for decades, democratic presidential candidates have been making steady gains among upper income whites and whites with college and postgraduate degrees. this year, however, is the first time in at least six decades that the democratic nominee is positioned to win a majority of these upscale voters. according to the oct. 20 reuters-ipsos tracking survey, hillary clinton now leads donald trump by 5.6 points among all whites earning $75,000 or more. this is a substantial improvement on the previous democratic record of support among upscale white voters, set in 2008 when barack obama lost to john mccain among such voters by 11 points. according to an oct. 23 abc news poll, clinton also leads among all white college graduates, 52-36. she has an unprecedented gender gap among these voters, leading 62-30 among college-educated white women and tying among college educated white men, 42-42. what these figures suggest is that the 2016 election will represent a complete inversion of the new deal order among white voters. from the 1930s into the 1980s and early 1990s, majorities of downscale whites voted democratic and upscale whites voted republican. now, looking at combined male and female vote totals, the opposite is true. as recently as 2012, mitt romney won among well-educated whites by 14 points. in 2008 , mccain won college-educated whites by four points. the data reflects an ongoing evolution in the composition of the two parties. in 1992, according to a september 2016 pew study , democratic voters with high school diplomas or less far outnumbered democrats with college degrees, 55-21, and the remaining 24 percent had some college but no degree. by 2016, the percentage of democratic voters with college degrees or better outnumbered those with high school degrees or less, 37-32, while 31 percent had some college but no degree. among republicans, the share with college degrees rose modestly from 28 to 31 percent, but remained smaller than those with high school diplomas or less, 34 percent in 2016. these shifts in education and income have contributed to sharp changes, at least for the moment, in the outlook of democrats and republicans. democrats, including the party<u+2019>s elite, remain decisively liberal, and have become more cosmopolitan <u+2014> more readily accepting of globalization, more welcoming of immigrants, less nationalistic <u+2014> and more optimistic about the future. the pew research center found in april 2016 that: highly educated adults <u+2013> particularly those who have attended graduate school <u+2013> are far more likely than those with less education to take predominantly liberal positions across a range of political values. and these differences have increased over the past two decades. from 1994 to 2014, the percentage of voters with postgraduate degrees holding <u+201c>consistently liberal<u+201d> views grew fourfold, from 7 to 31 percent, and fivefold among those with college degrees, 5 to 24 percent. whites remain the majority in both political parties, 57 percent of democratic voters and 86 percent of republicans. white democrats share a high level of optimism with the two largest democratic minority constituencies, african-americans and hispanics. working class african-americans and hispanics are, like their white counterparts without degrees, on the low end of the income distribution. when blacks and hispanics compare their situations to those of their parents, they see their circumstances improving, in contrast to low income, non-college whites, who see a downward trajectory. as andrew cherlin, a professor of sociology at johns hopkins, wrote in february in these pages, african-americans may look back to a time when discrimination deprived their parents of equal opportunities. many hispanics may look back to the lower standard of living their parents experienced in their countries of origin. whites are likely to compare themselves to a reference group that leads them to feel worse off. blacks and hispanics compare themselves to reference groups that may make them feel better off. for many whites, cherlin writes, their main reference group is their parents<u+2019> generation, and by that standard they have little to look forward to and a lot to lament less well-educated blacks and hispanics have not experienced the income gains of the college-educated of all races, but they do see their lives improving when their parents are the reference point. this is reflected in responses in an august 2016 pew report to the question <u+201c>compared with 50 years ago, life for people like you in america today is worse, better or the same?