republican economic policy doesn<u+2019>t have a good recent track record. the last two republican presidents left office deeply unpopular, thanks to recessions. ronald reagan<u+2019>s record was much better but still not as good as bill clinton<u+2019>s. all told, economic growth under democratic presidents over the last half-century has been 25 percent faster than under republicans. private-sector job growth has been more than twice as fast. republicans even have a worse record running up the deficit. (these comparisons hold no matter when precisely you start the clock on a president<u+2019>s legacy.) of course, presidents don<u+2019>t deserve full credit or blame for the economy<u+2019>s performance. but they do bear some responsibility. the notion that republican presidents have been better economic stewards than democrats but fallen victim to a terribly unfair mix of luck and timing is about as sensible as it sounds. there are reasons that the modern version of republican economics hasn<u+2019>t worked so well. it takes the powerful ideas behind market-based capitalism to an extreme, where they often stop working. cutting taxes for the affluent <u+2014> who have received both the largest pretax raises in recent decades and the largest tax cuts <u+2014> doesn<u+2019>t stimulate growth much anymore. allowing corporate america to write its own regulations creates more problems than it solves. you may recall that the recent housing crisis wasn<u+2019>t so great for g.d.p. growth. this reality creates a fascinating choice for donald trump . he won the presidency by trashing both political parties. he defied republican orthodoxy and praised government programs . he memorably dismissed his primary opponents as <u+201c>low-energy<u+201d> jeb, lyin<u+2019> ted and little marco. doing so allowed him to win a landslide of white working-class voters frustrated with their own lives, the country<u+2019>s direction and both parties. these voters, by no means libertarians, saw trump as flawed yet willing to fight for them. now that he<u+2019>s won, he has to decide whether his differences with the republican establishment are more stylistic than substantive. on the issues with the biggest impact on working-class lives, he will need to choose between pursuing the policies of a traditional republican president and creating something new. in effect, he<u+2019>ll have to decide whether he is going to be his own president or a bigger version of little marco. so far, some kind of standard republicanism looks more likely. trump doesn<u+2019>t seem to enjoy policy detail and may defer to congress. his tax plan is classic trickle-down economics, with a modest middle-class tax cut that would probably lift growth temporarily. his early appointments are mixed, variously nodding to the party establishment , wealthy businesspeople and white nationalists . they offer little indication of a conservative, working-class agenda to match his rhetoric. yet there are still two reasons to wonder if he will take steps away from traditional republican economics. first, not only has he suggested he would, but some of his advisers , like stephen moore, have said so explicitly. moore recently told congressional republicans that, as the hill phrased it, they <u+201c>should no longer think of themselves as belonging to the conservative party of ronald reagan,<u+201d> but instead <u+201c>to trump<u+2019>s populist working-class party.<u+201d> that party, moore explained , would need new positions on trade, immigration and infrastructure. the second reason is that the outlines of a conservative, working-class agenda do exist, scattered among think tanks and publications. i<u+2019>m skeptical that these ideas would do more good than, say, the obama economic proposals that congress has refused to pass. but the reformist conservative agenda is a vastly more serious attempt to address working-class stagnation than another trickle-down tax cut. reihan salam of national review has called for sharply reducing low-skilled legal immigration (and increasing high-skilled immigration) to reduce the competition for working-class jobs. avik roy, president of the foundation for research on equal opportunity, advocates an overhaul of obamacare that doesn<u+2019>t require throwing millions of people off of health insurance. michael strain of the american enterprise institute is full of ideas to encourage work: less occupational licensing, a lower payroll tax , more apprenticeships, a disability system that no longer incentivizes idleness. these proposals try to use a market-based philosophy to help working-class families <u+2014> which is quite different from the recent republican emphasis on comforting the comfortable. presidents may not be able to directly control the economy<u+2019>s growth rate, but they do have enormous influence on which groups benefit most from government policy. for now, these issues remain obscured by trump<u+2019>s fondness for sideshows and his sordid promotion of the family business. those distractions won<u+2019>t disappear when he becomes president. no doubt, he<u+2019>ll often describe his policies however he feels like describing them. but something will change soon: he will need to begin making real decisions, with clear consequences for the people whose votes elected him. lyin<u+2019> tweets won<u+2019>t pay their bills. you can join me on twitter (@dleonhardt) and facebook . i am also writing a daily email newsletter and invite you to subscribe . follow the new york times opinion section on facebook and twitter (@nytopinion). a version of this op-ed appears in print on november 29, 2016, on page a27 of the new york edition with the headline: <u+2018>big marco,<u+2019> or his own presidency?. today's paper | subscribe
donald trump: be <u+2018>big marco<u+2019> or set his own path?
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