. c ons ideiat ions 't"g;.aing security inplications of such lrealons. During the national d.ebate vhiehlrecede.l Jalan,s ratification o:fl .the Treatlr on the Non''profiferat ion or wucfear ilu.po''"^in rqrg, li """-iiii""nt tn"- consensus exi.sted on a nunber of reasons rrh1]. ;rsnan," national security woufd not be enhanced if it acouired nuclear *u.pon".- g."*tr"" of its high population " Jalan is very vulnerable to a nuclear attacki The nuclear d.eterrent rrould therefore need::,i: ":i" ;,ffi ':ffii;ff l, ; :i:'lil.{;,i;i;' "}:i:,:;;ff :;:*;i.lil.*;.:""e)rtremely irigh- The development of -such a" force i,rould furthermore have required a long' lead-time. r'ina1'ry, there was trr. pro"p""t that, by the tine of comnieti on the arsenal- r.iaht alreadv be in need. or "oprri"ii".ted ,systems, ,rr"t,-rurrriTnillton' exarple, improved systems and c ornnand. ana conirof arrangements, 376' A lover 1evel of nucr-ear capabirity r,rhich a non*nuclear-weapon state might consider acquiring is to deter a convent-ionat .itit."y .at."t ou-I-.rr."il.r*o,".po' State. The acquisition of such a "tacticaf -mrliear capability,, was given detaifed consideration by Sweden in the late 1950s anJ eprf1, t96Os. fn sur.r!ar./. the discussion r-ed to the conclusion that sireden's ".ii;";i ;;;l*ia"",lolliu'nu.r. o".., veakened rather than enhanced. !'ivst, the accluisition of the nuclear force r{rould for reasons of cost have. :,rellrelgd the existinj conventional military capability. Secondly, the use of battlefield _ nucl_ear .,n"u.p6rr" , or the threat of their. use, would in manlr instances have invited nuclear retaliation ly u ,rr"r"rr-r.apon i.tate. This \roul. have led to a fa? greater level 0f destruction on sr.redish territory than in the case of a conventional railitary "o.t*i"i. rts deterrence strategy vould therefore have serious credibility difficulties.