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Nicaragua v. United States
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Nicaragua v. United States
Court
International Court of Justice
Full case name
Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)[1]
Decided
June 27, 1986 (1986-06-27)
Citation(s)
1986 I.C.J. 14
Case opinions
Separate Opinion: Nagendra Singh
Separate Opinion: Manfred Lachs
Separate Opinion: José María Ruda
Separate Opinion: Taslim Olawale Elias
Separate Opinion: Roberto Ago
Separate Opinion: José Sette-Camara
Separate Opinion: Ni Zhengyu
Dissent: Shigeru Oda
Dissent: Stephen Schwebel
Dissent: Robert Jennings
Court membership
Judges sitting
Nagendra Singh, Guy Ledreit de Lacharrière, Roberto Ago, Mohammed Bedjaoui, Taslim Olawale Elias, Manfred Lachs, Kéba Mbaye, Ni Zhengyu, Shigeru Oda, José María Ruda, Stephen Schwebel, José Sette-Camara, Robert Jennings, Claude-Albert Colliard (ad hoc)
The Republic of Nicaragua v. The United States of America (1986) ICJ 1 is a public international law case decided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ ruled in favor of Nicaragua and against the United States and awarded reparations to Nicaragua. The ICJ held that the U.S. had violated international law by supporting the Contras in their rebellion against the Nicaraguan government and by mining Nicaragua's harbors. The United States refused to participate in the proceedings after the Court rejected its argument that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The U.S. also blocked enforcement of the judgment by the United Nations Security Council and thereby prevented Nicaragua from obtaining any compensation.[2] Nicaragua, under the later, post-FSLN government of Violeta Chamorro, withdrew the complaint from the court in September 1992 following a repeal of the law which had required the country to seek compensation.[3]
The Court found in its verdict that the United States was "in breach of its obligations under customary international law not to use force against another State", "not to intervene in its affairs", "not to violate its sovereignty", "not to interrupt peaceful maritime commerce", and "in breach of its obligations under Article XIX of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Parties signed at Managua on 21 January 1956."
The Court had 16 final decisions upon which it voted. In Statement 9, the Court stated that while the U.S. encouraged human rights violations by the Contras by the manual entitled Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, this did not make such acts attributable to the U.S.[4]
Contents
[hide]
1 Background and history of US intervention in Nicaragua
1.1 Nicaragua's submissions
2 Judgment
2.1 Findings
2.2 The ruling
2.3 Legal clarification and importance
2.4 How the judges voted
2.5 Dissent
3 Certain witnesses against the US
3.1 First witness: Commander Luis Carrion
3.2 Second witness: Dr. David MacMichael
3.3 Third witness: Professor Michael Glennon
3.4 Fourth witness: Father Jean Loison
3.5 Fifth witness: William Hüper
4 UN voting
5 U.S. defense and response
6 Significance
6.1 Third-party interpretations
7 See also
8 References
8.1 Citations
8.2 Sources
9 External links
Background and history of US intervention in Nicaragua[edit]
The first armed intervention by the United States in Nicaragua occurred under President Taft. In 1909, he ordered the overthrow of Nicaraguan President José Santos Zelaya. During August and September 1912, a contingent of 2300 U.S. Marines landed at the port of Corinto and occupied León and the railway line to Granada. A pro-U.S. government was formed under the occupation. The 1914 Bryan–Chamorro Treaty granted perpetual canal rights to the U.S. in Nicaragua and was signed ten days before the U.S.-operated Panama Canal opened for use, thus preventing anyone from building a competing canal in Nicaragua without U.S. permission.[5]
In 1927, under Augusto César Sandino, a major peasant uprising was launched against both the U.S. occupation and the Nicaraguan establishment. In 1933, the Marines withdrew and left the Nicaraguan National Guard in charge of internal security and elections. In 1934, Anastasio Somoza García, the head of the National Guard, ordered his forces to capture and murder Sandino. In 1937, Somoza assumed the presidency, while still in control of the National Guard, and established a dictatorship that his family controlled until 1979.[6]
The downfall of the regime is attributed to its embezzlement of millions of dollars in foreign aid that was given to the country in response to the devastating 1972 earthquake. Many moderate supporters of the dictatorship began abandoning it in the face of growing revolutionary sentiment. The Sandinista (FSLN) movement organized relief, began to expand its influence and assumed the leadership of the revolution.[7] A popular uprising brought the FSLN to power in 1979. The United States had long been opposed to the socialist FSLN, and after the revolution the Carter administration moved quickly to support the Somocistas with financial and material aid. When Ronald Reagan took office, he augmented the direct support to an anti-Sandinista group, called the Contras, which included factions loyal to the former dictatorship. When Congress prohibited further funding to the Contras, Oliver North continued the funding through arms sales that were also prohibited by Congress.[8]
Nicaragua's submissions[edit]
Nicaragua charged:
(a) That the United States, in recruiting, training, arming, equipping, financing, supplying and otherwise encouraging, supporting, aiding, and directing military and paramilitary actions in and against Nicaragua, had violated its treaty obligations to Nicaragua under:
Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter;
Articles 18 and 20 of the Charter of the Organization of American States;
Article 8 of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States;
Article I, Third, of the Convention concerning the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife.
