in the wake of long, painful wars in iraq and afghanistan, americans are understandably wary of the idea of state-building. but the issue won<u+2019>t go away. last week, the iraqi military, along with u.s. special operations forces and other partners, launched an offensive to retake the city of mosul from islamic state. if such campaigns are to succeed in the long term, state-building is essential. it is the only way to make real progress in defeating islamic state, al qaeda and other terrorist groups. recent history in the middle east<u+2014>from pakistan to yemen to syria<u+2014>has shown that ungoverned, unstable areas can incubate global threats. but simply launching military strikes to devastate terrorist bases without trying to rebuild afterward<u+2014>the sort of <u+201c>bomb the hell out of them<u+201d> strategies advocated by donald trump and sen. ted cruz <u+2014>is a prescription for failure. intervening more cautiously and leaving some measure of stability and good government helps to ensure that ousted jihadists cannot return. military planning can no longer neglect the urgent question of who will take political power once the battle is won. fortunately, from the bitter experience of the past 15 years, we now know much more about what it takes to do state-building right. forget imperialism. in centuries past, military planners worried far less about postwar rebuilding. victory was often followed by outright conquest. but trying to install some friendly autocrat after a u.s. intervention won<u+2019>t work anymore: it would stoke distrust, invite uprisings, increase tensions with other major powers and alarm many americans unwilling to get into the business of permanent occupation. u.s. interests are better served by cultivating legitimate leaders. today, successful state-building means democratic state-building. avoid centralization. to establish a government that can stand on its own, the u.s. must help national leaders to develop the political support necessary to fend off insurgents, opportunists and nasty neighbors. a new government must find and cultivate active allies in every part of the country, and these allies must be confident, in turn, that their loyalty can earn them long-term rewards and security. <u+2018> you can surge troops and equipment, but you can<u+2019>t surge trust. <u+2019> but negotiating with local activists to build such inclusive political networks can be expensive and tedious; newly established national leaders often prefer instead to focus on pleasing their own communities, comrades and cronies. when they confine the benefits of power to a small circle in this way, they neglect remote areas and stoke corruption. such shortsighted centralization creates a weak state that can endure only with continuing u.s. support. push for power-sharing. a key to evading this trap is a federal constitution that distributes power between the national and local governments. too often in iraq and afghanistan, u.s. policy-makers focused on developing the capabilities of the national government from the top down. constitutional provisions that grant considerable power to elected municipal and provincial governments can help to ensure that there are leaders in every part of the country with a real stake in the new government. these local governments must be funded equitably, too, especially when it comes to sharing national resources, like iraq<u+2019>s oil fields. staff up. the u.s. charged into afghanistan and iraq without any single agency ready to tackle the challenges of state-building. leaving the task to the military won<u+2019>t suffice, as the fiasco of iraq after the 2003 invasion proved. the u.s. needs a new agency devoted explicitly to state-building missions, with its own deep bench of americans with specialized skills. these experts would combine knowledge of local governance, financial savvy, managerial skill and linguistic ability, along with the basic military training necessary to operate confidently in conflict zones. the new agency would need to be large and well-funded enough to offer an attractive career path for talented recruits who might otherwise pursue diplomatic or military careers. a good start would be to increase substantially the funding for the state department<u+2019>s bureau of conflict and stabilization operations or to reconfigure the mission of the u.s. agency for international development. a new state-building agency would cost perhaps hundreds of millions of dollars<u+2014>a small sum in comparison to military outlays<u+2014>and its budget could be offset with contributions from nato and our other allies. make a sustainable commitment. the u.s. needs to be able to provide reliable long-term support to friendly governments facing insurgencies without committing to massive military involvement. call it <u+201c>war downsized<u+201d><u+2014>a more sustainable policy than in recent years, based on sending aid and teams of u.s. advisers rather than on deploying massed battalions. a capable u.s. state-building agency would provide essential members for such teams and cultivate key local relationships. as a marine general who commanded troops in iraq<u+2019>s anbar province and afghanistan<u+2019>s helmand province said, <u+201c>you can surge troops and equipment, but you can<u+2019>t surge trust.<u+201d> americans often look with dismay at the recent results of state-building. in afghanistan after 9/11, we backed a corrupt central government in an unruly country accustomed to decentralized rule. and in iraq, we found ourselves entangled with the shiite-dominated government of nouri al-maliki, who paved the way for islamic state by so thoroughly alienating the country<u+2019>s sunni minority. but there have been happier instances of state-building, too. consider the west african country of sierra leone. in 2002, british military intervention ended a long and vicious civil war there. afterward, the british-led mission helped to establish and empower elected local councils in towns and rural districts throughout sierra leone. these institutions have involved local notables from across the country, giving them a stake in the national government and in supporting democratic norms and procedures. but perhaps the most inspiring case of decentralized, democratic state-building is the u.s. itself. the american revolution relied on broadly distributed political power. in 1776, every state declaring independence had leaders who were at once respected locally and involved in the new national project. the constitution that they went on to devise extended and enshrined this balance of power, giving legitimacy and a shared sense of purpose, beyond region or clique, to the new republic. that profoundly american success story still stands as an instructive precedent. done right, state-building can mean not just a freer and more stable world but a stronger and more secure u.s., without the prolonged military entanglements that have cost us and our local partners so dearly. <u+2014>dr. myerson is the glen lloyd distinguished service professor at the university of chicago and was awarded the nobel memorial prize in economic sciences in 2007. mr. weston was a state department official in iraq and afghanistan and is the author of <u+201c>the mirror test: america at war in iraq and afghanistan<u+201d> (knopf).
five rules to get state-building right - wsj
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