43' rndeed, the history of arns limitation negotiations and their neagre outcomein artns lirnltation agreements prove that such agreements have ahrays left opendoors for nelr quar.itatlve deveropnents and that they diat not have a direct effecton restrainlng the nucrear arns race. partiar rinilatrons on nucrear testing areparalleled by deverorments of technologies which wouLd make nucrear testsunnecessary. Agreed ceilings on launchers are accorq)anied by increases in nuclearnarheads. Linitations on the nurnbers of antijball-istic nissiles have been followealbv considerabre advances rn balristic missires defence technorogy (BMD), lvhich nayresult in a new round of escalation of the nuclear arns race unless theAnti -Bau istlc Missile systems Agreernent, signed in 1972, is extended beyonat 1982,when it is due for review. Reductions in nuclear rrarbeads coexist rrith thedesigning and stockpiling of other weapons of mass destruction including chenicalweapons' The arms race over oceans and space is becoming an additional facEorundermining the disarmament process. r€ck of progress tolvards disarfiamenE in oneor more of these areas reinforces deadlocks, while in others i! creates a virtuarstalenate in the entire disarlement negottaiing process.
**Analysis**
The text discusses the limitations and agreements regarding nuclear arms, their impact on the nuclear arms race, and the lack of progress towards disarmament. It highlights the contradictions and paradoxes in the agreements, such as the increase in nuclear warheads despite agreed ceilings on launchers. The text also mentions the development of new technologies and the expansion of the arms race to oceans and space. This suggests that the category should be related to international relations, security, and defense.

**Category**
International relations, Security