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Blue Man Group
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"Blue man" redirects here. For the novel by Kin Platt, see The Blue Man. For the film, see The Blue Man (film). For the horse, see Blue Man (horse).
Blue Man Group
Blue Man Group in Brazil in 2009
Formation
1987; 31 years ago (1987)
Type
Theatre group
Purpose
Performance art, music
Location
New York City, Boston, Chicago, Las Vegas, Orlando, Berlin
Website
blueman.com
Blue Man Group is a performance art company formed in 1987.[1][2][3] It is best known for its stage productions around the world. It combines many different categories of music and art, both popular and obscure, in its performances.[4]
Blue Man Group currently has continuing theatrical productions in Berlin, Boston, Chicago, Las Vegas, New York City, and Orlando. In addition to the stage theatre show, Blue Man Group has had multiple national and global tours, appeared on various TV programs as both characters and performers, appeared on the Norwegian Cruise Line ship Epic, released multiple studio albums, contributed to a number of film scores, performed with orchestras around the US, and appeared in ad campaigns.
In July 2017, Cirque du Soleil purchased the Blue Man Productions for an undisclosed sum. Cirque announced plans to expand Blue Man Group globally and diversify the live entertainment production.[5]
Contents
[hide]
1 History
2 Themes
3 Theatrical productions
3.1 Current theatrical productions
3.2 Previous theatrical productions
4 Music and tours
5 Discography
6 Feature film
7 Videography
8 Television
8.1 Advertising
8.2 Programming
9 Awards and nominations
10 See also
11 Notes
12 References
13 External links
History[edit]
Blue Man Group grew out of a collaboration between three close friends, Chris Wink, Matt Goldman and Phil Stanton, on Manhattan’s Lower East Side in 1987. Its first public appearance was a celebration of the end of the 1980s. The three men wore blue masks and led a street procession that included the burning of a Rambo doll and a piece of the Berlin Wall.[6] MTV’s Kurt Loder, who covered the event, drew attention to the strange Blue Men—and what began as creative "disturbances" on the streets of the city became a series of small shows at downtown clubs, and eventually a full performance at the Astor Place Theatre in 1991.
In July 2017, Blue Man Group was bought by Cirque Du Soleil, who announced that they would expand the concept.[7]
Themes[edit]
There are a number of different themes found in various Blue Man performances. These themes include:[8]
Science and technology, especially the topics of plumbing, fractals, human sight, DNA, and the Internet.
Information overload and information pollution, such as when the audience is asked to choose one of three simultaneous streams of information to read.
Innocence, as when the Blue Men appear to be surprised and perplexed by common artifacts of modern society or by audience reactions.
Self-conscious and naïve imitation of cultural norms, such as attempting to stage an elegant dinner for an audience member with Twinkies; or following the Rock Concert Instruction Manual with the expectation that following a series of instructions is all it takes to put on a rock concert.
The Outsider. Blue Men always appear as a group of three. This is because[8] not only are Blue Men viewed as outsiders to the rest of the world, but three is the smallest group possible when endeavoring to create a community. Many of the Blue Man skits involve one of the three Blue Men performing in a manner inconsistent with the other two.
Rooftops, or otherwise climbing to the top. There are a number of references, both in visual pieces and in lyrics from the Complex tour, that have a common theme of getting to the roof. This theme is a metaphor for the advice Stanton, Wink, and Goldman drew from Joseph Campbell and Bill Moyers's PBS program The Power of Myth and represents "following your bliss".[8]

Theatrical productions[edit]
Astor Place Theatre with marquee for the group
Blue Man Group-Buddy Bears, in Berlin-Mitte
Current theatrical productions[edit]
United States
New York City at the Astor Place Theatre (1991 – present)
Boston at the Charles Playhouse (1995 – present)
Chicago at the Briar Street Theater (1997 – present)
Las Vegas at the Luxor Hotel and Casino (November 18, 2015 – present)
Orlando at the Blue Man Group Theatre at CityWalk at the Universal Orlando Resort (June 6, 2007–present)
World Tour (March 29, 2016 – present) - a celebration of life in full color with the launch of a World Tour beginning March 29, 2016 in Singapore.[9]
Germany
Berlin at the Bluemax Theater (February 1, 2006–present)
Previous theatrical productions[edit]
United States
Live at Luxor in Las Vegas (March 10, 2000 – September 15, 2005)
“How to be a Megastar” national arena "rock concert" tour (2003)
“How to be a Megastar 2.0” (2006)
Las Vegas, Nevada at The Venetian Resort Hotel Casino (October 10, 2005 – September 30, 2012)[10]
Las Vegas at the Blue Man Theatre at Monte Carlo Resort and Casino (October 10, 2012 – October 11, 2015)
North American Tour (first show September 2, 2010 – March 2016)
Norwegian Cruise Line
Norwegian Epic (July 2010 – March 2015)[11][12]
Germany
Berlin at the Theater am Potsdamer Platz (May 9, 2004 – January 31, 2006)
Oberhausen at the Metronom Theatre (March 11, 2007 – October 3, 2008)
Stuttgart at the Apollo Theater (February 28, 2008 – October 12, 2008)[13]
Canada
Toronto at the Panasonic Theatre (June 20, 2005 – January 7, 2007)
United Kingdom
London at the New London Theatre (November 2005 – June 24, 2007)[14]
Netherlands
Amsterdam at the Theater Fabriek (December 2006 – September 30, 2007)
Japan
Tokyo at the Roppongi Invoice Theatre (December 1, 2007 – November 29, 2009)
Tokyo at the Roppongi Blue Man Theatre (April 29, 2010 – March 31, 2012)
Switzerland
Basel at Musical Theater Basel (October 25, 2008 – January 11, 2009)
Zürich at Theater 11 (January 17, 2010 – May 2, 2010)[15]
Sweden
Stockholm at Göta Lejon (September 8, 2010 – October 24, 2010)
Austria
Vienna at MuseumsQuartier (November 4, 2010 – January 2, 2011)
Australia
Sydney at the Sydney Lyric Theatre (August 2013 – October 2013)
Music and tours[edit]
In 1999, the group released Audio, their first studio recording. Although it contained some of the music from their stage productions, it was chiefly a collection of full-length instrumentals featuring new instruments.