(b) That the United States had breached international law by
1. violating the sovereignty of Nicaragua by:
armed attacks against Nicaragua by air, land and sea;
incursions into Nicaraguan territorial waters;
aerial trespass into Nicaraguan airspace;
efforts by direct and indirect means to coerce and intimidate the Government of Nicaragua.
2. using force and the threat of force against Nicaragua.
3. intervening in the internal affairs of Nicaragua.
4. infringing upon the freedom of the high seas and interrupting peaceful maritime commerce.
5. killing, wounding and kidnapping citizens of Nicaragua.
Nicaragua demanded that all such actions cease and that the United States had an obligation to pay reparations to the government for damage to their people, property, and economy.
It is noteworthy that the United States, the defaulting party, was the only member that put forward arguments against the validity of the judgment of the court, arguing that it passed a decision that it "had neither the jurisdiction nor the competence to render." Members that sided with the United States in opposing Nicaragua's claims did not challenge the court's jurisdiction, its findings, nor the substantive merits of the case.[9] Pursuant to general and customary international law, the United States has an obligation to Nicaragua to respect the sovereignty of Nicaragua. ii. Pursuant to general and customary international law, the United States has an obligation to Nicaragua not to use force or the threat of force against Nicaragua. iii. Pursuant to general and customary international law, the United States has an obligation to Nicaragua not to intervene in the internal affairs of Nicaragua.
Judgment[edit]
The very long judgment first listed 291 points, among them that the United States had been involved in the "unlawful use of force". The alleged violations included attacks on Nicaraguan facilities and naval vessels, the mining of Nicaraguan ports, the invasion of Nicaraguan air space, and the training, arming, equipping, financing and supplying of forces (the "Contras") and seeking to overthrow Nicaragua's Sandinista government. This was followed by the statements that the judges voted on.[10]
Findings[edit]
The court found evidence of an arms flow between Nicaragua and insurgents in El Salvador between 1979-81. However, there was not enough evidence to show that the Nicaraguan government was imputable for this or that the US response was proportional. The court also found that certain transborder incursions into the territory of Guatemala and Costa Rica, in 1982, 1983 and 1984, were imputable to the Government of Nicaragua. However, neither Guatemala nor Costa Rica had made any request for US intervention; El Salvador did in 1984, well after the US had intervened unilaterally.[4]
"As regards El Salvador, the Court considers that in customary international law the provision of arms to the opposition in another State does not constitute an armed attack on that State. As regards Honduras and Costa Rica, the Court states that, in the absence of sufficient information as to the transborder incursions into the territory of those two States from Nicaragua, it is difficult to decide whether they amount, singly or collectively, to an armed attack by Nicaragua. The Court finds that neither these incursions nor the alleged supply of arms may be relied on as justifying the exercise of the right of collective self-defence."[11]
Regarding human rights violations by the Contras, "The Court has to determine whether the relationship of the contras to the United States Government was such that it would be right to equate the Contras, for legal purposes, with an organ of the United States Government, or as acting on behalf of that Government. The Court considers that the evidence available to it is insufficient to demonstrate the total dependence of the contras on United States aid. A partial dependency, the exact extent of which the Court cannot establish, may be inferred from the fact that the leaders were selected by the United States, and from other factors such as the organisation, training and equipping of the force, planning of operations, the choosing of targets and the operational support provided. There is no clear evidence that the United States actually exercised such a degree of control as to justify treating the contras as acting on its behalf... Having reached the above conclusion, the Court takes the view that the Contras remain responsible for their acts, in particular the alleged violations by them of humanitarian law. For the United States to be legally responsible, it would have to be proved that that State had effective control of the operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed."[11]
The Court concluded that the United States, despite its objections, was subject to the Court's jurisdiction. The Court had ruled on November 26 by 11 votes to one that it had jurisdiction in the case on the basis of either Article 36 (i.e. compulsory jurisdiction) or the 1956 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Nicaragua. The Charter provides that, in case of doubt, it is for the Court itself to decide whether it has jurisdiction, and that each member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the Court. The Court also ruled by unanimity that the present case was admissible.[12] The United States then announced that it had "decided not to participate in further proceedings in this case." About a year after the Court's jurisdictional decision, the United States took the further, radical step of withdrawing its consent to the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, ending its previous 40 year legal commitment to binding international adjudication. The Declaration of acceptance of the general compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice terminated after a 6-month notice of termination delivered by the Secretary of State to the United Nations on October 7, 1985. [13]
