two weeks after their drubbing in the nov. 8 election, democratic confusion still outweighs clarity. but this isn<u+2019>t the first time the party has had to cope with defeat. there are precedents for what should come next. the first task is to examine the political climate and understand the reasons that republicans will control the presidency, both houses of congress and a strong majority of governorships. once president-elect donald trump assumes office, it won<u+2019>t be long before there is also, once again, a conservative majority on the supreme court. such resounding defeat cannot be blamed on fbi director james comey or, as some allege, racist or sexist impulses fanned by republicans. democrats lost because the big two issues<u+2014>international and domestic security; and economic stability and well-being<u+2014>were not being handled to voters<u+2019> satisfaction. so americans took a risk by electing an inexperienced and largely undefined tough guy. digging into polling data would suggest many subtopics that contributed to the desire for change. but the big two issues outweighed others. the democratic party once addressed electoral defeat in an orderly way. unsuccessful presidential candidates became the titular leaders of the party over the next four years, appointing new democratic chairmen and serving as spokesmen for the party. thus adlai stevenson, after his 1952 loss to dwight eisenhower, named paul butler chairman of the democratic national committee and formed a broad-based democratic advisory council to develop new policies. the council took more liberal positions than democratic congressional leaders, who by necessity were largely reactive to a popular president eisenhower. its proposals gained legitimacy within the party and formed the basis for later policies by presidents john f. kennedy and lyndon b. johnson. in 1968, after richard nixon won the presidency, defeated candidate hubert humphrey became the chairman of a new democratic policy council, which helped reunite a divided party. humphrey appointed sen. fred harris as dnc chairman. he, as with butler in the 1950s, was the leading non-congressional partisan voice for democrats. the policy council, as did its predecessor advisory council, developed foreign and domestic-policy proposals that reflected party consensus, especially on environmental issues that previously were not part of the party<u+2019>s core platform. the tradition of letting the failed democratic nominee serve in a prominent leadership role disappeared after george mcgovern <u+2019>s one-sided 1972 loss to richard nixon. thereafter, aspiring chairmen campaigned for the jobs among party leaders. for the most part, democrats in congress and would-be presidential candidates were the principal generators of alternative policies. but that didn<u+2019>t serve the party as well as many had hoped. the democrats<u+2019> 1976 nominee, jimmy carter, was nearly as inexperienced in national policy as mr. trump is today. his administration, over the next four years, lacked coherence and clear direction. after president carter<u+2019>s 1980 loss to ronald reagan, stunned democrats sought renewal as they do today. before reagan<u+2019>s inaugural, democrats began organizing an unofficial center for national policy, led by duke university president terry sanford and former secretary of state cyrus vance. as in the 1950s and <u+2019>60s, the goal was to generate new policy ideas. reagan, like eisenhower, was a popular president and dominated policy-making in the 1980s. but the cnp, which i headed from 1981-85, published alternative proposals by a wide range of officeholders, academics and others. it served to unify factions within the party and give exposure to serious plans for the 1990s. the closest thing democrats have to the cnp today is the center for american progress, initially financed in 2003 by george soros and led by john podesta. yet because it has produced most of its work during president obama <u+2019>s two terms, it has been less a source of alternative ideas than a megaphone for incumbent policies. with the advent of the trump presidency, it may be able to adopt the out-of-power role of its predecessors. such bodies are not a substitute for leadership from democrats in congress or presidential hopefuls. but they can bring party factions together to consider new policies and, not least, reject those that lack weight or practicality. today<u+2019>s alternatives might include a coherent approach to federal debt reduction; tax reforms to enhance both growth and equity; and targeted programs to address local crises in law enforcement, employment and education. the party should also consider when and where american interventions abroad are and are not required. where should dividing lines be drawn on cultural and social issues, which have risen steadily in importance over the past 50 years? they clearly cannot be allowed to outweigh peace and prosperity on the party<u+2019>s agenda. the path to democratic recovery does not lie with ever-shriller denunciation of republicans as alleged racists, enemies of women, or allies of the wealthy. democrats must demonstrate ourselves capable of growing a fair economy and keeping the country safe. today, given our party<u+2019>s and candidates<u+2019> ties to big money and finance, we are not credible as populists or allies of the common man. millions of voters think we are committed to our own political success but not necessarily to the national welfare. democrats should not worry about their current shortage of leaders. more will emerge. better to ask: what are the country<u+2019>s big problems? what are our plans to address those problems? how can we persuade a majority to support those proposals? there<u+2019>s no time to waste: another election<u+2014>and a shot at redemption<u+2014>will be along before we know it. mr. van dyk was active for more than 40 years in democratic national policy and politics. he is the author of <u+201c>heroes, hacks and fools<u+201d> (university of washington press, 2007).
how democrats can win again - wsj
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