In 2002, the group participated in Moby's Area2 tour, giving a more rock-oriented performance than in the theatrical shows. Songs developed during this tour appeared on 2003's album The Complex.
Unlike Audio, The Complex, released in 2003, featured a variety of vocalists and guests including Tracy Bonham, Dave Matthews, Gavin Rossdale and Venus Hum. The record spawned its own 2003 tour, "How to Be a Megastar," the first headlined by Blue Man Group. The tour deconstructed the traditional rock concert experience into its often clichéd parts and was chronicled in a 2004 DVD release. The tour featured Tracy Bonham and Venus Hum as supporting acts. The DVD included a surround sound mix of some of the studio recordings.
Blue Man Group launched its second tour, "How to Be a Megastar Tour 2.0", on September 26, 2006. It featured some new material as well as material from the original Complex Rock Tour, and featured Tracy Bonham as opening act and vocalist. DJ/VJ Mike Relm was the opening act for the tour's second leg, which ended April 22, 2007 in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. The third leg of the tour began in May 2007 and included performances in Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey, Mexico; Buenos Aires, Argentina; São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and Santiago, Chile. The fourth leg, using "2.1" in its title, included more U.S. and Canada dates. The tour visited France, Korea, Canada, Germany, and a few other European countries through 2008. From August 19–23, it visited Taipei, Taiwan to promote its 2009 Summer Deaflympics, with most of the show's dialogue accompanied by subtitles. After Typhoon Morakot hit the island in mid-August, the group held an extra show to benefit flood victims.
Blue Man Group performed with Ricky Martin at the 2007 Latin Grammy Awards[16] and again with Michael Telo at the 2012 Latin Grammy Awards.[17]
In 2008, they collaborated on the track "No More Heroes" with Dutch DJ and producer Tiësto for the remixed version of the Elements of Life album.
Announced in 2009, Blue Man Group began performing for the first time at sea on Norwegian Cruise Line's ship Epic. From July 2010 to March 2015, Epic alternated 7-Day Eastern and Western Caribbean sailings from Miami with nightly Blue Man Group shows.
A Blue Man Group national tour in 2010 visited various cities in the United States, Canada and Latin America. The tour included elements from their then-current theatrical performances, and new elements created for the tour.[18]
To celebrate their 20th anniversary, the group gave a special performance with Dave Matthews at the Astor Place Theatre in New York City, collaborating on the song "Sing Along."[19]
To celebrate Blue Man Group's 25th anniversary, a global tour kicked off in Singapore in March 2016. It continued through Asia and Oceania in 2016 and opened for the first time in South Africa in February 2017.[20] It was announced that the tour will continue on to Abu Dhabi and Switzerland later in 2017.[21]
In April 2016, Blue Man Group released "THREE", their third studio album. Building on the group's previous albums, "THREE" draws inspiration from the group's 25 years of creativity.[22]
Discography[edit]
Main article: Blue Man Group discography
Audio (1999) - Blue Man Group's first album is certified gold (500,000 units) and was nominated for the Grammy Award for Best Pop Instrumental Album.
The Complex (2003) - Blue Man Group's second full-length studio album features collaborations with various musicians including Dave Matthews, Gavin Rossdale, and more. This album charted four songs on the Billboard charts.
Live at The Venetian – Las Vegas iTunes exclusive (2006)
THREE (2016) - Released in April 2016 as a completely instrumental album (like Audio), the single Giacometti was released on blue vinyl originally. New instruments such as the “Snorkelbone,” “Chimeulum,” “Pipeulum,” and “Tone Spokes” are introduced on this album.
Feature film[edit]
In September 2008, Variety reported that the original trio (Matt Goldman, Chris Wink and Phil Stanton) would appear in a Blue Man Group IMAX 3D feature film, to be produced by Charlotte Huggins.[23] The film, titled Blue Man Group: Mind Blast, was to be directed by David Russo and released by National Geographic Entertainment.[24]
Videography[edit]
The Complex Rock Tour Live DVD (2003) – live concert footage taken from shows in Grand Prairie, Texas
Robots (2005) – performed on soundtrack for movie
Inside the Tube (2006) – one-hour documentary created for PBS. Features interviews with Stanton, Wink, and Goldman describing the Blue Men, and video clips from various theatrical performances. In "Inside the Tube," press notes state, "the three founders discuss the improbable journey they took from building drums and tube instruments in their living room to having one of the most popular shows in Las Vegas, a gold album, and a successful arena-sized rock tour. The program takes an intimate look inside Blue Man Group's unique creative process and provides never before revealed insight into some of the underlying themes of their work. The founders also cite some of their influences, including a public PBS program that impacted them at a pivotal moment in their career."[1] Available through the PBS store and also as an extra on the How To Be A Megastar Live! DVD.
How to Be a Megastar Live! (2008) – live concert footage from Blue Man Group's newest tour. It was released on DVD on April 1 and Blu-ray on November 4, 2008. The DVD version includes an additional audio CD of many of the show's songs.
Space Chimps (2008) – performed on the soundtrack for the movie
Scoring Reel – a scoring DVD only available in 2004
Television[edit]
Advertising[edit]
Intel – Blue Man Group appeared in advertisements for the Pentium III, Pentium 4, and Centrino line of processors.
TIM Brasil – Blue Man Group is the face of TIM Brasil, a telecommunications company in Brazil.
