for a brief, happy<u+2014>and misguided<u+2014>moment, most americans stopped thinking about iraq. after withdrawing the last u.s. troops in 2011, president barack obama declared the country <u+201c>sovereign, stable and self-reliant.<u+201d> no such luck. iraq plunged back into chaos as the islamic state stormed the region last year, and the fall of ramadi in may revived questions about how, and whether, the country can be salvaged.









as americans try to understand what $2 trillion and nearly 4,500 american lives really accomplished, partisans are battling over how much blame falls on obama, who left iraq, and on president george w. bush, who took us there. <u+201c>if you fought in iraq, it worked,<u+201d> 2016 presidential candidate lindsey graham recently said. <u+201c>it<u+2019>s not your fault it<u+2019>s going to hell. it<u+2019>s obama<u+2019>s fault.<u+201d> naturally, democrats see it differently: <u+201c>this represents the failed policies that took us down this path 10 years ago,<u+201d> house minority leader nancy pelosi has said.









who<u+2019>s right? could iraq have remained stable if obama had left behind a small troop contingent? did bush<u+2019>s <u+201c>surge<u+201d> really stabilize the country? in june, politico magazine assembled a dozen experts<u+2014>including veterans of both administrations from the state department, white house, pentagon and the cia<u+2014>and asked a simple question: who lost iraq? <u+2014>michael crowley









michael crowley: ambassador khalilzad, you were in iraq from 2005 to 2007. describe the trajectory iraq was on when you left, and the iraq that obama inherited when he was inaugurated in january 2009.









zalmay khalilzad: it was a very difficult period. especially in the aftermath of the al-askari mosque bombing in 2006, the sectarian violence became front and center<u+2014>a very large number of fatalities and causalities, both shia and sunni<u+2014>and the rise of al qaeda in iraq. we began a more concerted effort training iraqi troops, which resulted in significant growth in their size and capabilities. the new iraqi government led by prime minister nouri al-maliki showed more willingness to use force against the shia militias in basra and baghdad<u+2019>s sadr city. additionally, the excesses committed by al qaeda in iraq against the sunni community was beginning to turn some sunnis against them. with increased outreach to the sunnis, we began to have significant numbers of them work with us.









there were still some issues unresolved<u+2014>there was no oil law for the distribution of resources, there still was no reform of de-baathification. these were self-inflicted wounds, if you like<u+2014>mistakes we made, in my judgment, at the very beginning. but i think the iraqis were heading in the right direction. you had a government that acquired greater national legitimacy. there was a greater sunni participation in government compared to an earlier period. the level of violence, by the end of the bush administration, was significantly down compared to 2006, early 2007.









we<u+2019>re still talking about iraq, but relatively speaking, i would say it was on a positive trajectory with some big issues still unresolved.









mc: kim, tell us more about the security situation when president obama arrived.









kim kagan: the security situation in iraq was dramatically improved by operations conducted by surge troops<u+2014>violence in baghdad and in iraq fell dramatically over the course of 2007. and in 2008, u.s. forces partnered with the iraqi security forces, pushed aqi out of baghdad, out of diyala and all the way to mosul, where the al qaeda elements were greatly reduced over time by follow-on operations and special forces operations. the shia militias, which posed a threat to the sovereignty of the iraqi government, had been greatly diminished by the operations that prime minister maliki and u.s. forces undertook in 2008 and were no longer militarily viable within iraq.









the two main threats to iraqi state security had been significantly diminished by 2008 and over the course of 2009. our u.s. forces were handing over security to iraqi security forces, such that u.s. forces came out of the major cities of iraq, and handed responsibility for those cities back to the iraqi security forces. one of the principles behind the way that the u.s. had constructed its surge operations was that the u.s. had special tie-in capabilities that the iraqi security forces did not have, because they were still growing, still developing skills. so clearing cities was something the u.s. did with iraqi security forces<u+2019> support.









as those cities became more peaceful, as the population returned, as aqi left, the iraqi security forces could handle the security environment in the urban centers. but aqi was not destroyed. it had not lost the will to fight. it was potentially reduced from an organization that had high-end terrorist capabilities that could threaten the state, to an insurgency, a group that had very limited capacity to act as a terrorist organization, but still had some will to fight, and still had some organization, some command and control left over, primarily in the mosul area.









mc: john, what did the threat to the u.s. or western interests in the region emanating from iraq look like at the time obama took office?









john mclaughlin:<u+00a0>if you go all the way back to 2008, the arab spring or awakening was still years away. in 2008, al qaeda central was on the run but not defeated. we were still very much on guard against attacks on the united states; we were just two years after detecting the attempt by al qaeda-related people to put together an operation over the atlantic out of london<u+2014>the planes plot. so al qaeda in that period is still very dangerous but not particularly noteworthy insofar as its capability in iraq was seen.









mc:<u+00a0> ambassador hill, you get to iraq at the start of obama<u+2019>s first term. what does that iraq look like<u+2014>is it on a trajectory to a place where it can stand on its own?









chris hill:<u+00a0>there was perhaps more optimism than the facts might have justified. for example, there was a view that somehow maliki had gotten in the saddle, that he understood the need for outreach to the various groups and was prepared to continue the payments to the so-called sons of iraq. there was an overall kind of optimistic mood, but i must say, in talking to the sunni leaders who were part of his cabinet, you certainly didn<u+2019>t get the sense there was any reason to be optimistic. you certainly got the impression when you talked to people that it wasn<u+2019>t going well. going out to anbar, for example, and talking to sunni sheiks out there, they were all prepared to work together in a kind of all-in sunni party, but you certainly didn<u+2019>t get the impression they were cutting baghdad any slack or cutting maliki any slack.
who lost iraq?
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