execution of an atteck, thus liniting the damage. It is open to debate whether a nuclear var between the naJor nuclear Powers could be conducted r+ith such restraint, and there viI1 alvays be a very large risk of escalation. Hovever, some studies "efer to "limited attacks " in a centrat strategic context, and this subject lril1 be reviewed. in section D bel-ow. 179. In addition, one could conceive of other "Iimited" scenarios, which might have l-ess likelihood but which are technically feasible and. occasional-ly nentioned in the literature. Tbese will be the topic of this section. Some of them are clearfy related to a super-Pouer confl ict, but th. naJority pertain to nuclear ag6lression against non-nuclear-veapon States. If nuclear lreapons are furthe" proliferated 'and if no interventions or other sanctions have to he feared, that sort of aggression might become a realistic alternative in fut1:-Ie conflicts. In those hypothetical cases, nuclear weapons use may be limited because the aggressor has linited nuclear ne&ns , 1BO. At present, however, the basic situation I^Iou-Id be one where a State with an abrmdanc e of nuclear weapons decided to use sone of these weapons to enforce its \^'ill upon a non-nuclear*qeapon State. (To decide to do so, one wouLd require a virtual certainty that the action did not trigger a large nucfear conflict.) In this case, other lirnitabions could apply " 181. Such linitations shou]-d not be thought of as simpJ-y a natter of the nurber of weapons employed, as the launching of even one nuclear weapon represents a most serious decision. Political and military constraints woufd most probably appl-y to the d.ecision and determine vhat ?estTictions rnight exist concerning the nature and location of the targets. This cou1d. for instance, imply that certain areas or