Programming[edit]
The Tonight Show with Jay Leno (1992–94, 1997–2001, 2003–2005, 2007) Blue Man Group appeared on the premiere of Leno's version of the Tonight Show, prompting him to state, "This is not your father's Tonight Show." They appeared on the show 17 times, often involving audience members and celebrity guests, including Robin Williams and Mel Gibson. One Blue Man Group episode won an Emmy for The Tonight Show.[25]
The Drew Carey Show (2001) - During the episode "Drew Live III," the Blue Man Group experimented on Drew Carey as he slept on the train, making it look like he had sex with his nemesis, Mimi Bobeck. At the end of the show, it was revealed that their motive was for Drew to kill himself out of embarrassment so that they, along with John Ratzenberger, could take over the show.[26]
Arrested Development (2004) - The show approached Blue Man Group about appearing in an episode. The collaboration grew to a storyline where Tobias longed to be a part of Blue Man Group, and, ultimately, his father-in-law “hid from the law” performing as a Blue Man in Las Vegas.[27]
NBC’s America’s Got Talent (2012) – For the season finale, BMG performed "Shake Your Euphemism".
NBC’s Today Show (2015) - Blue Man Group performed on a live broadcast from Universal CityWalk. At the end of the performance, Al Roker helped the Blue Men fire confetti from the stage.
NBC’s I Can Do That (June 2015) - Alan Ritchson and Joe Jonas trained to become Blue Men.
NBC’s The Tonight Show Starring Jimmy Fallon (October 2015) – During the “Telephone Booth” skit, a Blue Man was a celebrity from the “mystery bench” and was placed in the telephone booth with Hugh Jackman after his opponent, Shaq, answered a question correctly. The trapped Blue Man wrote “help” with blue paint from his head on the telephone booth wall.
Telemundo’s La Voz Kids (July 2016) - During the live finale, Blue Man Group performed alongside the show's top 6 finalists. The kids sang “Applause” by Lady Gaga and three Blue Men and Blue Man Group band members provided the music.
NPR's Tiny Desk Concert (September 2016) - Blue Man Group performed tracks from their studio album Three during a Tiny Desk Takeover[28]
NBC's Best Time Ever with Neil Patrick Harris (October 2016) - The Blue Men played instruments alongside Neil Patrick Harris, who got in on the drumming. By the end of the performance, Harris and episode co-host Shaq were doused in blue paint.[29]
AMC's Halt and Catch Fire (August 2017) – In this drama about the first decade of personal computing, Blue Man Group performs at engineer and businessman Gordon Clark's 40th birthday party.[30]
Blue Man Group has also performed on various shows such as an appearance on The Grammy Awards (with Jill Scott and Moby), The Emmy Awards, The Latin Grammy Awards, The Royal Variety Show (for Queen Elizabeth II), Wetten, dass..? (Germany), The Voice (Germany), Regis and Kathie Lee, Regis and Kelly and The Ellen DeGeneres Show.
Blue Man Group also appeared on episode 7 of Season 12 of Celebrity Apprentice.
Blue Man Group performed in Star Awards 2016 (Show 1) in Singapore, a special variety programme of prize giving to the Singapore Artiste.
Awards and nominations[edit]
1991 Obie Award (winner)
1992 Drama Desk Award for Unique Theatrical Experience (winner)
1992 Lucille Lortel Special Award [2]
2000 Grammy Award (nominee)
2000 Eddy Award (design) [3]
2010 OBIE Advertising Award [4]
2011 Off Broadway Alliance Awards' Audience Choice Award for Best Long-Running Show (winner)[31]
2012 International Emmy Award nomination for Arts Programming (nominee) [5]
2014 Drum! Magazine Readers Choice Award – Best Percussion Ensemble (winner)
2015 Drum! Magazine Readers Choice Award – Best Percussion Ensemble (winner)

See also[edit]
Überschall, a Las Vegas band consisting of past and present members of Blue Man Group
Penn Jillette, a Blue Man affiliate and Las Vegas magician
STOMP
GEAR
Nanta
Notes[edit]
Jump up ^ Lauren, Flanders, Haley (2015). Audience Participation in Blue Man Group: Success Through Authentic Character, Adaptable Narrative, and Accessible Space (Thesis). Brigham Young University.
Jump up ^ "Blue Man Group | Biography & History | AllMusic". AllMusic. Retrieved 2018-03-17.
Jump up ^ Sickler, Linda. "A close look inside the secret life of a Blue Man". Savannah Morning News. Retrieved 2018-03-17.
Jump up ^ "Theater: Long Running Shows". New York Times. 2015.
Jump up ^ Pickert, Eugenia (2017-07-06). "Cirque du Soleil Buys Blue Man Group". Bloomberg News. Retrieved 2017-07-07.
Jump up ^ Welch, Liz (2008). "THE BLUE MAN GROUP (Cover Story)". Inc. 30.8: 110–112.
Jump up ^ Deb, Sopan (2017). "Blue Man Group Is Bought by Cirque du Soleil, With Plans to Expand". New York Times.
^ Jump up to: a b c Blue Man Group: Inside the Tube. PBS. 2006.
Jump up ^ Blue Man Productions (February 11, 2016). "Blue Man Group Launches World Tour in Singapore on March 29, 2016". MarketWired.
Jump up ^ Ogunnaike, Lola. "For the Blue Man Army, Recruitment Is on the Rise", The New York Times, 10 October 2005.
Jump up ^ "Norwegian Introduces Norwegian Epic's Captains And Hotel Directors Unveils Inaugural Sailing Dates in Europe and U.S. Miami" (Press release). Norwegian Cruise Line. 15 October 2009.
Jump up ^ "Broadway musical 'Priscilla' heading to cruise ship". USA TODAY. Retrieved 2017-01-25.
Jump up ^ BLUE MAN GROUP / Show in Berlin – English Archived June 27, 2008, at the Wayback Machine.
Jump up ^ "Blue men pack up bags". OfficialLondonTheatre.com. March 27, 2007. Retrieved 31 Oct 2017.
Jump up ^ "Blue Man Group – "DIE SHOW SENSATION"". Bluemangroup.ch. Archived from the original on March 19, 2008. Retrieved November 23, 2009.
