LriLed States had a very sna11 stockpile of nlrc-lear veapons and there was no sLrong driV^ to ineraa.sp fo a^!r orcar evl.prh the s.i-c of J-l-et einnlrril^ .Jh^ Initeu States had a vlrtuaf nonopoly of nucl ear weapons, but no particular doctrine had pnFroad f^r +ha rrea ^f +l_ -- - -lese veaFons " 306. rn the beginning of the 1950s. however, a re-evaluar"ion of Arne: iean defencc po]icy vas hegun, under the impact of the changing world. situation and the ,.r^\rol -nh^hi ^l- rla i^lr'iat Ltnionis n,clear r.anal.it.iLv. ln ro5L- the tirited lLULes Lv ts'qL t rf uJ Secrebary of Stare, John Foster Du-lles, expressed what was referred Lo as 'Lha doctrine of massi./e retal-iation''. Under this doctrine, the United States defence was reinforced by the threatened deterrent of massive retaliato"y pol/er. The UniLed States, according Lo Dulles, reserved the oplion of reta]iating instanl Iy, 'by means, aL Ljmes, and at places of our choosing' 32/ That declaraf,ion vas q. id 1 - ha inl-an'ltrd nrimFr"i l1r t ^ r nd^rc^^r- t hF nrAl.ahl- irrp nal"rrra .f +l-- nuclcar Lhrear. Tfe oeclaration did not jn itsetf signJflr a major change in po) icy bul r"ra s e cleer exrrression of a re-evaluation initiated earlier, i{either was it clear lhar rhe policy should be interpreted as a \^rarning that the Urited States !'rou.Ld auLonaLicatly bonb the capi[a] of an sdversary jn the event of en attack on rhc United Stat,es or its allies over the world. Cn Lhe conlrary, the d.octrine ?/ fepartment of State Bullqtin, vol , 30, 25 January 1954, pp" 107-110.A/?1 ! ja? r,lrr.;J-Si-l Annex PaBe t05 sight weff also be interpreted as a form of limited retal.iation - that the