367' There is finally the consideration that a decisicn by a trrecliurn--lever nuclear Po\'rer to taxget nuclear weapons aqainst a super:power .^rouid invite couniertarget ing by that super-Porn'€r. once having resorted tl the use of nuclear weapons, a me.ium* levei nucLear power vould- ttrerefore be sut,lecteJ to a much greater amount of destruction tha.n it r,ras itself able to inriict.- This again raises basic orrostion<of credibllity for the mediuro_Ievel nuclear power. The non".nuclear-weapon States 368. n:nong the various concerns that might promFt a non *nuclear _veapon State toconsider acquiring nuclear veapons J the que;tio; ot tne ir,rpaci- on -ii"..n"tiorr.r s€curity must pls.y a central roIe. rt thu"" are no good security argument s r.or an accluisition a'. if, cn the contrary, goo. argr:rcent s point the "t;., ;;;, then thecase for becoming a nuclear.-ueapon stat€ should be a dubicus one. rrrere is.,however " an obvious difficulty in proving this point at a time r,ihen the nuclear.-rnreapon states are continuing the devel0pment of their nuclear arsenals at a fast pace' Their exa'nple is a bad one. rt attows a Justification for other states toacquire nuclear veapons. At the same tirne, the technjcal af,ld economj.c difficultiesin going nuclear are gradually decreasing vith time" as discussed in chapter rr. ]59' Ntc*r" wealrons have already been used in war against a non-nucr-ear,weaponstate, Japan. rt is therefore not inconceivable that a state rrhich found itseff in conflict r"rith a nucr-ear--r{eapon state might incur the use or the threat of use ofnucrear weepons. such a coursc of action is becoming increasingly unlikely, partlybecause of the development of the perception of a threshold. a€lainst the use ofnucfear weapons in lu'ar and because of the concern that the use of such lreapons wouldrisk a spread ox an escalation of the conflict.r\/ 35 / 392 _8i11[_L f Sn linnex Page 120 3TO, This situation maye however, not be a stable one' The super-Povers. in particular, have developed substantial arsenals of tactical nuclear leapons. Thrir