<u+201d> the optimists: clinton supporters (59 better, 19 worse), democrats (55-23), white college grads (43-39), african-americans (51-20), voters with post graduate degrees (51-29). a separate june 2016 pew survey of hispanic voters found that 81 percent of clinton supporters expect their family<u+2019>s finances to improve in the near term, and 72 percent said they expect their children to be better off than they are. the pessimists: trump supporters (81 worse, 11 better), republicans (72-17) and whites without college degrees (60-28). among well-educated whites, there are clear reasons for optimism. what is a primary marker of likely success in the contemporary american economy? the answer in one word is education. alan berube and natalie holmes, a senior fellow and a research analyst at brookings, provided me with data from 2015 demonstrating that education is a key determinant of income. for whites with a high school diploma or less, median annual income is $30,038; with some college, it<u+2019>s $36,047; with a bachelor<u+2019>s degree, $51,064; and with a postgraduate degree, $68,086. overall, high earners who have postgraduate or college degrees are in the democratic camp. in the pew august survey , postgraduate voters favored clinton over trump by 59-21; college grads favor her 47-34. three recent studies of the american electorate illuminate the upheaval in the two political parties: the first , published on oct. 12 by t he institute for advanced studies in culture at the university of virginia, the other two published oct. 19 and oct. 25 by the public religion research institute . the uva-iasc survey highlighted the political and cultural gulf between upscale, predominately democratic whites and downscale, predominately republican whites. the first group, <u+201c>the social elite<u+201d> in uva-iasc<u+2019>s terminology, is made up of whites with advanced degrees. they are 49 percent democratic, 16.8 percent republican. 87.5 percent say the democratic party represents their views very or fairly well, compared to zero percent who say the republican party represents them very well and 24.2 percent who say that it does so <u+201c>fairly well.<u+201d> they plan to vote for clinton over trump by 74.3 to 14.1 percent. the second group, termed <u+201c>the disinherited<u+201d> in the uva-iasc survey, comprises religiously conservative whites without college degrees. republicans outnumber democrats 52.3 to 11.1, and 60.9 percent say the republican party represents their views very or fairly well. they plan to vote for trump by 74.3 to 13.5 percent. james davison hunter, a professor of religion, culture and social theory at uva, and carl desportes bowman, director of survey research at the iasc, write that half of the disinherited live on less than $50,000 per year compared to 10 percent of the social elite. the majority of the disinherited (58%) describe their family<u+2019>s current financial situation as <u+201c>only fair<u+201d> or <u+201c>poor,<u+201d> with half (52%) seeing their prospects in the future as worse, 21 percent seeing their prospects as <u+201c>much worse.<u+201d> <u+201c>conversely, six out of ten (58%) of the social elite have family incomes that are $100,000 or over, compared to 13 percent of the disinherited. the social elite are aware of their good fortune: 73 percent describe their current financial situation as <u+201c>good<u+201d> or <u+201c>excellent<u+201d> and an even stronger majority (79%) see their future as staying the same (36%) or getting better (43%). more affluent and well-educated white voters have substantially different policy agendas from their less affluent and less well-educated fellow citizens. first, the downscale whites. nearly half say they feel alienated from contemporary america (<u+201c>a stranger in their own land<u+201d>), that they have little or no power to change the course of events <u+2014> 84.4 percent believe public officials do not care <u+201c>what people like me think.<u+201d> 83.5 percent agreed that <u+201c>in general, americans lived more moral and ethical lives 50 year ago.<u+201d> these voters are convinced (72.6 percent) that they can no longer get ahead in america through hard work, and that the government in washington threatens the freedom of <u+201c>ordinary americans<u+201d> (75.3 percent). in a nation where same-sex marriage has gained public acceptance and gays routinely appear in television and movies, 54.9 percent of these voters say their own <u+201c>beliefs and values<u+201d> are different from those of gays and lesbians, and 66.2 percent oppose requiring every state to permit same-sex marriages. then the <u+201c>social elite.<u+201d> 74.2 percent say the economy is holding steady or improving; 71.1 percent say that 25 years from now <u+201c>people like you<u+201d> will be doing the same or better; 66 percent disagree with the statement that <u+201c>people like me<u+201d> have no say in government; 68.8 percent say that in america you still get ahead by working hard; 56.7 percent are personally in agreement with the values and beliefs of the cultural elite. 57 percent disagree with the statement that <u+201c>people like me don<u+2019>t have any say in what the government does.<u+201d> these upscale white liberals like government. 52.5 percent have <u+201c>some<u+201d> or <u+201c>a lot<u+201d> of confidence that public officials will tell the truth, compared with 17.1 percent of the disinherited. 68.7 percent of <u+201c>the social elite<u+201d> disagree with the statement <u+201c>the best government governs least,<u+201d> compared with the 75.3 percent of the disinherited.