Jump up ^ "Ricky Martin e Blue Man Group". Latin GRAMMYs. Retrieved 2017-02-15.
Jump up ^ "Michel Telo y Blue Man Group". Latin GRAMMYs. Retrieved 2017-02-15.
Jump up ^ "Blue Man Group National Tour". January 21, 2010. Retrieved February 9, 2010.
Jump up ^ JaredB23 (2009-08-18), Blue Man Group (feat Dave Matthews) - Sing Along, retrieved 2017-02-15
Jump up ^ Concerts, Big. "Blue Man Group | Big Concerts". www.bigconcerts.co.za. Retrieved 2017-02-15.
Jump up ^ "World Tour - Official Site of Blue Man Group". www.blueman.com. Retrieved 2017-02-15.
Jump up ^ "25 Years: NEW VINYL "THREE" - Official Site of Blue Man Group". www.blueman.com. Retrieved 2017-02-15.
Jump up ^ Cohen, David S. (September 8, 2008). "Blue Man Group heads to bigscreen". Variety.
Jump up ^ Cohen, David S. (September 15, 2009). "Blue Man, Nat Geo map 3D pic plans". Variety.
Jump up ^ "Blue Man Group". IMDb. Retrieved 2017-02-15.
Jump up ^ The Drew Carey Show (TV Series 1995–2004), retrieved 2017-02-15
Jump up ^ Bateman, Jason; Rossi, Portia de; Arnett, Will; Cera, Michael (2004-11-07), The One Where Michael Leaves, retrieved 2017-02-15
Jump up ^ "Blue Man Group: Tiny Desk Concert". NPR.org. Retrieved 2017-02-15.
Jump up ^ Carra, Mallory. "Blue Man Group Performs On 'Best Time Ever With Neil Patrick Harris' & It's So Fun — VIDEO". Retrieved 2017-02-15.
Jump up ^ "Halt and Catch Fire Season 4, Episode 1: So it Goes".
Jump up ^ "Off Broadway Alliance Awards". Retrieved August 24, 2011.
References[edit]
"Blue Man Group: Color them cool"[dead link] – Orlando Sentinel, January 5, 2007
"Toronto’s Blue Period?" – kapiTal magazine, December 2006
"Who killed Blue Man Group?" – Toronto Star, September 29, 2006
"Canuck unions blue over group" – Variety, June 16, 2005
"The Business of Blue Man" – Fortune Small Business, March 2003
External links[edit]
Wikimedia Commons has media related to Blue Man Group.
Official websites: General, Germany, Japan, Switzerland
Blue Man Group on IMDb
Blue Man Group discography at MusicBrainz
Unofficial fan community podcast feed
Inc. Magazine profile
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Whistler (1982)
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Deterrence theory
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This article is about deterrent theories of war and nuclear weapons. For legal theory of justice, see Deterrence (legal).
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The USS Growler, one of two submarines designed to provide a nuclear deterrence using cruise missiles with a 500 miles (800 km) range—placed on patrol carrying the Regulus I missile (shown at Pier 86 in New York, its home as a museum ship).
Deterrence theory gained increased prominence as a military strategy during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons. It took on a unique connotation during this time as an inferior nuclear force, by virtue of its extreme destructive power, could deter a more powerful adversary, provided that this force could be protected against destruction by a surprise attack. Deterrence is a strategy intended to dissuade an adversary from taking an action not yet started, or to prevent them from doing something that another state desires. A credible nuclear deterrent, Bernard Brodie wrote in 1959, must be always at the ready, yet never used.[1][a]
In Thomas Schelling's (1966) classic work on deterrence, the concept that military strategy can no longer be defined as the science of military victory is presented. Instead, it is argued that military strategy was now equally, if not more, the art of coercion, of intimidation and deterrence.[2] Schelling says the capacity to harm another state is now used as a motivating factor for other states to avoid it and influence another state's behavior. To be coercive or deter another state, violence must be anticipated and avoidable by accommodation. It can therefore be summarized that the use of the power to hurt as bargaining power is the foundation of deterrence theory, and is most successful when it is held in reserve.[2]
In 2004 Frank C. Zagare made the case that deterrence theory is logically inconsistent, not empirically accurate, and that it is deficient as a theory. In place of classical deterrence, rational choice scholars have argued for perfect deterrence, which assumes that states may vary in their internal characteristics and especially in the credibility of their threats of retaliation.[3]
In a January 2007 article in the Wall Street Journal, veteran cold-war policy makers Henry Kissinger, Bill Perry, George Shultz, and Sam Nunn reversed their previous position and asserted that far from making the world safer, nuclear weapons had become a source of extreme risk.[4] Their rationale and conclusion was not based on the old world with only a few nuclear players, but on the instability in many states possessing the technologies and the lack of wherewithal to properly maintain and upgrade existing weapons in many states:
The risk of accidents, misjudgments or unauthorised launches, they argued, was growing more acute in a world of rivalries between relatively new nuclear states that lacked the security safeguards developed over many years by America and the Soviet Union. The emergence of pariah states, such as North Korea (possibly soon to be joined by Iran), armed with nuclear weapons was adding to the fear as was the declared ambition of terrorists to steal, buy or build a nuclear device.[4]
—  The Economist, June 16, 2011
According to The Economist, "Senior European statesmen and women" called for further action in 2010 in addressing problems of nuclear weapons proliferation. They said: "Nuclear deterrence is a far less persuasive strategic response to a world of potential regional nuclear arms races and nuclear terrorism than it was to the cold war".[5]
Contents
[hide]
1 The concept of deterrence
1.1 Proportionality
1.2 Reciprocity
1.3 Coercive credibility
2 Rational deterrence theory
2.1 The military balance
2.2 Signaling and bargaining power
2.3 Reputations for resolve
2.4 Interests at stake
3 Nuclear weapons and deterrence
4 United States' policy of deterrence
5 Criticism
6 See also
7 Notes
8 References
9 Further reading
10 External links
The concept of deterrence[edit]
The use of military threats as a means to deter international crises and war has been a central topic of international security research for at least two hundred years.[6] Research has predominantly focused on the theory of rational deterrence to analyze the conditions under which conventional deterrence is likely to succeed or fail. Alternative theories however have challenged the rational deterrence theory and have focused on organizational theory and cognitive psychology.
