donald trump has threatened to renege on treaty obligations unless u.s. allies accept a larger share of the defense burden. that strikes many ordinary americans as reasonable. but the flaws in the trump platform quickly become apparent when one imagines how it could play out on the korean peninsula. south korea is threatened by the same north korean dynasty that invaded it in 1950. by all accounts, third-generation dictator kim jong un is every bit as brutal as his father and grandfather were. and while south korea is now a major, thriving economy with a modern military, north korea spends some 20% or more of its gross domestic product on its armed forces. the north has a force of more than one million heavily indoctrinated soldiers, a large number of whom are poised near the demilitarized zone dividing north and south, within artillery and rocket range of seoul. the north also possesses a nuclear arsenal of a dozen or more bombs. that arsenal has been tested five times<u+2014>twice this year alone<u+2014>and the north is believed to have the capacity to deliver a weapon by missile, though no one, including the north koreans, can really be sure. there<u+2019>s no telling how kim and his generals view the north-south military balance, no way to be sure they realize that victory would elude them in a classical warfare scenario. in fact, if willing to threaten or even use nuclear weapons, they might be able to coerce seoul into a surrender, especially if there were no fear of an american response. despite these circumstances, mr. trump has singled out south korea as a country he thinks could provide for its own self-defense. he suggests seoul acquire nuclear weapons if necessary to ensure its safety in the absence of an american security guarantee. in practice, it<u+2019>s unclear how mr. trump would withdraw u.s. troops from south korea, but here are three plausible options. in the first, he could announce an immediate suspension of the u.s. security guarantee to south korea and pull out america<u+2019>s 28,000 forces there within a year. both of these results could be achieved as commander in chief, neither necessitating congressional approval. tens of thousands of american civilians in the private sector would still be left in korea, but mr. trump could give them fair warning that they, like their south korean hosts, would now be on their own. alternatively, mr. trump could carry out this policy over the four-year term of his presidency. that would give south korea time to carry out a crash program to acquire nuclear weapons by the time u.s. forces left. perhaps more reasonably, mr. trump could make the u.s. withdrawal conditional. he could give seoul three years to improve its defense spending and burden-sharing. failure to achieve an acceptable level of military investment could then be grounds for severing u.s. security ties and returning troops to the u.s. all three options are highly fraught. the first might tempt north korea to test fate and immediately attack the south as soon as u.s. forces are gone. or it could threaten force<u+2014>demanding that, to avoid war, south korea accede to certain economic demands, or perhaps even confederation under pyongyang<u+2019>s rule. it may sound crazy, but few leaders do crazy like kim. the second option may simply not work, given the challenges of building the bomb. but if it did, washington will have been complicit in undercutting a generally successful nuclear nonproliferation regime, one that has limited the spread of nuclear weapons to just 10 countries, with only north korea having tested any nuclear weapons this century. even the third possible approach may fail dangerously. sovereign democratic states don<u+2019>t always respond well to demands that they reorient their budgetary priorities or military policies. south korea already devotes about 2.5% of its gdp to its military, the largest portion among major american allies in europe or east asia. how much higher would mr. trump demand that seoul go? under any of these three options, north korea might still be tempted to test south korea<u+2019>s will. it might employ limited amounts of conventional force, or even detonate a single nuclear weapon in a relatively rural part of the peninsula, and then make an attempt at blackmail. war could ensue. to be sure, the u.s. might then return to protect its south korean ally, even under mr. trump, rather than dishonorably watch a close friend be attacked by a murderous regime. but that is precisely the outcome the trump policy is intended to prevent. today, american deterrence is working, as it has for more than 60 years on the korean peninsula and elsewhere. the u.s. shouldn<u+2019>t roll the dice with this situation. at a minimum, mr. trump should be expected to explain further how he would avoid causing wars while abruptly abandoning allies abroad. mr. o<u+2019>hanlon is a senior fellow at the brookings institution and an informal advisor to the hillary clinton campaign.
trump<u+2019>s dangerous korean gamble - wsj
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