Although the Court called on the United States to "cease and to refrain" from the unlawful use of force against Nicaragua and stated that the US was "in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to use force against another state" and ordered it to pay reparations, the United States refused to comply.[14] As a permanent member of the Security Council, the U.S. has been able to block any enforcement mechanism attempted by Nicaragua.[15] On November 3, 1986 the United Nations General Assembly passed, by a vote of 94-3 (El Salvador, Israel and the US voted against), a non-binding[16] resolution urging the US to comply.[17]
The ruling[edit]
On June 27, 1986, the Court made the following ruling:
The Court
Decides that in adjudicating the dispute brought before it by the Application filed by the Republic of Nicaragua on 9 April 1984, the Court is required to apply the "multilateral treaty reservation" contained in proviso (c) to the declaration of acceptance of jurisdiction made under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court by the Government of the United States of America deposited on 26 August 1946;
Rejects the justification of collective self-defense maintained by the United States of America in connection with the military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua the subject of this case;
Decides that the United States of America, by training, arming, equipping, financing and supplying the contra forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting and aiding military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of another State;
Decides that the United States of America, by certain attacks on Nicaraguan territory in 1983-1984, namely attacks on Puerto Sandino on 13 September and 14 October 1983, an attack on Corinto on 10 October 1983; an attack on Potosi Naval Base on 4/5 January 1984, an attack on San Juan del Sur on 7 March 1984; attacks on patrol boats at Puerto Sandino on 28 and 30 March 1984; and an attack on San Juan del Norte on 9 April 1984; and further by those acts of intervention referred to in subparagraph (3) hereof which involve the use of force, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to use force against another State;
Decides that the United States of America, by directing or authorizing over Rights of Nicaraguan territory, and by the acts imputable to the United States referred to in subparagraph (4) hereof, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to violate the sovereignty of another State;
Decides that, by laying mines in the internal or territorial waters of the Republic of Nicaragua during the first months of 1984, the United States of America has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligations under customary international law not to use force against another State, not to intervene in its affairs, not to violate its sovereignty and not to interrupt peaceful maritime commerce;
Decides that, by the acts referred to in subparagraph (6) hereof the United States of America has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligations under Article XIX of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the Republic of Nicaragua signed at Managua on 21 January 1956;
Decides that the United States of America, by failing to make known the existence and location of the mines laid by it, referred to in subparagraph (6) hereof, has acted in breach of its obligations under customary international law in this respect;
Finds that the United States of America, by producing in 1983 a manual entitled 'Operaciones sicológicas en guerra de guerrillas', and disseminating it to contra forces, has encouraged the commission by them of acts contrary to general principles of humanitarian law; but does not find a basis for concluding that any such acts which may have been committed are imputable to the United States of America as acts of the United States of America;
Decides that the United States of America, by the attacks on Nicaraguan territory referred to in subparagraph (4) hereof, and by declaring a general embargo on trade with Nicaragua on 1 May 1985, has committed acts calculated to deprive of its object and purpose the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Parties signed at Managua on 21 January 1956;
Decides that the United States of America, by the attacks on Nicaraguan territory referred to in subparagraph (4) hereof, and by declaring a general embargo on trade with Nicaragua on 1 May 1985, has acted in breach of its obligations under Article XIX of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Parties signed at Managua on 21 January 1956;
Decides that the United States of America is under a duty immediately to cease and to refrain from all such acts as may constitute breaches of the foregoing legal obligations;
Decides that the United States of America is under an obligation to make reparation to the Republic of Nicaragua for all injury caused to Nicaragua by the breaches of obligations under customary international law enumerated above;
Decides that the United States of America is under an obligation to make reparation to the Republic of Nicaragua for all injury caused to Nicaragua by the breaches of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Parties signed at Managua on 21 January 1956;
Decides that the form and amount of such reparation, failing agreement between the Parties, will be settled by the Court, and reserves for this purpose the subsequent procedure in the case;
Recalls to both Parties their obligation to seek a solution to their disputes by peaceful means in accordance with international law.[11]
Legal clarification and importance[edit]
The ruling did in many ways clarify issues surrounding prohibition of the use of force and the right of self-defence.[18] Arming and training the Contra was found to be in breach with principles of non-intervention and prohibition of use of force, as was laying mines in Nicaraguan territorial waters.