The concept of deterrence can be defined as the use of threats by one party to convince another party to refrain from initiating some course of action.[7] A threat serves as a deterrent to the extent that it convinces its target not to carry out the intended action because of the costs and losses that target would incur. In international security, a policy of deterrence generally refers to threats of military retaliation directed by the leaders of one state to the leaders of another in an attempt to prevent the other state from resorting to the threat of use of military force in pursuit of its foreign policy goals.
As outlined by Huth,[7] a policy of deterrence can fit into two broad categories being (i) preventing an armed attack against a state's own territory (known as direct deterrence); or (ii) preventing an armed attack against another state (known as extended deterrence). Situations of direct deterrence often occur when there is a territorial dispute between neighboring states in which major powers like the United States do not directly intervene. On the other hand, situations of extended deterrence often occur when a great power becomes involved. It is the latter that has generated the majority of interest in academic literature. Building on these two broad categories, Huth goes on to outline that deterrence policies may be implemented in response to a pressing short-term threat (known as immediate deterrence) or as strategy to prevent a military conflict or short term threat from arising (known as general deterrence).
A successful deterrence policy must be considered in not only military terms, but also in political terms. In military terms, deterrence success refers to preventing state leaders from issuing military threats and actions that escalate peacetime diplomatic and military cooperation into a crisis or militarized confrontation which threatens armed conflict and possibly war. The prevention of crises of wars however is not the only aim of deterrence. In addition, defending states must be able to resist the political and military demands of a potential attacking nation. If armed conflict is avoided at the price of diplomatic concessions to the maximum demands of the potential attacking nation under the threat of war, then it cannot be claimed that deterrence has succeeded.
Furthermore, as Jentleson et al.[8] argue, two key sets of factors for successful deterrence are important being (i) a defending state strategy that firstly balances credible coercion and deft diplomacy consistent with the three criteria of proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive credibility, and secondly minimizes international and domestic constraints; and (ii) the extent of an attacking state's vulnerability as shaped by its domestic political and economic conditions. In broad terms, a state wishing to implement a strategy of deterrence is most likely to succeed if the costs of non-compliance it can impose on, and the benefits of compliance it can offer to, another state are greater than the benefits of noncompliance and the costs of compliance.
Deterrence theory holds that nuclear weapons are intended to deter other states from attacking with their nuclear weapons, through the promise of retaliation and possibly mutually assured destruction (MAD). Nuclear deterrence can also be applied to an attack by conventional forces; for example, the doctrine of massive retaliation threatened to launch US nuclear weapons in response to Soviet attacks.
A successful nuclear deterrent requires that a country preserve its ability to retaliate, either by responding before its own weapons are destroyed or by ensuring a second strike capability. A nuclear deterrent is sometimes composed of a nuclear triad, as in the case of the nuclear weapons owned by the United States, Russia, the People's Republic of China and India. Other countries, such as the United Kingdom and France, have only sea- and air-based nuclear weapons.
Proportionality[edit]
Jentleson et al. provide further detail in relation to these factors.[8] Firstly, proportionality refers to the relationship between the defending state's scope and nature of the objectives being pursued, and the instruments available for use to pursue this. The more the defending state demands of another state, the higher that state's costs of compliance and the greater need for the defending state's strategy to increase the costs of noncompliance and the benefits of compliance. This is a challenge, as deterrence is, by definition, a strategy of limited means. George (1991) goes on to explain that deterrence may, but is not required to, go beyond threats to the actual use of military force; but if force is actually used, it must be limited and fall short of full-scale use or war otherwise it fails.[9] The main source of disproportionality is an objective that goes beyond policy change to regime change. This has been seen in the cases of Libya, Iraq, and North Korea where defending states have sought to change the leadership of a state in addition to policy changes relating primarily to their nuclear weapons programs.
Reciprocity[edit]
Secondly, Jentleson et al.[8] outline that reciprocity involves an explicit understanding of linkage between the defending state's carrots and the attacking state's concessions. The balance lies neither in offering too little too late or for too much in return, not offering too much too soon or for too little return.
Coercive credibility[edit]
Finally, coercive credibility requires that, in addition to calculations about costs and benefits of cooperation, the defending state convincingly conveys to the attacking state that non-cooperation has consequences. Threats, uses of force, and other coercive instruments such as economic sanctions must be sufficiently credible to raise the attacking state's perceived costs of noncompliance. A defending state having a superior military capability or economic strength in itself is not enough to ensure credibility. Indeed, all three elements of a balanced deterrence strategy are more likely to be achieved if other major international actors like the United Nations or NATO are supportive and if opposition within the defending state's domestic politics is limited.
The other important consideration outlined by Jentleson et al.[8] that must be taken into consideration is the domestic political and economic conditions within the attacking state affecting its vulnerability to deterrence policies, and the attacking state's ability to compensate unfavourable power balances. The first factor is whether internal political support and regime security are better served by defiance, or if there are domestic political gains to be made from improving relations with the defending state. The second factor is an economic calculation of the costs that military force, sanctions, and other coercive instruments can impose, and the benefits that trade and other economic incentives may carry. This in part is a function of the strength and flexibility of the attacking state's domestic economy and its capacity to absorb or counter the costs being imposed. The third factor is the role of elites and other key domestic political figures within the attacking state. To the extent these actors' interests are threatened with the defending state's demands, they act to prevent or block the defending state's demands.
