to wall street, to the insurance companies, to the drug companies, to the fossil fuel industry.<u+201d> but is there any reason to believe that this would work? let me offer some reasons for doubt. first, a general point: any claim that changed policy positions will win elections assumes that the public will hear about those positions. how is that supposed to happen, when most of the news media simply refuse to cover policy substance? remember, over the course of the 2016 campaign, the three network news shows devoted a total of 35 minutes combined to policy issues <u+2014> all policy issues. meanwhile, they devoted 125 minutes to mrs. clinton<u+2019>s emails. beyond this, the fact is that democrats have already been pursuing policies that are much better for the white working class than anything the other party has to offer. yet this has brought no political reward. consider eastern kentucky, a very white area which has benefited enormously from obama-era initiatives. take, in particular, the case of clay county , which the times declared a few years ago to be the hardest place in america to live. it<u+2019>s still very hard, but at least most of its residents now have health insurance: i ndependent estimates say that the uninsured rate fell from 27 percent in 2013 to 10 percent in 2016. that<u+2019>s the effect of the affordable care act, which mrs. clinton promised to preserve and extend but mr. trump promised to kill. mr. trump received 87 percent of clay county<u+2019>s vote. now, you might say that health insurance is one thing, but what people want are good jobs. eastern kentucky used to be coal country, and mr. trump, unlike mrs. clinton, promised to bring the coal jobs back. (so much for the idea that democrats need a candidate who will stand up to the fossil fuels industry.) but it<u+2019>s a nonsensical promise. where did appalachia<u+2019>s coal mining jobs go? they weren<u+2019>t lost to unfair competition from china or mexico. what happened instead was, first, a decades-long erosion as u.s. coal production shifted from underground mining to strip mining and mountaintop removal, which require many fewer workers: coal employment peaked in 1979, fell rapidly during the reagan years, and was down more than half by 2007. a further plunge came in recent years thanks to fracking. none of this is reversible. is the case of former coal country exceptional? not really. unlike the decline in coal, some of the long-term decline in manufacturing employment can be attributed to rising trade deficits, but even there it<u+2019>s a fairly small fraction of the story. nobody can credibly promise to bring the old jobs back; what you can promise <u+2014> and mrs. clinton did <u+2014> are things like guaranteed health care and higher minimum wages. but working-class whites overwhelmingly voted for politicians who promise to destroy those gains. so what happened here? part of the answer may be that mr. trump had no problems with telling lies about what he could accomplish. if so, there may be a backlash when the coal and manufacturing jobs don<u+2019>t come back, while health insurance disappears. but maybe not. maybe a trump administration can keep its supporters on board, not by improving their lives, but by feeding their sense of resentment. for let<u+2019>s be serious here: you can<u+2019>t explain the votes of places like clay county as a response to disagreements about trade policy. the only way to make sense of what happened is to see the vote as an expression of, well, identity politics <u+2014> some combination of white resentment at what voters see as favoritism toward nonwhites (even though it isn<u+2019>t) and anger on the part of the less educated at liberal elites whom they imagine look down on them. to be honest, i don<u+2019>t fully understand this resentment. in particular, i don<u+2019>t know why imagined liberal disdain inspires so much more anger than the very real disdain of conservatives who see the poverty of places like eastern kentucky as a sign of the personal and moral inadequacy of their residents. one thing is clear, however: democrats have to figure out why the white working class just voted overwhelmingly against its own economic interests, not pretend that a bit more populism would solve the problem. read my blog, the conscience of a liberal , and follow me on twitter, @paulkrugman. follow the new york times opinion section on facebook and twitter (@nytopinion) , and sign up for the opinion today newsletter . a version of this op-ed appears in print on november 25, 2016, on page a27 of the new york edition with the headline: the  populism  perplex. today's paper | subscribe
the populism perplex
noauthor