unacceltable levels of damage. \1?. Another elenent to be taken into account is the vulnerability to destruction of the conmrmications systems wtlich supporb the strategic weapons and provide fJ-exibility to adopt various postules. Destruction of these support systens vould put into question lhe concept of controlLed nuclear exchange and seriously undermine the cor.lrterforce capability of a super-Power. )+18. A super-Por,rer may consider the capacity to make a controlled o" linitetl res?onse to have certain benefits in times of crisis. It couJ-d provide the opportunity to give a measured response to a linited or accidentaf attack 'lrithout automatic escafatio[ to a fu1l and. devastating response. on the othe" hand' crisis management nay become more d.ifficult. If, e.g., each supef-Power woul"d acquire the capability to destroy the fixed land.-based nissile forces of the other side by expending only a pottion of its or,"n land-based. rnissiles, deterrence based on second st;ike might be undernined, Retaliation to an attack on the lantl-based force would in turn invite a fijrther response inflicting unacceptable levels of da&age 'Al 35 / 392 nnglish -fu1nex Page 131 419. The banier against nuclear war is strongest when the thaeshold to be crossedin initiating a nuclear exchange is very vetl defined. Adoption by the super-porn'ersof a witier range of strategies providing for controLJ.ed response and lirnited strikescould tlrus leaal to an erosion of the nucl-ear threshold., The assumption r.rnderlyingthese strategies is tlat a nuclear exchange can take place ithout the certainty ofescal-ation' Anothe" irnportant technological- d.evelopnent has been the emergence of systens. which can perforrn both strategie and theatre roles (so-ca1led "gray area,' systems ). One consequence of thei.r deployment could be to blur distinction betueentheatre and. strategic use of nuclear weaBons.