Nicaragua's dealings with the armed opposition in El Salvador, although it might be considered a breach with the principle of non-intervention and the prohibition of use of force, did not constitute "an armed attack", which is the wording in article 51 justifying the right of self-defence.
The Court considered also the United States claim to be acting in collective self-defence of El Salvador and found the conditions for this not reached as El Salvador never requested the assistance of the United States on the grounds of self-defence.
In regards to laying mines, "...the laying of mines in the waters of another State without any warning or notification is not only an unlawful act but also a breach of the principles of humanitarian law underlying the Hague Convention No. VIII of 1907."
How the judges voted[edit]
Votes of Judges - Nicaragua v. United States
Operative Paragraph
Judge
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
President Nagendra Singh (India)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vice-President de Lacharrière (France)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Judge Ago (Italy)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Judge Elias (Nigeria)
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Judge Lachs (Poland)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Judge Mbaye (Senegal)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Judge Ni (People's Republic of China)
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Judge Oda (Japan)
Yes No No No No No Yes No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Judge Ruda (Argentina)
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Judge Schwebel (United States)
Yes No No No No No No Yes Yes No No No No No No Yes
Judge Sette-Camara (Brazil)
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Judge Sir Robert Jennings (United Kingdom)
Yes No No No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Judge ad hoc Colliard (France)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dissent[edit]
Judge Schwebel's dissent was twice as long as the actual judgment. Judge Schwebel argued that the Sandinista government came to power with support of foreign intervention similar to what it was now complaining about. He argued that the Sandinista government achieved international recognition and received large amounts of foreign aid in exchange for commitments they subsequently violated. He cited evidence that the Sandinista government had indeed supported the rebels in El Salvador and noted that Nicaragua’s own CIA witness contradicted their assertions that they had never at any point supported the rebels in El Salvador. The CIA witness said that there was no evidence of weapon shipments since early 1981, but Schwebel argued that he could not credibly explained why opponents of Contra aid such as Congressman Boland, who also saw the evidence, believed that weapon shipments were ongoing. He further argued that Daniel Ortega publicly admitted such shipments in statements in 1985 and 1986. Furthermore, there was no dispute that the leadership of the rebels operated in Nicaragua from time to time.
He stated that in August 1981 the U.S. offered to resume aid to Nicaragua and to not support regime change in exchange for Nicaraguan commitments to not support the rebels in El Salvador. These proposals were rejected by the Sandinistas, and judge Schwebel argued that the U.S. was entitled to take action in collective self-defense with El Salvador by authorizing contra aid in December 1981. He stated that further U.S. proposals to resolve the issue made in early 1982 were also ignored by the Sandinistas. The Sandinista government in 1983 began advancing proposals in which it would undertake not to support the rebels, but Schwebel noted that these were coupled with demands that the U.S. cease supporting the lawful government of El Salvador. The judge noted that since early 1985 the U.S. had increasingly made regime change a primary objective but argued this was not inconsistent with self-defense because it was reasonable to believe that Nicaragua would not maintain any commitments unless Sandinista power was diluted.
The judge said that both sides of the wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador had committed atrocities. He said the U.S. mining of Nicaraguan harbors was unlawful in regard to third parties, but not Nicaragua.[19]
Certain witnesses against the US[edit]
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First witness: Commander Luis Carrion[edit]
The first witness called by Nicaragua was Nicaragua's first Vice Minister of the Interior, Commander Luis Carrion. Commander Carrion had overall responsibility for state security and was in charge of all government operations in the "principal war zone". He was responsible for monitoring United States involvement in military and paramilitary activities against Nicaragua, directing Nicaragua's military and intelligence efforts against the contra guerrillas.
