377' A stir-l 10wer leve1 0f cleterrent force r'rhich a non.-nuclear-weapon srare may consider accluiring is a rud.imentary to modest nuclear force against a possiblenilitary attack by a non-nuclear-.weapon state. guch a nuclear force woul-dbasically require acquisition of a siffi.cient number of nuclear weapons to threaten vast d'estruction and casuaLties on the territory of an adverssxy. The difficu-rtyl[th this scenario is, of cour.se, that the non- irucrear-oreapon state to be d€terrednay also be tempted to go nuclear and it is by no nxeans self*evident that a nuclearconfrontation situation wourd be better than L conventional one for the nationalsecurity of either State. Rather, there seem to be strong nreunents to thecont.rary " 378' r'irst, the acquisition of a modest nuclear-weapon force by one state wouldhave a dramatic effect on the r-ocal strategic envirlnment. ttoi onry iis nain ?9"?""?.V but also uany other_statcs in thJ region cou]-d be expected to review their levef of national seeurity. Those vhich fer-t that their national securityr.ras in sone vay affected.might decide to accluire a comparable nuclear capability.There.is thus the tangible risk that, with tiime, the vhole region would go nucfear,rn this context it should be remerabered that nuciear-veapon proliferation is aprocess 'hich is difficult to reverse. once the knowled.ge of nucrear-weapon designis acquired" the capability would be easier to re_establish.A/ 3r/ 392 English Annex Page I22 379. Secondly, a basie difficufty with the proliferation scenario is that the new ,r.,r"f.." "*p.ii.titi"" established woul,d be rudinentary and nodest not only in terms of numbers of weapons but sfso with regard to the systens for conmand and control aDtt the nethods for protecting the nuclear weapons against attack. Thisr in turn' lnay lead to a ,td.elic;te balance of terror", thus increasing fears of attack in politically tense situations. 380. The maior result' as in the case of the super-Polter nuclear arns race" would ire sinply to raise the fevel of destruction tha't vould occur if the"e was a conrliit. ilith proliferation, the internationa] system of states vould move to{ards a situation where nationaf security would be upheld ' not by the best prirr"ipru* of int-.rnationar law, but by the harshest possible rules of punishment " 381, there is further the generaf probl-em of escalation of conflicts to be Ionsiderea, escalation up io the nucfear level as vell as to affect a videning
**Analysis**
The text discusses the potential consequences of a non-nuclear-weapon state acquiring a nuclear force, including the risks of nuclear proliferation, the difficulty of reversing the process, and the potential for escalation of conflicts. The text does not mention specific economic, environmental, or social issues, but rather focuses on the international security implications of nuclear proliferation.

**Category**
International relations, Science and technology