49' l'to t all confricts among the deveroping countries are equarry relevant to thestrategies of the leading Heapons exporters and, by and large, many of them fallinto.the category of what rnay be described as areas of narginal strateglcsignificance. But, co the eitent that they continue to occur in sone areas thatare less marginar than othersr their eventuar. outcone has a rer.evance for thestrategic calculatlons of the najor arnrs suppliers. h this sense, as in severalothers, the norld has becolne an integrated iirategJ.c scene. The risk of one orItlore triggering events in the developing countries resulting in a wlderconflaglation has imparted a geographic cllnension to the strategy of preventing rraramong the developed countries. The confrict situations i.n the ilveroiing countriesneed to be resorved not onry because of the suffering and the arestruction theyinflict.upon the peopte directly affectecl by then and the risks of widerescalations they entail, but also because tiey continue to provide a strongstimulus for increases in miritary outr-ays of the countries actually experiencingthese confricts. rt ls not a rnere coincidence that practicalry arl the deveropingcountries generally incruded albng the rlst of domesiic arms pioducers have eitheractually experienced one or more conflicts or are producing the types of neaponsParticularly .,ell suited to neet the dernands of other deveioping countrles that areinvolved in conflict situations but dlo not have the industrlar infrastructure toproduce those weapona dornestically. 23/ The phenomenon of domestic arns productionin the developing countries, driven iiinry uy tne requirements of the confrictsactually experienced and perceived, may aiso be seen as reflecting a growing v37/386 Engl ish Annex Paqe 25 reLuctance by the recipient countries abou t being sucked into the strategic considerations of the suppllers when such considerations do not corresPond to their imned iate security concerns. 50. Throughout the Ig?Os, international artns transfers, confined entirely to conventional weaPonry, nere characterlzed by ti{o najor features' First' an increaslng portion of mllitary proatuction arnong the leading suPPlier countries consisted-o-f weaPons tor expoltl Partly, it is believed, to recover at least a share of the soaring costs ;f reaearch, develoFnent, testing and evaluatlon' Secondly, the nature of equiPment tranaferred inco4)orated an increased variety of weaponJ of greater tecfrnoiogicaf sophistication. The export outlets for the exotic weaPonry manufactured in the developed ltorld have become lncreaslngly attractive avenues for recovering some of the exhorbitant costs of production. Also, slnce, as lras sho$n earlier' some of the rnissions traalitionally asslgned to tactical nuclear rreapons could vtell be Perforned by Precis ion-delivered weaPons ldith a conventional warhead, it tnay rnean that nuclear neapons could be lrore readily dlspensed with in a regionai conflict. This could neII have the effect of blurring the distinction between the use of nuclear and non-nuclear r'teaPon s ' thus enhancing the risk that an arned conflict may develop into a nuclear war'
**Analysis**
The text appears to be discussing the relationship between military conflicts in developing countries and the strategies of leading weapons exporters. It highlights the phenomenon of domestic arms production in developing countries, driven by the requirements of conflicts, and the growing reluctance of recipient countries to be drawn into the strategic considerations of suppliers. The text also touches on the role of international arms transfers and the development of precision-guided weapons. Given the focus on military conflicts, arms production, and international relations, it is likely that the text falls under categories related to international relations and security.

**Category**
International relations, Security