LOO, to live in a worl-d. with nucleaLweapons also neans that certain innate element s of the nucl-eax arns race endanger international peace and security. Period-s nay co&e vhen one or the other, and sometimes both, of the super.-Pdwers becone less confid.ent about their state of national_ security, This cou]-d occur vhen one consid.ers that +ha ^fhFT !''< oanrrira'r " conpet,itive edge in strategici,/ 35 / 392 -E;nar-L I s 11 linnr:x ta;e Lla nuclear capabili.ty. It is almost axiomatic that the ).evel- of international security is adversely affected r,rhen a super-Pornrel becomes uncertain about its own security. In general, the state of international securltll i,tould. thus come to vary rrith th€ u.ps and dovns of the nuclear arms race. And it is a fact that the drrnon-ia ^f tha h,1.1aAr ar]ls race has caused an increase in the 1eve1 of nuclear capabili-t]r at rrhich the deterrenc€ t,al-ance is rrerceived to be established by the tl.ro suler-Powers, l+OL. tUe su,rer'Povers' reliance on nuclear \.teapons for their securitl' confers tegitinacy on these r{eapons as instruments of power. The efforts to encourage States to accept binding multilateral conmitments to forgo nuclear r'reapons vi1l therefore bc hindered untess the nuclear- r.reapon States themselves demonstrate a preparedness to take neaningful measures to\,'ards the elirrinati on of nr-:cl-egr 1{eal-lons. Acquisition of nuclear r.reaTrons by additional States is, however. lihe1J' to underr:rine interna-tional securittr, lro2. Ttrere is therefore a need for the super-Powers to enhance the over-alI 1evel of intern3tional security by introducing order and predictability into their strategic relationship by neaotiating reductions in and qualitative restraints on the developrent of their nuclear--Ireapon sLocl(fi1es and finalftr by effectinf extensive iecluctions in their stockrriles .Ieading to the ultimate elim.ina-tion of all nuclear lreapons. The possibility of this depends upon the Ieve1 of mutual trust