location (exact geographical co-ordinates); they will have to be either closed down or converted for purposes of protection. The conversion of laboratories to peaceful uses should be authorized but the convention will have to spell out recommendations in that regard. "Pilot" units generally have only a very short existence; their future will remain the responsibility of the State party. As regards the manufacture of chemical weapons, a distinction should be made between plants producing toxic substances and workshops for filling them into delivery vehicles, workshops producing the bodies or warheads of munitions or special devices. The latter workshops are generally part of larger units and are justified only by the existence of the toxic chemical. If the source of the chemical is dried up, these workshops a priori lose their raison d'etre . The plants producing toxic chemicals and the workshops for filling them into delivery vehicles are finally the elements which present the greatest risk of circumvention of the convention and are therefore the only means of production which will have to be considered for irreversible neutralization. 1. Definitions There are likely to be great differences in facilities between the States parties, which have not all attained the same technological standard and which have neither the same political structures nor the same technical organizations. Each factory is in itself a special case. It is, however, essential that a number of common criteria should be established in the convention: (a) Plants producing toxic chemicals Such plants are capable of producing either lethal supertoxic substances and/or their key precursors, or incapacitating agents, or lethal toxic substances or harmful products. (a.1) Facilities for the manufacture of lethal supertoxic chemicals The manufacture of such extremely dangerous products is possible only in high-security, more or less secret facilities . Generally speaking, therefore, 
**Analysis**
This text appears to be discussing the destruction of chemical weapons and the conversion of facilities used for their production. It mentions laboratories, plants, and workshops, and refers to the need for international cooperation and recommendations for the conversion of facilities. The text also touches on the issue of secrecy and security, suggesting that the facilities in question are likely to be highly specialized and require specific measures to prevent circumvention of the convention.

**Category**
Science and technology, Industry