the foundation upon which the Treaty rests. However, the"e has not been any substantia] result in the direction of fulfi]-nlent of this obLigation. [33. me technical preconditions for producing nuclear weapons have been d.iscussed in s one detail in chapter II . In practice, a state wishing to aequire a rudinentaly nuclear-r,ieapon capability would not require a gxeat deal of weapon-grade fissionable material. A rninim]m of 12 warheads night constitute such a force. Although this figure is conpletely arbitrary, it would provide the capacity to target four cities fl ma Nuclear Suppliers Croup - -Belgiurn, canada, Czechoslovakia" France, Gernany, tr'ederal Republi.c of, the Getman Demoeratic Republic ' Italy' Japan ' the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States - notified IAXA in 1978 of conmon guidelines to be applied in the erport of nuclea? naterial equipnent or technology.Al 3r/392 nnglish Annex Page 135 with three 20 kt' .oeapons each or r-2 cities with one veapon each, Alfow:ing for arisk of failure of one r^reapon in three, such a force could establish a capability tothreaten severe damage to some 3 to B cities.
**Analysis**
The text appears to discuss the technical aspects of nuclear weapons and the potential for a state to acquire a rudimentary nuclear capability. The language used is technical and specific, with references to weapon-grade fissionable material, warheads, and cities. This suggests that the text is related to science and technology, particularly in the field of nuclear physics.

**Category**
Science and technology