possesses nuclear forces which cou1d, if necessary' be used independently ' 337. These considerations explain why the debate on stratery within the United Kingdon is today generally bouna up *itn ntlurlti" d'efence and vhy the United Itingdorn alnost never publicly dissociates itself from the main ]ines of thought stated $ithin NATo. 5. lluclear doctrines of France 338" France holds that nucfear ueapons are, in tbe final analysis ' national veapons ' The Governmentts L97? tr"lhite Paper on national defence states that: "Unless vital interests are at stake, the threat of recourse to nuclear weapons has absotutefy no credibility "' In any event " the exclusivel-y nationaL €ng essentiatly defensj-ve "rt."""i"t of-deiterrence is evident here " ' If they /tbe United States s.:nd the s."i.i u"ioa7 recognize obi ectively tbat d"eterrence between then will be effectlve onty when t-tt"it ttttionul sanctuaries are directly threatened-, it must t" "on"fr]O"a that the defence of l.trestern Europe will not u..lot.ti"tirv benefit from Arnerican deterrence" ' ll8/ 339. The main idea of French deterrence - the weak deterring the strong - is that the weak must have the neans to inflict upon the strong a punishment proportionate tothevaluethatdefeatingtheveakrepresentsfoltheStrong.IntbeFrench viewu therefore, the deter"rence of a medium nuclear power is credibl"e even if the size of its strategre nuclear forces could not at all be compared to ttre size of the forces of the suFer-Powers ' l+8/ Livre blanc sur 1a dSfense nationale, Tome I ' 1972" p' d'A/35 /392 English Annex Pada II?