arsenals, including the deadly nuclear weapons. The risks of a nuclear war by accident, niscalculation or an act of strategy have increased due to several develolments during the period under review. There has also been a reiterated emphasis on enlarging th€ scope and expanding the reach of strategic doctrineB rhich view the entire worLd as an integrated nultilevel strategic scene. v37/385Engllsh Annex Page 62 135. In a deteriorating international climate, the vicious causati.on between the technological and strategic aspects of the nuclear arms race, confined essentiallyto the rnajor rnilltary powers, produced a virtual staLernate in the process of nuclear disarnament negotiatlons. The perioat uhder review also underlined thefragility of d€tente unless it is accornpanied by political action in the field of conf ldence-bu ilding and securiey and neaningful reductions in the nassive military bulld-ups in accordance with the principle of undiminished security as stressed bythe Final Docunent of the Tenth special session of tbe General Assenbly (resolution S-I0/21 . The develolments since then represent a step backvrards from theinternatlonal consensus on a disarnanent strategy, the imnediate goal of which wastbe elininatlon of the danger of nuclear war and inplernentation of neasures to halt and reverse the arms race, wr.th a view to achieve general and conple te disarlament under effective internabional control. The inabiLity of the second special sesslon devoted to dlsarmanent hel-d in 1982, to agree on a cornprehensive progranme of disarmament and on the causes of the failure to Lmplement the decision and reconnendations of the first special session largely reflected a spilL-over of thedistinctly deteriorating international clitnate, which b}' nor{ is under unprecedentedthreats ernanating from the deadly destructive potential of an unabated arms race. 136. With an uprard trend at an estinated rate of about 3 per cent per annum (in