declared CW stocks and production facilities, as well as their destruction; verification of non-production of chemical weapons, i.e. the monitoring of relevant non-prohibited activities in the chemical industry; and clarification and verification procedures in case of ambiguous situations and doubts about compliance. The conceptual approach underlying this verification system is sound. Last year's discussions on the pattern of verification testified to that. They also demonstrated that this approach is broadly accepted and considered to provide the basis for reliable and effective verification. Last year's discussions in the Ad hoe Committee on Chemical Weapons also focused on possible additional verification measures which are to supplement the existing ones already provided for in our "rolling text". As early as January 1988 my delegation put forward a proposal for ad hoe checks, a CD/PV.550 17 (Mr. Ludeking, Federal Republic of Germany) verification measure designed to complement the existing routine measures for the verification of non-production. We did so in an attempt to meet concerns expressed about the ease with which chemical weapons can be produced clandestinely in the chemical industry. Ad hoe checks were designed to provide for a flexible, easily implementable and unintrusive means of verification at the disposal of the Technical Secretariat covering all facilities in the chemical industry which can be misused for the production of chemical weapons. Following our initial proposal, which was subsequently further developed in the course of the discussions (cf. CD/869 of 6 September 1988), other suggestions for strengthening the existing verification system have been put forward. In this regard I would like to mention specifically the very interesting and important proposal by the United Kingdom on ad hoe inspections. The proposals which were put forward differed in their conceptual approach. However, the concerns which lay behind them were basically the same. The discussions on ad hoe verification, although they have not yet been 
**Analysis**
The text appears to be discussing the verification of chemical weapons and the implementation of measures to ensure compliance with international agreements. The language used is formal and technical, suggesting a focus on international relations and diplomacy. The references to specific proposals and documents also suggest a context of international negotiations and agreements.

**Category**
Industry, Science and technology