Rational deterrence theory[edit]
The predominant approach to theorizing about deterrence has entailed the use of rational choice and game-theoretic models of decision making (see game theory). Deterrence theorists have consistently argued that deterrence success is more likely if a defending state's deterrent threat is credible to an attacking state. Huth[7] outlines that a threat is considered credible if the defending state possesses both the military capabilities to inflict substantial costs on an attacking state in an armed conflict, and if the attacking state believes that the defending state is resolved to use its available military forces. Huth[7] goes on to explain the four key factors for consideration under rational deterrence theory being (i) the military balance; (ii) signaling and bargaining power; (iii) reputations for resolve; and (iv) interests at stake.
The military balance[edit]
Deterrence is often directed against state leaders who have specific territorial goals that they seek to attain either by seizing disputed territory in a limited military attack or by occupying disputed territory after the decisive defeat of the adversary's armed forces. In either case, the strategic orientation of potential attacking states is generally short term and driven by concerns about military cost and effectiveness. For successful deterrence, defending states need the military capacity to respond quickly and in strength to a range of contingencies. Where deterrence often fails is when either a defending state or an attacking state under or overestimate the others' ability to undertake a particular course of action.
Signaling and bargaining power[edit]
The central problem for a state that seeks to communicate a credible deterrent threat through diplomatic or military actions is that all defending states have an incentive to act as if they are determined to resist an attack, in the hope that the attacking state will back away from military conflict with a seemingly resolved adversary. If all defending states have such incentives, then potential attacking states may discount statements made by defending states along with any movement of military forces as merely bluffs. In this regards, rational deterrence theorists have argued that costly signals are required to communicate the credibility of a defending state's resolve. Costly signals are those actions and statements that clearly increase the risk of a military conflict and also increase the costs of backing down from a deterrent threat. States that are bluffing are unwilling to cross a certain threshold of threat and military action for fear of committing themselves to an armed conflict.
Reputations for resolve[edit]
There are three different arguments that have been developed in relation to the role of reputations in influencing deterrence outcomes. The first argument focuses on a defending state's past behaviour in international disputes and crises, which creates strong beliefs in a potential attacking state about the defending state's expected behaviour in future conflicts. The credibilities of a defending state's policies are arguably linked over time, and reputations for resolve have a powerful causal impact on an attacking state's decision whether to challenge either general or immediate deterrence. The second approach argues that reputations have a limited impact on deterrence outcomes because the credibility of deterrence is heavily determined by the specific configuration of military capabilities, interests at stake, and political constraints faced by a defending state in a given situation of attempted deterrence. The argument of this school of thought is that potential attacking states are not likely to draw strong inferences about a defending states resolve from prior conflicts because potential attacking states do not believe that a defending state's past behaviour is a reliable predictor of future behaviour. The third approach is a middle ground between the first two approaches. It argues that potential attacking states are likely to draw reputational inferences about resolve from the past behaviour of defending states only under certain conditions. The insight is the expectation that decision makers will use only certain types of information when drawing inferences about reputations, and an attacking state updates and revises its beliefs when the unanticipated behaviour of a defending state cannot be explained by case-specific variables. An example both shows that the problem extends to the perception of the third parties as well as main adversaries and underlies the way in which attempts at deterrence can not only fail but backfire if the assumptions about the others' perceptions are incorrect.[10]
Interests at stake[edit]
Although costly signaling and bargaining power are more well established arguments in rational deterrence theory, the interests of defending states are not as well known, and attacking states may look beyond the short term bargaining tactics of a defending state and seek to determine what interests are at stake for the defending state that would justify the risks of a military conflict. The argument here is that defending states that have greater interests at stake in a dispute are more resolved to use force and be more willing to endure military losses to secure those interests. Even less well established arguments are the specific interests that are more salient to state leaders such as military interests versus economic interests.
Furthermore, Huth[7] argues that both supporters and critics of rational deterrence theory agree that an unfavourable assessment of the domestic and international status quo by state leaders can undermine or severely test the success of deterrence. In a rational choice approach, if the expected utility of not using force is reduced by a declining status quo position, then deterrence failure is more likely, since the alternative option of using force becomes relatively more attractive.
Nuclear weapons and deterrence[edit]
Main articles: Nuclear strategy, Massive retaliation, Mutual assured destruction, and Flexible response
In 1966 Schelling[2] is prescriptive in outlining the impact of the development of nuclear weapons in the analysis of military power and deterrence. In his 1966 analysis, before the widespread use of assured second strike capability, or immediate reprisal, in the form of SSBN submarines, Schelling argues that nuclear weapons give nations the potential to not only destroy their enemies but humanity itself without drawing immediate reprisal because of the lack of a conceivable defense system and the speed with which nuclear weapons can be deployed. A nation's credible threat of such severe damage empowers their deterrence policies and fuels political coercion and military deadlock, which in turn can produce proxy warfare.
Historical analysis of nuclear weapons deterrent capabilities has led modern researchers to the concept of the stability-instability paradox, whereby nuclear weapons confer large scale stability between nuclear weapon states, as in over 60 years none have engaged in large direct warfare due primarily to nuclear weapons deterrence capabilities, but instead are forced into pursuing political aims by military means in the form of comparatively smaller scale acts of instability, such as proxy wars and minor conflicts.
United States' policy of deterrence[edit]
United States policy of deterrence during the Cold War underwent significant variations. The early stages of the Cold War were generally characterized by ideology of containment, an aggressive stance on behalf of the United States especially regarding developing nations under their sphere of influence. This period was characterized by numerous proxy wars throughout most of the globe, particularly Africa, Asia, Central America, and South America. A notable such conflict was the Korean War. In contrast to general opinion, George F. Kennan, who is taken to be the founder of this ideology in his Long Telegram, asserted that his ideas had been misinterpreted and that he never advocated military intervention, merely economic support.
