thedescription ofnavalunitsandsystems isincomplete, butforothersitis hopedthatthecontent willbesufficient topresent abroadpicture ofnaval forcesandtheircapabilities. 1.Strategic nuclear forces11/ (a)Ballistic missile nuclear submarines 102.Thenumbers ofballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBNs) areasfollows: USA 6OHIO 19LAFAYETTE 12FRANKLIN~ 3TYPHOON 36DELTA 23YANKEEFrance 6 4 2 (~: Theabovefigures fortheSoviet UnionandtheUnitedStates show thoseSSBNswithinthebilateral Strategic ArmsLimitation Talks(SALT) Agreement. Newconstruction isunde<wayorbeingplanned and,separately, theSoviet Unionhasanumberofsmaller, olderSSBNsoutside thatAgreement. TheUnitedStates announced on10June1985that,astheseventh OHIO-class SSBNputstosealaterin1985,anexisting LAFAYETTE/FRANKLIN SSBNwillbe deactivated anddisassembled according toagreedprocedures inordertoremain withintheun<atified SALTIIlimits.) 103.SSBNsvaryinsize,e.g.fromabout8,000displacement tonsinthecaseofthe British andF<enchvessels to18,000displacement tonsfortheOHIOclassandsome 25,000displacement tonsfo<theTYPHOON class. Theynormally operate, itis believed, intheNo<thAtlantic, NorthPacific andArcticOceans, usually remaining onsubme<ged patrolforove<twomonthsatatime.Although mostSSBNshave twocrewswhichgotoseaonalternate patrols inordertomaximize theoperational availability oftheSUbmarines, itisbelieved thatinnormalpeacetime conditions owingtoperiods ofmaintenance, majo<refit,modernization andtrials, abouthalf theSSBNsareoperationally available atanyone time. /...A/40/535 English Page34 (b)Submarine-launched ballistic missiles 104.Thenumbers ofsubmarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMS) areasfollows: 640!o/ !o/Mid-1985. ~/Early1985.928~/France 96 64 24 /...MostSSBNscarry16missile tUbes,although theSoviet TYPHOON classofSSBNsis reported tohave20andtheUnitedStates OHIOclass24.Missile rangesvaryfrom about3,000kmtoabout8,000km.Thelongerrangespermitoperations closerto protected homecoasts. Thenumberofwarheads permissile variesaccording to missile typebutisbetween 1and14.Forthemostpart,UnitedStates SLBMscarry morewarheads thanSoviet SLBMsresulting, itisbelieved, inasignificant numerical superiority infavouroftheUnitedStates, although superiority in individual weaponyieldisbelieved toliewiththeSovietUnion. Mostmodern SLBMsinservice inUnitedStates andSoviet SSBNshavemultiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV)capabilities. Targetaccuracy isconstantly beingimproved, butasyetsea-launched ballistic missiles arebelieved nottohave theaccuracy ofland-based ballistic missiles. Inthenextfewyearstechnological advancements inthematterofaccuracy willundoubtedly continue tobemade. Of thecombined UnitedStatesandSovietpotential totalsof3,992strategic missiles (ICaMsandSLBMS),1,568ofthem-orsome40percent-aresea-borne. Ithas beenestimated 16/thattherearemorethan7,200SLBMstrategic nuclear warheads distributed amongthenaviesofthefivenuclear-weapon States, byfarthelarge majority beingonboardUnitedStates andSoviet SSBNs. 105.untiltheendofthe1970sitwasgenerally believed thatSSBNswere invulnerable. Astherewasdoubtabouttheability ofstrategic bomberaircraft to penetrate anti-aircraft defences andtbecapacity tocarryoutmissile launcbes fromlandintimeofsurprise attack, SSBNsappeared tobetbemoststableelement ofdeterrence. Furthermore, thedevelopment ofmoreaccurate missiles provides SSBNswithaprecision capacity against specific targets previously reserved to bombers andland-based missiles. 106.Advances illanti-submarine warfare, theentryintoservice ofimproved "hunter-killer" or"attack" submarines, veryfastandquietsubmarines, andthe constant improvement indetection devices havearoused certain doubtsregarding the maintenance ofinvulnerability. Suchapprehensions arelargely exaggerated: the extentofthezonesthatmustbesurveilled inordertofindSSBNsonstation is immense, andithasbeenfurther enlarged bytheextension oftherangeofnew missiles. Furthermore, underwater detection remains verydifficult. The probability thatasignificant numberofsubmarines onpatrolcanbedestroyed is thusveryslim,andthissituation seemslikelytolastatleastuntilthenext decade, amajortechnological breakthrough appearing improbable. Nonetheless, suchperceptions bavecontributed toacceleration inthenavalprogrammes ofthe UnitedStates andtheSoviet Union.A/40/535 English
**Analysis**
The text appears to be a description of naval forces and their capabilities, specifically focusing on strategic nuclear forces, ballistic missile submarines, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The language used is technical and detailed, suggesting a focus on military strategy and technology. The text also touches on the role of SSBNs in deterrence and the potential for technological advancements to improve their capabilities.

**Category**
Transport and communication, Science and technology