restraint? would it not be tenpted to strike r.rithgreater force for fe ar. that the adversary night begin a second round of escalation in the means en0ployed? 3l+7, A1] these questions raise serious d.oubt s about the possibil-ities of keeping d.evelopments under control and within the limits deter:nined by doctrines' Nevertireless, different doctrines may have different security inplications ' Deterrence in the forrn of massive retal-iation - on which the concept of deterrence ult imatel-y rests - has vast consequences for the whole international community in case of raiture. trll:ile is is diffieult to state lthether, and to vhat extent ' it has contributed. to avolding war betveen the super-Powers, it is clear that it hss not sheltered the non-nucl-ear States from the threat oi others ' nor prevented a nr.nlrber of conf]-icts invo]ving both nuclear and non-nucl-ear Po'wers 'CHAPTER VI SECURTTY IMPI,ICATIONS OI' THE CONTINUE! QUAI\ITITATIVE INCFEASEAND QUA],ITATIVE ]I,J?NOITI,IEIIT Otr, NUCLEAN-WEAPOII SYSTEMS lIiS' Trre concept of security anong nations is very complex and- open to differentinterlretations . In a regional context, States sonetimes achieve r.rhat j.s perceivedas a higher leve1 of security by enterinfl into an a11iance. The same 1evel ofnational security nay be obtained by regional co..operation and disarrnament or armscontrol- agreenents. rt is then recognized that a vid.ened econouic and cul_turafco-operation between States can hel-p foster an increased interd.ependence .rnternationa.l' secu-rity ean, in this perspective, be seen as the nigtrest ,regional''level. In the follor.ring paragraphs, the impact of the further spriad andd.eve]oproent of nucLear rneapons on a1l- thaee l_evels r,rill be analy-secl.