f2/ Prospect fo? a comprehensive nuclear tes!-!gA fuggln. Eearings for theS"l"oo*i d. Organization of the Conmitteeon rroreign Relations, united states senatee p2nd congress " !'irst session on acomprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, JuLy 19?1.Al 35 / 392 Annex 5) pel cent - Weapon d.evelopnent tests 16 per cent - Validation tests 9 per cent - Weapons effects tests 5 per cent - Conbined veapon developnent and. validation tests ! per cent - Csnbined r,reapon effects and v:rlidt tion tests By "validation" is meant essentially the final confirmation, if required", of the firnctioning of a completed 'weapon, vhile "developnent" refers to the earlief', more explorative design stages. It should be noted that trstockpile testing?r, i.e. sampling to check the function Of stockpiled \,realons 1 is not mentioned. Ther.e are ind.ieations, hovever, that at l"east the United States has nade very feln' tests ri-ith Lhe so.Ie purpose of checking the stockpile. 89. Those favouring a comprehensive test ban cl-ain that it wil-J. inpede the evolution of nuclear-weapon technolog:y arnong the existing nuclea? Powers, contribute to prevent the proliferation of nuclear r,reapons a.nong nations whieh do not now possess them and generally cle-emphasize nuclear weaponry. 90. Those opposing a comprehensive test ban argue that nuclear stockpiles vould become less re1iabIe, and thet one rrcu-Id have to forgo nuclean-weapon developments leading to nucl-ear weapons which are safer against accident and more cont"ollab1e. Tbe view is also expressed. that the nucfear-weapon Powels rtoul.d- need to continue to test in order to stay ahead- of those nuclear Powers that have not signed thepartial test-ban tres.ty " 91, It might be tectrnical-ly possible for a nucfear-weapon Po\,rer to maintain a stockpile (without improving it) by non-nuclear testing and rernanufacture of components which age, corroale or otherrrise become unacceptable for use in the