is consid.ered to be an inportant provision in the tleaty as it sets a l-imit on the further ttverticaL" prol-iferation of nuclear varhead.s. fn adalition, the treaty vou.l-d. ban nev heavy ICBMS and otherwise linit clualitative ilaprovenents on ICBMS, pernitting the flight testinS and deplolrnent of onl-y one new type of light ICBM on each side, There nould be no restrictions on qualitative improvenents on SLBMS, howeve", l_10. In order to conply with the aggfegate linits, the soviet union would have to disnant]-e a5b stratelic del-ivery systems. The United states is at present vittrin the final SALT If fimits. Neverthel"ess " uodernization plogralees on both sidesfii;ifi' Annex Paae \7 are continuing. The treaty voul"d limit the Soviet forces to 6,200 ICal.{ varheadsand 21000 to 3"000 SLBI1 varheads in 1985, at which ti.me the United States woutdhave some 2,100 varheads on ICBMS, 6,300 on SLBl4s and_ perhaps 3,OOO onair-launched cruise missiles, fll"' At present, the d.irection of the long-term evolution of the strategic forcesis not at al1 clear. As one exarnll-e of this, some erperts argue that thetechnical facts which dTove the super-powers to prefer targe iubmarines may nowhave changed-" Designs are available for nissires which do not require nalntenancefrom one year to the next. Furthermore, the deptoy[ent of satelli-te navigationsystems and their possible coupling to the guidance computers of the roissilesthenselves means that even smar,r- nissires (which could not afford heavy guidancesystens ) may be highly accuratee and that their inertial guidance systlns need notbe so expensive as formerly. To take ad.vant age of these developrnenis, someadvocate the introduction of smalr submar:ines e each ca*ying z ir \ missiles inhermet ic a-lly-sealed capsu-les, outside the pressure hul1 of the submarine - F.