and hitting administrat ive centers . . . The reeulting situet ion, according to / . . . A/40/6 36 S/17464 Enpli#h Pdq* 6 onr diplomatic source, ir a fierce war of attrition, . . . fighting is worse than it’r over barn (rinco Virtnamose invasion late 1978) ,,, Independent l ourceo tend to confirm that (the national resistance forces) tre indeed vary active, carrying out sabotage operations to within IOKms of Phnom Penh . . . Othrr rqortr speak of burned-out trucks strewn along some of the main highways in Cambodia and frequrnt disruption of rail services because of guemilla rrabotage at tacks. A ferry operating on the southern estuary of the Tonla Sap or Great Lake, was reportedly destroyed (by the national resis- tanco forces) in January . . .“(12) 13. “The Foreign Ministers (of the ASCAN countries) . ,. were parti- cularly gratified at the steady growth and high state of moral@ of the resis- tance forces which, inspite of the ferocity of the Vietnamese dry-season offsldvo, are enjoying growing support from the Kampuchean people. They have also enhanced co-ordination of their act ions in the f iold and have con- tinued to caune serious disruption to the Vietnamese occupation f’orBces.tt(13 1 14 * “The international aid agencies have detected gl*owing dissent among the Kampuchean people against the Heng Sarnrin rule and Vietn?mose control, and have concluded that kationaliem rraotion hae beoome inedtabld’ , In other words, they are convinced that nationalism has become a signiticant factor in the country.“(l4 1 15. On 29 July 1985, the Vietnamese radio in Phnorn Ppnh broadcast a stat. of emorgsncy calling on all Vietnamese officials, sold I ws and the Hong Samrin’s group to be highly vigilant and be prenared for any eventualities, to oppose and prevent the resistance forces from carryin/: [l\lt art Ivitdeg 