Commander Carrion began by explaining the condition of the contras prior to United States' aid in December 1981. Commander Carrion stated that the contras consisted of insignificant bands of poorly armed and poorly organized members of Somoza's National Guard, who carried out uncoordinated border raids and rustled cattle (presumably for food).
In December 1981, the U.S. Congress authorized an initial appropriation of 19 million dollars to finance paramilitary operations in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America. Because of this aid, Commander Carrion stated that the contras began to become centralized and received both training and weapons from the CIA. During 1982 the contra guerrillas engaged the Sandinista armed forces in a series of hit and run border raids and carried out a number of sabotage operations including:
the destruction of two key bridges in the northern part of Nicaragua, and
the planting of bombs in Nicaraguan civil aircraft in Mexico and in the baggage area of a Nicaraguan port.
The United States Central Intelligence Agency, and Argentine military officers financed by the CIA, were engaged in the training of the contra forces. The guerrillas received both basic infantry training as well as training in specialized sabotage and demolition for "special operation groups".
The U.S. Congress apportioned new funds for the contras to the amount of $30 million at the end of 1982. This made it possible for the contra forces to launch a military offensive against Nicaragua. According to Commander Carrion, the offensive known as "C Plan" had the objective of capturing the Nicaraguan border town of Jalapa in order to install a provisional government, which could receive international recognition. This plan failed.
After the failure of the Jalapa offensive the contras changed their tactics from frontal assaults to economic warfare against State farms, coffee plantations, grain storage centers, road junctions, etc.
The CIA began to support the contras by setting up and coordinating a communications and logistical system. The CIA supplied aircraft and the construction of airfields in the Honduran border area next to Nicaragua. This allowed the contras to carry out deep penetration raids into the more developed and populated areas of the Nicaraguan interior. U.S. Army engineers created this airfield. The purpose of these deep penetration attacks upon economic targets was to weaken the Nicaraguan economy, causing a shortages of goods.
As a part of its training program for the contras, the CIA prepared and distributed a manual entitled Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare. This manual included instructions in the "use of implicit and explicit terror", and in the "selective use of violence for propaganda effects". Commander Carrion explained that the manual was given to the Contras, "All of these terrorist instructions have the main purpose of alienating the population from the Government through creating a climate of terror and fear, so that nobody would dare support the Government". The manual calls for the "neutralization" (i.e. assassination) of Sandinista local government officials, judges, etc. for purposes of intimidation. It was openly admitted by the President Reagan in a press conference that the manual had been prepared by a CIA contract employee.
After the United States Congress approved an additional $24 million aid to the contras in December 1983, a new offensive was launched, named Plan Sierra. This offensive involved approximately 7000 members of the contra forces. As in earlier attacks, the initial objective of this offensive was to capture the border town of Jalapa to install a provisional government, which the CIA informed the contras would be immediately recognized by the United States Government. But this contra offensive was also repulsed by the Nicaraguan government forces.
In the beginning of 1984, the contras made a major effort to prevent the harvesting of the coffee crop, which is one of Nicaragua's most important export products. Coffee plantations and state farms where coffee is grown were attacked, vehicles were destroyed, and coffee farmers were killed.
Commander Carrion testified that the ability of the contras to carry out military operations was completely dependent upon United States funding, training and logistical support. Carrion stated that the U.S. Government supplied the contras with uniforms, weapons, communications equipment, intelligence, training, and coordination in using this material aid.
In September 1983, CIA operatives blew up Nicaragua's only oil pipeline, which was used to transport oil from off-loading facilities to storage tanks on shore. The United States was also directly involved in a large scale sabotage operation directed against Nicaragua's oil storage facilities. This last attack was carried out by CIA contract employees termed by that organization as "Unilaterally Controlled Latin Assets" (UCLAs). The CIA personnel were also directly involved in a helicopter attack on a Nicaraguan army training camp. One of the helicopters was shot down by Nicaraguan ground fire resulting in the death of two U.S. citizens.
