2BT. A staters defensive capability has in the past often been the basis for thepractice of deterrence, on the principle of naking the outcome of aggression morecosily than the benefits which an adversary could derive from it. ir. tir" nucfearaeie, however, the very cornerstone of what is projected as defence is offensivecapabifity, vhile defensive capabilities - in ihu tr... sense cf the vord - ir.revery linited. Thus, deterrence can be said to be based fundafientally on offensi.vecapability' meaning the ability to inffict intorerable damage on the adversary.This holds true also in a situation uhere deterrence by denial, e.g., by the threatof use of tactical nuclear weapons in a rirnited battlefierd conflict siiuation, isconsidered, as this involves a ris! of escalation to higher 1eve1s of nuclearengagement and thus in itself from the beginning carries a.n el*ment of del-errenceby punishment, which allrays risks becoming the doninating feature. 2BB' rne above does not mean that defence capabilities today are .bsoluterynon-existent. A technologicar breakthrough in defence systems is .mrike-ry butcannot bd totally excluded. Besides, ABM defence capabilities are linited by theA/35 /392 I,lnslish Annex 9age 1O1 Treaty concluded. under the terms of the first SALT agreement of 1972 and of the pT.r.^^1 f^ rhol Trpol', sisned in Moscou in la7L. The APlil T-eatv indicated that h^l 1 srrnar-D.waFq \,,rE, r.a tr",1-aua4 '^ cnl in'r. +^ rall' .r tha ^nn.Fnt l\|. ^ALel^fenceas a basic feature of their strategie relationship. Concluding this Treaty, they both irFlieitLy acknowfedged the fact thaL r.heir respecLive high value targets rnust remain hoslase fp ar"c .,f pI'dress i.'r hv +hc other. 28o 'll'^ .oneprl. n' dot.cr.o^^o iqnljac 'lar halr.nd a cerLain leveI of expected dal--age, Statcs viIL orefer peaca Ll vor. Tn Lhe mid-I96Os, former United States Secretary of Defense Robert lr4cNamara statecl that unacceptabfe destruction vould require one fourth to one third. fe.talities to a population of a 1arge, industrialized nation and des'lruction of half to tvo thirds of the entire industrial capaciLy. Likevise, l{.r, McNemara has illustrated lhe United States capacity for "assured dcstruction'' by sratjng Lhat Lhe Uniled States r even aftel" suffcrjng o first stril{e, could Lhen in a second sLrike have destroyed two fifLhs ol ll^e Soviel Unionts popuJation and 70 per cent of its indusLry. ton 'lha nnl-inn ^f F .la.r-F-i.a I^1'pl .C .1e.1-r,,nt.inn it shrr'r'ld he reeopni 'e''{ ieI f '16 I YvEf v! r !!vb!rr qvv t 4v 6h+iyallr relet irra c^r raAa^hc of ocnor:Tlhieql diffFrpncpc- demopraDhic ql]Ll l\ a.y considerations (dispersion or concentration of the population) and other factors(including historical Lraclitions and experiences). It LrouLd nost certain-Ly be
**Analysis**
The text appears to be discussing the concept of deterrence in the context of national defense and nuclear warfare. It mentions the role of defense capabilities, the risks of escalation, and the consequences of nuclear attacks. The language used is technical and strategic, suggesting a focus on military and political issues.

**Category**
Science and technology, International relations