repeattheinvitation today. TheAntarctic isexempted fromtheinternational arms racebyspecific provisions againstitsmilitarization. AsanAntarctic Treaty partyweapplaud thisandthegeneral mannerinwhichtheAntarctic ismanaged. Soprogress hasbeenmadeonthispotentially mostdestructive problem facing us.Butitmustalsobesaidthattheprogress hasbeenslow,oftenlimited and oftengrUdging. TheAustralian Government saysthis,notasabystander wringing itshands,butasanactiveandsometimes frustrated participant inthedisarmament process. Wehavearighttoexpressthisfrustration. Weunderstand thattheJSM/mo A/40/PV.17 23 (Mr.Harden, Australia) majorandprimary responsibility fornuclear disarmament andtheprevention of nuclear warrestswiththenuclear-weapon States, andparticularly the super-Powers. Inthissense,disarmament suffers fromthesameironythatafflicts theunitedNations asawhole: thoughtheeffects ofnuclear warwouldbefeltby all,directpowertopreventitisrestricted toafew.Thefewshouldreflect on this.Probably asmanyas30States, inclUding Australia, haveconsidered acquiring nuclear weaponsatonetimeorotherbecause ofthesecurity andstatus theywerethought toprovide. Thosecountries havedecided nottodosobecause theyacceptthenormlaiddowninthenon-proliferation Treatythatnuclear weapons aresimplynotacceptable intheprogressive worldorder. Inmakingthisdecision, thoseStatesearnedtherighttoinfluence thedisarmament process, ratherthan leaveittoanexclusive coterie ofnuclear Powers. Theyhaveearnedtherightto pointoutaspects oftheprocess whichgivethemcauseforconcern. WeinAustralia, ofcourse, appreciate thecomplexities oftheprocess. Ou~ viewisthattheforemost goalofdisarmament negotiations isearlyandradical reductions inthenumberofnuclear weapons. Ifnegotiations focusonthisandif theytakefairaccount ofthevalidinterest ofeachpartyinthemaintenance of stability, itshouldnotbeallthatdifficult toidentify thenumbers andtypesof weaponsystems whichcouldbereduced. Difficulties wouldariseifthe negotiations arenotconducted inthefairwayIhavejustdescribed. Theywould alsoariseifagreement onreductions ismadeconditional onotherissues. We wouldbedeeplyconcerned, forinstance, iflinkage withother, pe~haps related, butclearly separate matters heldupmovement towards reduction ofweapons. Another ofourconcerns isthepossibility ofanarmsraceinspace. The Australian Government hasdeclined toendorse theUnitedStaesstrategic defence initiative. Wepreferthatmaximumattention begiventoeliminating existing ••o••JSM/mo A/40/PV.17 24 (Mr.Hayden, Australia) weapons systems, preserving theanti-ballistic missile regimeandenhancing international effortstoensurethatactivities inspaceremainexclusively for peaceful purposes. Itisnecessary tospeakplainly inasituation inwhichthere isinadequate clarity aboutthefacts. Thereshouldbenoweapons systeminspace, inourview.Iftherearesuchsystems, andifthosewhopropose theexclusively peaceful useofspacehavesuchsystems already there,theyshouldremovethem.If thereisanhonestdifference ininterpreting whatconstitutes permissible research undertheanti-ballistic missile Treaty, thosewhowanttopreserve the anti-ballistic missile regimeshouldbeabletoworkthedifferences out. TheSovietUnionhasproposed totheAssembly thatweshouldtakeanewstep towards international co-operation inspace. TheAustralian Government willstudy theproposal carefully andcritically, bearing inmindalltheramifications ofthe extensive research onthismatterwhichhasalready beenconducted overmanyyears bytheSovietUnion. Ourmostimmediate concern onarmscontrol anddisarmament isthefailure to agreeonatreatywhichwouldprohibit allnuclear testsbyallStatesinall environments foralltime.Suchacomprehensive banisessential toanendtoan armsrace.Thisiswhyithasbeensoughtforthebestpartof25years. Thisis whycommitments tonegotiate suchatreatyhavebeenmadeinsomanyexisting international agreements, including thenon-proliferation Treaty. Andthisiswhy progress towards suchatreatyhasbeensofrustratingly slow.Theconcluding document ofthenon-proliferation TreatyReviewConference calledonthe nuclear-weapon Statestoresumenegotiations onacomprehensive test-ban treatyas amatterofurgency andbeforetheendofthisyear.JSM!mo A/40/PV.17 25 (Mr.Hayden, Australia) Ipropose totakeupthiscallattheAssembly. Idirectitparticularly at thosemembersoftheConference onDisarmament whohavewithheld consensus on proposals whichAustralia, NewZealand andothershavemadesothatpractical work canbestarted without delayonthecomprehensive test-ban treaty. Procedural wrangling abouthowthatworkshouldbedescribed doesaterrible disservice tothe community thatwerepresent here.AW/ljb A/40/PV.11
**Analysis**
The text primarily discusses the issue of disarmament, specifically nuclear disarmament, and its implications for international relations and security. While it touches on the topic of the Antarctic Treaty and the management of the Antarctic region, the main focus is on the international arms race and the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

**Category**
International relations, Science and technology