29" lleither the baslc structure nor the techni.ca] details o? such intelligence,conmand., contTol and conmunications syst€ms are publicry knor,rn. rt is obvious,hor,re-ver, that they could be designed to serve either a central-ized or adecentralized command authority. rt is also obvious - from several press reportsof false alarms ovex the lrgs1s - that the systems are not infallibLe. tr'or thisreason there is a growing concern that control may sone day fai1, und.er theinfluence of, for example, a false message or a misunderstood cormard. and thatnuclear var is thus triggered inadvertentl-y, D,Thg..-lr31in stle!-ggi-c gtlgry.ls- oq_ths -:s_rlL911e_,or,r91 s ! / 30" fn the proposed SAI,T ff treaty J/ be_tween the Uniteai States and the sovi et union ' there is an exchange of data ;; ;;; J;.;.gic nuclear forces of bo'i sides. The forces in question are.those with capability. to tnreaten the super-poraers'ort'n homelands. i.e." vhat is sometimes ""r""""i"o as central strategic systems,. -4/ Figures pertaining to numbers and characteristics of weapons quoted in this chapter are based on data given in SIpRI ieqlboo5_1ggo-., -r;;lnii;;?ff -Bgrgg-g (19?g -1g80 ) " rnternationar i""iit"#i; blrategf,c studies , London , unl"es s othervise stated. J/ As at l-2 July L9B0 this treaty had not been ratified.Ll35/392 English Annex rage 1o In the 'l'{enorandum of Understand.ing Regarding llstablishnent of a Data Base the two countries for the first time have declared their possession of the fo11on'inf nunbers of such strategic arns as at 18 Jrrt:e l_979: Launchers of fCEUs Fixed launche"s of Larrnchers of ICEMS La.unchers 'of SLBMS Lar.rnchers of SLBIIS HeavJr bonbers United thos eICBvls equrpped wlth I'4It(v s9l_i-tS$-!!atSS _1 , O5)+ I ,051+ \96 573 3 0USSN 550 608 655 9501,398 I ,398 f44 r )o 0 0equipped with I{IRVs Hea'qr bombers equipped for cruise nissiles capable of range in excess of 600 kn. ASBMs ( ai r-t,o-.surface ballistic nissil-es)