Commander Carrion testified that the United States was involved in the mining of Nicaragua's ports between February - April 1984. The mining operation was carried out by CIA ships directing the operation from international waters, while the actual mining was carried out by CIA employees on board speedboats operating inshore. After the mine-laying was completed the speedboats returned to the mother vessel.[20][21]
Carrion stated that 3,886 people had been killed and 4,731 wounded in the four years since the contras began their attacks. Carrion estimated property damage at $375 million.[22]
Commander Carrion stated if the United States stopped aid, support and training, this would result in the end of the contras military activities within three months. Asked why he was so sure of this, Commander Carrion answered, "Well, because the contras are an artificial force, artificially set up by the United States, that exists only because it counts on United States direction, on United States training, on United States assistance, on United States weapons, on United States everything...Without that kind of support and direction the contras would simply disband, disorganize, and thus lose their military capacity in a very short time".[20]
Second witness: Dr. David MacMichael[edit]
David MacMichael was an expert on counter-insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and Latin American affairs, he was also a witness because he was closely involved with U.S. intelligence activities as a contract employee from March 1981 - April 1983. MacMichael worked for Stanford Research Institute, which was contracted by the U.S. Department of Defense. After this he worked two years for the CIA as a "senior estimates officer", preparing the National Intelligence Estimate. Dr. MacMichael's responsibility was centered upon Central America. He had top-secret clearance. He was qualified and authorized to have access to all relevant U.S. intelligence concerning Central America, including intelligence relating to alleged Nicaraguan support for, and arms shipments to the anti-Government insurgents in El Salvador. He took part in high level meetings of the Latin American affairs office of the CIA. Including a fall 1981 meeting, which submitted the initial plan to set up a 1500-man covert force on the Nicaraguan border, shipping arms from Nicaragua to the El Salvador insurgents. This plan was approved by President Reagan.[22][23]
"The overall purpose (for the creation of the contras) was to weaken, even destabilize the Nicaraguan Government and thus reduce the menace it allegedly posed to the United States' interests in Central America..."
Contra paramilitary actions would "hopefully provoke cross-border attacks by Nicaraguan forces and thus serve to demonstrate Nicaragua's aggressive nature and possibly call into play the Organization of American States' provisions (regarding collective self-defense). It was hoped that the Nicaraguan Government would clamp down on civil liberties within Nicaragua itself, arresting its opposition, so demonstrating its allegedly inherent totalitarian nature and thus increase domestic dissent within the country, and further that there would be reaction against United States citizens, particularly against United States diplomatic personnel within Nicaragua and thus to demonstrate the hostility of Nicaragua towards the United States".
In response to repeated questions as to whether there was any substantial evidence of the supply of weapons to the guerrilla movement in El Salvador- either directly by the Nicaraguan Government itself-or with the knowledge, approval or authorization of the Nicaraguan Government of either non-official Nicaraguan sources, or by third country nationals inside or outside Nicaragua, using Nicaraguan territory for this purpose, Dr. MacMichael answered that there was no such evidence. In the opinion of the witness it would not have been possible for Nicaragua to send arms to the insurgents in El Salvador in significant amounts (as alleged by the U.S. Government) and over a prolonged period, without this being detected by the U.S. intelligence network in the area...Counsel for Nicaragua, asked the witness several times whether any detection of arms shipments by or through Nicaragua had taken place during the period he was employed by the CIA. (MacMichael) answered repeatedly that there was no such evidence. He also stated that after his employment had terminated, nothing had occurred that would cause him to change his opinion. He termed the evidence that had been publicly disclosed by the U.S. Government concerning Nicaraguan arms deliveries to the El Salvadoran insurgents as both "scanty" and "unreliable". The witness did however state that based on evidence, which had been gathered immediately prior to his employment with the CIA, evidence he had already actually seen, there was substantial evidence that arms shipments were reaching El Salvador from Nicaragua - with the probable involvement and complicity of the Nicaraguan Government - through late 1980 up until the spring of 1981....But this evidence, which most importantly had included actual seizures of weapons, which could be traced to Nicaragua, as well as documentary evidence and other sources, had completely ceased by early 1981. Since then, no evidence linking Nicaragua to shipments of arms in any substantial quantities had resumed coming in.[23]
Third witness: Professor Michael Glennon[edit]
Mr. Glennon testified about a fact-finding mission he had conducted in Nicaragua to investigate alleged human rights violations committed by the contra guerrillas, sponsored by the International Human Rights Law Group, and the Washington Office on Latin America. Glennon conducted the investigation with Mr. Donald T. Fox who is a New York attorney and a member of the International Commission of Jurists.
