than those of the two ;";;"-P;;t;" ' sti1l' -these arsenals are far from insignificant ana incruai bottr fission and fusion weapons that could cause vast i*"E. "-p".ticu1arly if used against urban targets'A/35/392 English Annex Page 119 355. fne States which acquired a nediun_ level nuclear capability did not neoessari.t* do so solelv for the purpose or neetins their requirerents or "., i.".i. - j"lii ii;*t-'u as they vere perceived. A concern for-national prestige may also have been rel-evant ' fn the case of France there vas the added desire to secure at the same time a capability which might provicle . ,"u=,rr"-ot. independence from the united states deterrent. Like-the u"it";-;;;;;.m) 'rance also sought to exert a certain influence on the use of that deteneni. ivevertheless, once nuclear_ lreaDons were acquired" thei.r possession and the ensuing irnplica_tions have come to have a principal bearing on the naticnar security of the nediuxrlevel*nuclearweapon Powexs. 366. h is evident from the large difference in the nurnber of nucl-ear weapons available to the t\'ro sides that the possibility of deterring a nuclear attach by a super-Por./er d.epends on the mediu::-leiref pover ieing credillJ .d. io*iniU"t significant retaliatory danage on "i"rii"" i""ilt". ilith a vulnerable nuctear force a counter'-value strategy I'r'ou'd need t.-i"ry on a first "l"itu-Jg;rrr"t t,r" super-Polrer l/ith its nuclear \{eapons in an SlBl.{_system, on the cther hand, the concern of a uedi'n-levef nucr-ear^weapon state vould be irr. ror.g.-t"r^ protectionand the- survivability of that system. Anti-submarine r,rarfare is an area of intense research and development by the super*Forrers. tr'ron the vier"rycinb of national security- the isolated deterrence capability of the rnedi'ra-1-evel nuclea.-on."por. states thus rests on even more uncertain foundations than those or ttaa -".lrp""rpo\,rers ,