years. Theconstant pressure togainQualitative advantage hasresulted inmassive diversion ofresources toresearch anddevelopment bythoseStatesabletoafford sUchactivities. Inproducing £ignificant technological progress, theefforts create acycleofcompetition thatisverydifficult tostop;theyarealso undertaken ataqreatcostandcanhavedestabilizing results. Theconcept of numerical restraints mayalsopresent otherdifficulties owingtosomeofthe asymmetries described earlier inthisreport. MeasureS torestrain technological improvements aregenerally verydifficult toverifyunless aparticular technological development isaltogether banned, butontheotherhand,technology itself maymakepossible waysofcontrolling elements ofthenavalarmsraceorthe effects ofcertain weapons. Suggested measures ofrestraint haveincluded: (a)Limitations ondual-capable missiles (i.e.thoseabletocarryeither nuclear orconventional warheads); (b)Systems forensuring thatnavalarmaments haveamethod fordeactivation whichwilldisable themiftheydonotexplode; (c)Methods forneutralizing, minimizing orbanning theemplacement of monitoring systems inoronthesea-bed oroceanfloor; (d)Prohibition onthedevelopment andproduction ofnewSLBMsystems. 289~Inthematter ofnavalarmstransfers thediversion ofscarce resources tothe acquisition ordevelopment ofarmsbycountries oftenhasharmful economic effects. Forthisreason, theremayalsobemeritinconsidering theapplicability ofagreed-controls onarmstransfers andthetransfer oftechnology fornaval application, interalia,asacomplement totheprohibition ofcertain arms developments. Suchrestraints should notimpede aState's ability toacquire arms inordertodischarge itsrighttoself-defence, norshouldsuchmeansbeusedto denyaccess onthepartofdeveloping Statestotechnological orindustrial progress. Qualitative and/or auantitative limitations onarmstransfers couldbe ofsignificant value, butthedifficulties andsensitivities, someofwhichwere described intherecent United Nations StUdyonConventional Disarmament, 33/ should begivenconsideration ifsatisfactory progress inthisareaistobe achieved. C.Geographic and/ormission restraints 290.Limitations ofthistypehavehadsomesucceSS inthepast,thebestknown perhaps beingtheRush-Bagot Agreement of1817andtheMontreux Convention of1936. Akeyingredient ofanylimitation measure, andofitssubsequent success andlongeVity, restsinthefactthatitmustcontain something ofgreatvalueto eachandeverysignatory. Without thisingredient, aStatemayconsider thatthe qaintobehadtromtheproposed aqreement isnotworththeconcessions thathave tobemade. Furthermore, progress insuchnegotiations cannot proceed ina political vacuum butissubject tothegeneral pressures andclimate of international relations between States. /...A/40/535 English page81 291.Another important factortobeborneinmindintheconsideration ofpossible geographic and/ormission restraints istheuniquemobility andflexibility of navalforces. States maywishtoexercise theprinciple ofthefreedom ofthehigh seasyetrecognize thatcertain limitations todeployments -forinstance, temporary deployments maybepermitted butnotpermanent stationing ofnaval forces -mayprovide specific benefits. Inothercircumstances, itmaybepossible tonegotiate limitations oncertain kindsofnavaldeployment, ornavalmissions, thatwouldlessenthechances ofconfrontation inareasofpossible regional conflict. 292.Therewouldappeartobeconsiderable interest OnthepartofmanyStatesin thelimitation oftbedeployment ofnuclear weapons. Giventhatthepresent policies ofnuclear-weapon Statesareneither toconfirm nordenythepresence On boardofnuclear weapons, oneofthemajordifficulties tobeovercome isthe matterofidentifying whichships,submarines ornavalaircraft arecarrying nuclear weapons atanypartiCUlar time. Theefforts tointroduce nuclear-weapon-free zones,suchasinLatinAmerica bytheTreatyofTlatelolco and inAntarctica bytheAntarctic Treaty, couldprovide stepping-stones towards the consideration ofnewareasinwhiChnuclear weapons wouldbeprohibited. Inthis respect, itmaybepossible togiveconsideration toagreements forextending existing areasthatarefreeofnuclear weapons, e.g.increasing the
**Analysis**
The text appears to be discussing the challenges and potential solutions related to the development and deployment of naval weapons, including the need for international agreements and restraints to prevent destabilizing competition and promote disarmament. The text also touches on the economic and technological aspects of naval arms development, as well as the potential for geographic and mission restraints to promote stability and cooperation.

**Category**
Science and technology, International trade, Industry