They traveled to Nicaragua, visiting the northern region where the majority of contra military operations took place. The two lawyers interviewed around 36 northern frontier residents who had direct experience with the contras. They also spoke with the U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua, and with senior officials of the U.S. Department of State in Washington after returning to the United States.
No hearsay evidence was accepted. Professor Glennon stated that those interviewed were closely questioned and their evidence was carefully cross-checked with available documentary evidence. Doubtful "testimonies" were rejected, and the results were published in April 1985. The conclusions of the report were summarized by Glennon in Court:
"We found that there is substantial credible evidence that the contras were engaged with some frequency in acts of terroristic violence directed at Nicaraguan civilians. These are individuals who have no connection with the war effort-persons with no economic, political or military significance. These are Individuals who are not caught in the cross-fire between Government and contra forces, but rather individuals who are deliberately targeted by the contras for acts of terror. "Terror" was used in the same sense as in recently enacted United States law, i.e. "an activity that involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that Is a violation or the criminal law, and appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to Influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping".
In talks with U.S. State Department officials, at those in Managua U.S. Embassy, and with officials in Washington, Professor Glennon had inquired whether the U.S. Government had ever investigated human rights abuses by the contras. Professor Glennon testified that no such investigation had ever been conducted, because in the words of a ranking State Department official who he could not name, the U.S. Government maintained a policy of "intentional ignorance" on the matter. State Department officials in Washington- had admitted to Glennon that "it was clear that the level of atrocities was enormous". Those words "enormous" and "atrocities" were the ranking State Department official's words.[24]
Fourth witness: Father Jean Loison[edit]
Father Jean Loison was a French priest who worked as a nurse in a hospital in the northern frontier region close to Honduras.
Asked whether the contras engaged in acts of violence directed against the civilian population, Father Loison answered:
"Yes, I could give you several examples. Near Quilali, at about 30 kilometers east of Quilali, there was a little village called El Coco. The contras arrived, they devastated it, they destroyed and burned everything. They arrived in front of a little house and turned their machinegun fire on it, without bothering to check if there were any people inside. Two children, who had taken fright and hidden under a bed, were hit. I could say the same thing of a man and woman who were hit, this was in the little co-operative of Sacadias Olivas. It was just the same. They too had taken fright and got into bed. Unlike El Coco, the contras had just been on the attack, they had encountered resistance and were now in flight. During their flight they went into a house, and seeing that there were people there, they threw grenade. The man and the woman were killed and one of the children was injured."
About contra kidnappings:
"I would say that kidnappings are one of the reasons why some of the peasants have formed themselves into groups. Here (indicates a point on the map) is Quilali. Between Quilali and Uilili, in this region to the north, there are hardly any peasants left of any age to bear arms, because they have all been carried off"."
Father Loison described many examples of violence, mostly indiscriminate, directed at the civilian population in the region where he resides. The picture that emerges from his testimony is that the contras engage in brutal violation of minimum standards of humanity. He described murders of unarmed civilians, including women and children, rape followed in many instances by torture or murder, and indiscriminate terror designed to coerce the civilian population. His testimony was similar to various reports including the International Human Rights Law Group, Amnesty International, and others.[25]
Fifth witness: William Hüper[edit]
William Hüper was Nicaragua's Minister of Finance. He testified about Nicaragua economic damage, including the loss of fuel as a result of the attack in the oil storage facilities at Corinto, the damage to Nicaragua's commerce as a result of the mining of its ports, and other economic damage.[26]
UN voting[edit]
After five vetoes in the Security Council between 1982 and 1985 of resolutions concerning the situation in Nicaragua [5], the United States made one final veto on 28 October 1986[27] (France, Thailand, and United Kingdom abstaining) of a resolution calling for full and immediate compliance with the judgment.[28]
Nicaragua brought the matter to the U.N. Security Council, where the United States vetoed a resolution (11 to 1, 3 abstentions) calling on all states to observe international law. Nicaragua also turned to the General Assembly, which passed a resolution 94 to 3 calling for compliance with the World Court ruling. Two states, Israel and El Salvador, joined the United States in opposition. At that time, El Salvador was receiving substantial funding and military advisement from the U.S., which was aiming to crush a Sandinista-like revolutionary movement by the FMLN. At the same session, Nicaragua called upon the U.N. to send an independent fact-finding mission to the border to secure international monitoring of the borders after a conflict there; the proposal was rejected by Honduras with U.S. backing. A year later, on November 12, 1987, the General Assembly again called for "full and immediate compliance" with the World Court decision. This time only Israel joined the United States in opposing adherence to the ruling.[29][30]
U.S. defense and response[edit]
The United States refused to participate in the merits phase of the proceedings, but the Court found that the US refusal did not prevent it from deciding the case. The Court also rejected the United States defense that its action constituted collective self-defense. The United States argued that the Court did not have jurisdiction, with U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick dismissing the Court as a "semi-legal, semi-juridical, semi-political body, which nations sometimes accept and sometimes don't." [31]
The United States had signed the treaty accepting the Court's decision as binding, but with the exception that the court would not have the power to hear cases based on multilateral treaty obligations unless it involved all parties to the treaty affected by that decision or the United States specially agreed to jurisdiction. The court found that it was obliged to apply this exception and refused to take on claims by Nicaragua based on the United Nations Charter and Organization of American States charter, but concluded that it could still decide the case based on customary international law obligations with 11-4 majority.
