t.roptttion to take advantage of it is usually d'ifficu-It to resist' 362. No attempt wil-l be nade to weigh the above-mentioned factors comparatively as e}enents of the nuclear arms race betveen the super-?o\,rers. I.trhatever- the cha"s,cter of the nuclear arms race' ec-ch super- Po""t pe"""1tte= that lts national security a"p..rau heavily on .tucl.ear-'teapon systems "t'd.ott " continuous upgrading of the capability of those ""=i",". fto ao"tt, the risk of a nuclear confl-agration has deterred the suler-Powers from allowing any confrontation between them t'o escalate to gfobal war. It is a lamentable staie of affairs' however ' that if a fu1l' scal-e conflict]nreletooccur'thepricetobepaid]^/ouldbethecertriindestructionof their ovn societies and very extensive consequences for the rest of the vorld ' 363. It was an encouraging developnent .'when. the two super'?owers agreed to begin their Strategic Arrns Lirniiation T;lks (SALT)' A detailed discussion of theiT nutual interest in an imp"o]rta national secr'rity could have had inportant . consequences to ttre lesl'interests also of the rest of the world' this could have been the caseo not onry in terms of arns l-imitation but also for a strenAthening of d6tente and inl,ernational relations in general. so far, however ' SAT'T has not led to steps or ai"r"ruiln;-";t;.; rrad only limired effects from thc arrns control point of view. It has rather served to strengthen the super''Power conviction that deterrence must be based on a balance cf terror' Against the background of the cufent i-mpasse in tit. i'qiT p"o"""", decisions are being taken to increase the size and capacity or tne "uciear forces of the super*Por'rers r'rhi ch are likefy in the long term to have aa,,.""" tuirt"r tntn positive efiects on the level of national security fel-t in each States' ttr" .tL.r *"f eat-*. 364, ttie nuclear forces of china, France and the United Kingdom are nuch smaller