stage(seeabove,paras. 72-81).' Inconformity withtheclearly prevailing view, theCommission wasagreedthattheCourtofthegivenState, whichenacted the modellaw,wascompetent forset~ing asidethoseawards madeinitsterritory. It wasagreedtodetermine atalat~rstage, whenthefinalwording ofageneral provision ontheterritorial scopeofapplication ofthemodellawwouldbe considered, whether theterritor'ial restriction should beexpressed inarticle 34 orwhether thegeneral provision, sufficed. Subsequently, inlightoftheadoption ofarticle 1 (1bis)containing ageneral provision ontheterritorial scopeof application ofthemodellaw (se~above,para.81),theCommission decided thatan expression oftheterritorial reistriction inarticle 34wasnotnecessary. Itwas notedthattheadoption oftheso-called strictterritorial criterion didnot Ipreclude parties fromselecting theprocedural lawofaStateothet thanthatof theplaceofarbitration, ptovid~d thattheselected provisions werenotin conflict withthemandatory pro~isions ofthe(model) lawinforceattheplaceof arbitration. . Paragraph (2) Concern aboutrestrictive listqfgrounds 277.Concern wasexpressed thatithelistofgrounds onwhichanawardmay beset asideunderparagraph (2)mightbetoorestrictive tocoverallcasesofprocedural injustice whereannulment wasjustified. Toillustrate thepoint,itwas questioned whether thefollowing caseswerecovered byanyofthegrounds setforth inarticle 34(2),morespecific!ally aub-paraqrapha(a)(ii)and(iv),read together witharticle 19(3),orsubparagraph (b)(ii):1.theawardwasfounded onevidence whichwasprovedor!admitted tohavebeenperjured; 2.theawardwas obtained bycorruption ofthearbitrator orofthewitnesses ofthelosingpartYJ 3.theawardwassubject toamiistake, admitted bythearbitrator, ofatypewhich didnotfallwithinarticle 33(1)(a)J4.freshevidence hadbeendiscovered that couldnothavebeendiscovered bytheexercise ofduediligence during thearbitral proceedings, whichdemonstrated thatthrough nofaultonthepartofthearbitrator -54-theawardwasfundamentally wrong.Itwassuggested that,unlesstheCommission wasagreedthatsuchserious instances ofproc~dural injustice werecovered by paragraph (2)andtheunderstanding wasclearly reflected inthereportofthe session and any commentary onthefinaltext,theprovision should bemodified by appropriate wording soastocoverthoseinstances. 278.Another suggestion wastomakethelistofgrounds non-exhaustive soasto allowforfutureinclusion ofworthycaseswhichmightnotbeforeseeable bythe Commission. 279.TheCommission postponed itsconsid~ration oftheaboveconcern and suggestions until aft~rit hadexamined thegrounds setforthinparagraph (2). Asfullydiscussed duringthatlaterconsideration (seebelow,paras. 298-302) and known from thedeliberations oftheWorking Group,thereweredivergent opinions on whether ortowhatextenttheconcern was met by theexisting textorshould be met byadditional wording. Oneviewwas,forexample, thatonlysomeandnotallof thegrounds presented intheaboveillustrative casesjustifiedsetting asidean award. Subparagraph (a)(i) 280.Asregards thefirstgroundsetforthinthesUbparagraph, itwassuggested thatthewording, whichwastakenfromarticle V (1)(a)ofthe1958NewYork Convention, wasunsatisfactory intworespects. First,thereference to"the parties" wasinappropriate sinceitsufficed thatoneoftheparties lackedthe capacity toconclude anarbitration agreement. Second, thewords"underthelaw applicable tothem"wereinappropriate inthattheyappeared tocontain aconflict oflawsrulewhichinfactwaseitherincomplete ormisleading inthattherule mightbeunderstood asreferring tothelawofthenationality, domicile or r~sidence oftheparties. Itwas,therefore, proposed tomodifythewording ofthe firstgroundalongthefollowing lines: "apartytothearbitration agreement referred toinarticle 7lackedthecapacity toconclude suchanagr~~ment". 281.Inresponsetothatproposal, itwas.statedthatitwasunnecessary andeven dangerous todeviate fromthewording embodi~d inthe1958NewYorkConvention and oth~rinternational tektsonarbitration suchasthe1961 Gen~vaConvention. It wasunnecessary sinc~theoriginal wording didnotappeartohaveledto considerable difficulties ordisparities andcertainly hadnotledingeneral toan interpretation different fromtheoneaimedatbytheproposed clarification. The deviation wasdangerous inthatitmightleadtodivergent interpretations, based onthedifferent wordings, inanissuewhichshouldbedealtwithinauniform manner.
**Analysis**
The text appears to be discussing the development of a model law on international arbitration, specifically the territorial scope of application and grounds for setting aside an award. The language used is technical and refers to specific international conventions and treaties, such as the 1958 New York Convention and the 1961 Geneva Convention. This suggests that the text is related to international trade and commerce, as arbitration is often used to resolve disputes between parties from different countries.

**Category**
International trade