With the U.S. drawdown from Vietnam, the normalization of U.S. relations with China, and the Sino-Soviet Split, the policy of Containment was abandoned and a new policy of détente was established, whereby peaceful coexistence was sought between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although all factors listed above contributed to this shift, the most important factor was probably the rough parity achieved in stockpiling nuclear weapons with the clear capability of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Therefore, the period of détente was characterized by a general reduction in the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States and a thawing of the Cold War, lasting from the late 1960s until the start of the 1980s. The doctrine of mutual nuclear deterrence characterized relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during this period, and present relations with Russia.
A third shift occurred with President Ronald Reagan's arms build-up during the 1980s. Reagan attempted to justify this policy in part due to concerns of growing Soviet influence in Latin America and the new republic of Iran, established after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Similar to the old policy of containment, the United States funded several proxy wars, including support for Saddam Hussein of Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War, support for the mujahideen in Afghanistan, who were fighting for independence from the Soviet Union, and several anti-communist movements in Latin America such as the overthrow of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The funding of the Contras in Nicaragua led to the Iran-Contra Affair, while overt support led to a ruling from the International Court of Justice against the United States in Nicaragua v. United States.
While the army was dealing with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the spread of nuclear technology to other nations beyond the United States and Russia, the concept of deterrence took on a broader multinational dimension. The U.S. policy on post–Cold War deterrence was outlined in 1995 in a document called "Essentials of Post–Cold War Deterrence".[11] This document explains that while relations with Russia continue to follow the traditional characteristics of Mutual Nuclear Deterrence, due to both nations continuing MAD, U.S. policy of deterrence towards nations with minor nuclear capabilities should ensure through threats of immense retaliation (or even preemptive action) that they do not threaten the United States, its interests, or allies. The document explains that such threats must also be used to ensure that nations without nuclear technology refrain from developing nuclear weapons and that a universal ban precludes any nation from maintaining chemical or biological weapons. The current tensions with Iran and North Korea over their nuclear programs are due in part to the continuation of this policy of deterrence.
Criticism[edit]
Deterrence theory is criticized for its assumptions about opponent rationales.
First, it is argued that suicidal or psychotic opponents may not be deterred by either forms of deterrence.[12] Second, if two enemy states both possess nuclear weapons, Country X may try to gain a first-strike advantage by suddenly launching weapons at Country Y, with a view to destroying its enemy's nuclear launch silos thereby rendering Country Y incapable of a response. Third, diplomatic misunderstandings and/or opposing political ideologies may lead to escalating mutual perceptions of threat, and a subsequent arms race that elevates the risk of actual war, a scenario illustrated in the movies WarGames (1983) and Dr. Strangelove (1964). An arms race is inefficient in its optimal output, as all countries involved expend resources on armaments that would not have been created if the others had not expended resources, a form of positive feedback. Fourth, escalation of perceived threat can make it easier for certain measures to be inflicted on a population by its government, such as restrictions on civil liberties, the creation of a military–industrial complex, and military expenditures resulting in higher taxes and increasing budget deficits.
In recent years, many mainstream politicians, academic analysts, and retired military leaders have also criticised deterrence and advocated nuclear disarmament. Sam Nunn, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and George Shultz have all called upon governments to embrace the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and in three Wall Street Journal opeds proposed an ambitious program of urgent steps to that end. The four have created the Nuclear Security Project to advance this agenda. Organisations such as Global Zero, an international non-partisan group of 300 world leaders dedicated to achieving nuclear disarmament, have also been established.[13] In 2010, the four were featured in a documentary film entitled Nuclear Tipping Point. The film is a visual and historical depiction of the ideas laid forth in the Wall Street Journal op-eds and reinforces their commitment to a world without nuclear weapons and the steps that can be taken to reach that goal.[14][15]
Former Secretary Kissinger puts the new danger, which cannot be addressed by deterrence, this way: "The classical notion of deterrence was that there was some consequences before which aggressors and evildoers would recoil. In a world of suicide bombers, that calculation doesn't operate in any comparable way."[16] Shultz has said, "If you think of the people who are doing suicide attacks, and people like that get a nuclear weapon, they are almost by definition not deterrable".[17]
As opposed to the extreme mutually assured destruction form of deterrence, the concept of minimum deterrence in which a state possesses no more nuclear weapons than is necessary to deter an adversary from attacking is presently the most common form of deterrence practiced by nuclear weapon states, such as China, India, Pakistan, Britain, and France.[18] Pursuing minimal deterrence during arms negotiations between United States and Russia allows each state to make nuclear stockpile reductions without the state becoming vulnerable, however it has been noted that there comes a point where further reductions may be undesirable, once minimal deterrence is reached, as further reductions beyond this point increase a state's vulnerability and provide an incentive for an adversary to secretly expand its nuclear arsenal.[19]
"Senior European statesmen and women" called for further action in addressing problems of nuclear weapons proliferation in 2010. They said: "Nuclear deterrence is a far less persuasive strategic response to a world of potential regional nuclear arms races and nuclear terrorism than it was to the cold war".[5]
Paul Virilio has criticized nuclear deterrence as anachronistic in the age of information warfare since disinformation and kompromat are the current threats to suggestible populations. The wound inflicted on unsuspecting populations he calls an "integral accident":
The first deterrence, nuclear deterrence, is presently being superseded by the second deterrence: a type of deterrence based on what I call 'the information bomb' associated with the new weaponry of information and communications technologies. Thus, in the very near future, and I stress this important point, it will no longer be war that is the continuation of politics by other means, it will be what I have dubbed 'the integral accident' that is the continuation of politics by other means.[20]
See also[edit]
Balance of terror
Chainstore paradox
Cold War
Confidence-building measures
Decapitation strike
Essentials of Post–Cold War Deterrence
Game theory
International relations
Launch on warning
Long Peace
Massive retaliation
Minimal deterrence
Mutual assured destruction
N-deterrence
Nuclear blackmail
Nuclear ethics
Nuclear peace
Nuclear strategy
Nuclear terrorism
Nuclear triad
Nuclear warfare
Peace through strength
Prisoner's dilemma
Reagan Doctrine
Second strike
Security dilemma
Tripwire force
Wargaming
Notes[edit]
Jump up ^ Definition of deterrence from the Dictionary of Modern Strategy and Tactics by Michael Keane: "The prevention or inhibition of action brought about by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. It assumes and requires rational decision makers."
