South African Governnent to stand. by its earlier stateaent that it vould not act in such a manner as to increase the mnber of nuclear-weapon States could be underrnined. by a number of factors n:nning the gamut from the attractions of trad.ing enrichrrent tectlnolo€y for ad.vsJrced conventional arms to its heiflhtened isolation from the international coamunity. D. Safeguards 1. Unsafeguarded- fegL_l.:U.es 40, The piLot scale enrichrnent facility is not covered by IAEA safe5uard's (see para. 20 i_love). l,{oreover, while the South African covernnent ha6 indicated a readiness to accept safeguards on the now-shelved. cornoercial plant, it has not made a comlarable otter in regard to the expanded enrichment plant that it d'ecided to build instead. As discussed below" these unsafeguarded enricbment facilities could be used to produce nuclear explosive material ' 2" Safeguarded fac ili.ties )+1. The SAFASI.I research reactor and- the l(Oeberg nuclear pover plant are covered by IAEA safeguarils ' These include materia]-s accormting 8'nd reporting procedures; containment of naterials, e.g., of cooling spent fuel, to specified areas with continuous autonated surveiliance and nonitoiing; and periodic inspections by the iiai', 7St (In arldition " cooled spent fuel from the Koeberg reactors is to be returned to tr'rance " J 75/ See lTuclear Prol-iferation Safeguards, A SIPRI Monograph written by L-ren-ilrnin s"*o"r" t@), pp. 25-l+T'Al35 /)102 English Annex Page 21 I]T. SOUTH AFRICAIS NUCTEAfi I,IEAPON CAPABIIJITY A. Al-ternative routes to nuclear explosive naterial 42. Access to sufficient quaitities of nuclear explosive llatelial is tbe first requirenent for any country setting out to nake a nuclear wea,poa. Either weapon-