<u+201d> 74.4 percent disagree with the statement that the government in washington threatens the freedom of ordinary americans. there is, in addition, a significant difference in the attitudes toward the poor coming from voters in the <u+201c>social elite<u+201d> and those from <u+201c>the disinherited.<u+201d> asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement <u+201c>most americans who live in poverty are there because of their own bad habits and choices,<u+201d> the social elite sharply disagreed, 81-19, while the disinherited were split (47.2 percent agree, 52.8 percent disagree). the two prri surveys use more traditional terminology, but the findings reinforce those of the uva-iasc study. prri shows how much the trump wing of the republican party sees itself as the underdog, while clinton supporters recognize their privileged position in today<u+2019>s economy: about seven in ten likely voters supporting donald trump (72%) say american society and way of life has changed for the worse since the 1950s, while seven in ten likely voters supporting hillary clinton (70%) say things have changed for the better. these patterns are repeated in the pronounced class differences among whites: a majority (56%) of white college-educated americans say american society is generally better now than it was in the 1950s, while nearly two-thirds (65%) of white working-class americans say things are now worse. white evangelical protestants have the bleakest view of all: <u+201c>nearly three-quarters (74%) say american culture has changed for the worse since the 1950s.<u+201d> the rise of the social elite constituency in the democratic party and the disinherited in the republican party has contributed to a shift in partisan views of free trade agreements <u+2014> part of a larger split on globalism, immigration, and multiculturalism. there is an argument that the divided preferences of white voters <u+2014> with the better off linked to an upscale democratic party and the less well off to a downscale republican party <u+2014> is a unique reflection of this year<u+2019>s presidential race pitting donald trump against hillary clinton. but these trends have been increasingly evident over the past five decades and are not a 2016 aberration. the origins lie in the bitter social and cultural conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s and were evident in the movement of the <u+201c>silent majority,<u+201d> reagan democrats and <u+201c> angry white men<u+201d> to the republican column. the shift of working class whites over the past half-century from the democratic to republican party gained momentum after pat buchanan and pat robertson were granted prime time spots at the 1992 republican convention to give fire-breathing speeches celebrating social conservatism that drove many suburbanites out of the republican party into the democratic party. looking now at the changing composition of the republican electorate, what stands out is the failure of party leaders to anticipate the discontent of their own primary voters. preliminary indications are that the traditional top levels of the republican party hierarchy <u+2014> heavily populated by the affluent and the wealthy <u+2014> will face major hurdles retaining control after the coming election. the trump campaign has demonstrated that many republican voters are deeply critical of their own party establishment, to put it mildly. in the florida republican primary, 60 percent of the voters said they felt <u+201c>betrayed by republican politicians<u+201d>; in michigan, 58 percent; pennsylvania, 59 percent. the disaffection of the republican electorate from the party leadership is palpable everywhere. democrats would appear to face problems trying to stabilize an affluent white and disadvantaged minority coalition with starkly different economic interests. divisions over environmental and energy policies, trade and taxes are potentially areas of disagreement. in practice, this may prove easier than expected. the largely white upscale wing of the democratic party is far more liberal on economic policy than its self-interest would suggest. in the uva-iasc survey, the social elite is not only sympathetic to the poor and to pro-government intervention, but, by 3 to 1, believes that the <u+201c>system is rigged in favor<u+201d> of the wealthy; by nearly 6 to 1 believes that wall street and big business <u+201c>profit at the expense of ordinary americans;<u+201d> and believes, by better than 2 to 1, that the government <u+201c>should do more to improve the lives of ordinary americans.<u+201d> if clinton wins, she should have less difficulty holding democratic factions together than previous democratic presidents, including her husband. she will, however, face a more hostile and obdurate republican opposition than her predecessors <u+2014> an opposition already signaling its unwillingness to compromise with a second clinton white house. follow the new york times opinion section on facebook and twitter (@nytopinion) , and sign up for the opinion today newsletter .
the great democratic inversion
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