References[edit]
Jump up ^ Brodie, Bernard (1959), "8", "The Anatomy of Deterrence" as found in Strategy in the Missile Age, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 264–304
^ Jump up to: a b c Since the consequence of a breakdown of the nuclear deterrence strategy is so catastrophic for human civilisation, it is reasonableness to employ the strategy only if the chance of breakdown is zero. Schelling, T. C. (1966), "2", The Diplomacy of Violence, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 1–34
Jump up ^ Zagare, Frank C. (2004), "Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence: A Re-examination of the Logical Foundations of Deterrence Theory", Journal of Theoretical Politics, 16 (2), pp. 107–141, doi:10.1177/0951629804041117
^ Jump up to: a b "Nuclear endgame: The growing appeal of zero". The Economist. June 16, 2011.
^ Jump up to: a b Kåre Willoch, Kjell Magne Bondevik, Gro Harlem Brundtland, Thorvald Stoltenberg, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Ruud Lubbers, Jean-Luc Dehaene, Guy Verhofstadt; et al. (14 April 2010). "Nuclear progress, but dangers ahead". The Guardian. CS1 maint: Multiple names: authors list (link)
Jump up ^ See, for example, Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1989)
^ Jump up to: a b c d e Huth, P. K. (1999), "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debate", Annual Review of Political Science, 2, pp. 25–48, doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.25
^ Jump up to: a b c d Jentleson, B.A.; Whytock, C.A. (2005), "Who Won Libya", International Security, 30 (3), pp. 47–86, doi:10.1162/isec.2005.30.3.47
Jump up ^ George, A (1991), "The General Theory and Logic of Coercive Diplomacy", Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War, Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 3–14
Jump up ^ Jervis, Robert (1982). "Deterrence and Perception". International Security. 7: 3. doi:10.2307/2538549.
Jump up ^ "The Nautilus Institute Nuclear Strategy Project: US FOIA Documents". Archived from the original on December 8, 2008.
Jump up ^ Towle, Philip (2000). "Cold War". In Charles Townshend. The Oxford History of Modern War. New York, US: Oxford University Press. p. 164. ISBN 0-19-285373-2.
Jump up ^ Maclin, Beth (2008-10-20) "A Nuclear weapon-free world is possible, Nunn says", Belfer Center, Harvard University. Retrieved on 2008-10-21.
Jump up ^ "The Growing Appeal of Zero". The Economist. June 18, 2011. p. 66.
Jump up ^ "Documentary Advances Nuclear Free Movement". NPR. Retrieved 2010-06-10.
Jump up ^ Ben Goddard (2010-01-27). "Cold Warriors say no nukes". The Hill.
Jump up ^ Hugh Gusterson (30 March 2012). "The new abolitionists". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
Jump up ^ Kristensen, Hans M, Robert S Norris, and Ivan Oelrich. "From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons." Federation of American Scientists. April 2009. Accessed July 31, 2010.
Jump up ^ Nalebuff, Barry. "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence." Journal of Conflict Resolution 32, no. 3 (September 1988): pg 424.
Jump up ^ John Armitage (October 18, 2000) The Kosovo War Took Place In Orbital Space: Paul Virilio in Conversation. , Ctheory
"U.S. Department of Defense's Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept" (Word). Retrieved 2011-10-11.
Further reading[edit]
Schultz, George P. and Goodby, James E. The War that Must Never be Fought, Hoover Press, ISBN 978-0-8179-1845-3, 2015.
Freedman, Lawrence. 2004. Deterrence. New York: Polity Press.
Jervis, Robert, Richard N. Lebow and Janice G. Stein. 1985. The Psychology of Deterrence. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 270 pp.
Morgan, Patrick. 2003. Deterrence Now. New York: Cambridge University Press.
T.V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, James J. Wirtz, Complex Deterrence: Strategy In the Global Age (University of Chicago Press, 2009) ISBN 978-0-226-65002-9
Garcia Covarrubias, Jaime. "The Significance of Conventional Deterrence in Latin America", March–April 2004
Waltz, Kenneth N. Nuclear Myths and Political Realities. The American Political Science Review. Vol. 84, No. 3 (Sep, 1990), pp. 731–746
External links[edit]
Wikiversity has learning resources about Survey research and design in psychology/Tutorials/Multiple linear regression/Exercises/Deterrence theory
Nuclear Deterrence Theory and Nuclear Deterrence Myth, streaming video of a lecture by Professor John Vasquez, Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS), University of Illinois, September 17, 2009.
Deterrence Today – Roles, Challenges, and Responses, analysis by Lewis A. Dunn, IFRI Proliferation Papers n° 19, 2007
Revisiting Nuclear Deterrence Theory by Donald C. Whitmore – March 1, 1998
Nuclear Deterrence, Missile Defenses, and Global Instability by David Krieger, April 2001
Bibliography
Maintaining Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century by the Senate Republican Policy Committee
Nuclear Files.org Description and analysis of the nuclear deterrence theory
Nuclear Files.org Speech by US General Lee Butler in 1998 on the Risks of Nuclear Deterrence
Nuclear Files.org Speech by Sir Joseph Rotblat, Nobel Peace Laureate, on the Ethical Dimensions of Deterrence
The Universal Formula for Successful Deterrence by Charles Sutherland, 2007. A predictive tool for deterrence strategies.
Will the Eagle strangle the Dragon?, Analysis of how the Chinese nuclear deterrence is altered by the U.S. BMD system, Trends East Asia, No. 20, February 2008.
When is Deterrence Necessary? Gauging Adversary Intent by Gary Schaub,Jr., Strategic Studies Quarterly 3, 4 (Winter 2009)
The significance of conventional deterrence in Latin America
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