After five vetoes in the Security Council between 1982 and 1985 of resolutions concerning the situation in Nicaragua [6], the United States made one final veto on 28 October 1986[27] (France, Thailand, and United Kingdom abstaining) of a resolution calling for full and immediate compliance with the Judgement.[28]
When the same resolution was brought before the United Nations General Assembly on 3 November it was passed.[29] Only El Salvador and Israel voted with the U.S. against it. El Salvador's ruling junta was at that time receiving substantial funding and military advisement from the U.S., which was aiming to crush a Sandinista-like revolutionary movement by the FMLN. In spite of this resolution, the U.S. still chose not to pay the fine.
Significance[edit]
Third-party interpretations[edit]
Professor of International Law, Anthony D'Amato, writing for the American Journal of International Law (Vol. 80, 1986), commented on this case, stating that "...law would collapse if defendants could only be sued when they agreed to be sued, and the proper measurement of that collapse would be not just the drastically diminished number of cases but also the necessary restructuring of a vast system of legal transactions and relations predicated on the availability of courts as a last resort. There would be talk of a return to the law of the jungle." The author also notes that the case resulted in an unusual candor. A month after the announced withdrawal, Secretary of State Shultz suggested, and President Reagan later confirmed in a press conference, that the goal of U.S. policy was to overthrow the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua.[32] Although this was what Nicaragua had alleged to be the U.S. goal, while the case was actively pending, the United States could not concede that goal without serious risk of undermining its litigating position.[33]
See also[edit]
Covert United States involvement in regime change
1949 Syrian coup d'état
1949–1953 Albania
1951–56 Tibet
1953 Iranian coup d'état
1954 Guatemalan coup d'état
1956–57 Syria crisis
1957–58 Indonesian rebellion
1959–2000 Cuba, assassination attempts on Fidel Castro
1959 Cambodian "Bangkok Plot"
1960 Congo coup
1961 Cuba, Bay of Pigs Invasion
1961 Cuba, Operation Mongoose
1961 Dominican Republic
1963 South Vietnamese coup
1964 Bolivian coup d'état
1964 Brazilian coup d'état
1966 Ghana coup d'état
1970 Cambodian coup
1971 Bolivian coup d'état
1970–73 Chile
1979–89 Afghanistan, Operation Cyclone
1981–87 Nicaragua, Contras
1982 Chad
1991 Haiti
1996 Iraq coup attempt
2001 Afghanistan
2004 Haiti
2011 Libyan civil war
2011–2017 Syria
view
talk
edit
Iran–Contra affair
List of International Court of Justice cases
Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare
References[edit]
Citations[edit]
Jump up ^ Official name: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1984 ICJ REP. 392 June 27, 1986.
Jump up ^ Morrison, Fred L. (January 1987). "Legal Issues in The Nicaragua Opinion". American Journal of International Law. 81 (1): 160–166. JSTOR 2202146. doi:10.2307/2202146. Archived from the original on 2012-02-05. "Appraisals of the ICJ's Decision. Nicaragua vs United State (Merits)"
Jump up ^ "Human Rights Watch World Report 1993 - Nicaragua". Archived from the original on October 9, 2012. Retrieved September 18, 2009.
Jump up ^ "Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14.". International Court of Justice. Retrieved 2006-09-05.
"Summary of the Judgment of 27 June 1986". International Court of Justice. Retrieved 2006-09-05.
Jump up ^ Walter, Knut (1993). The Regime of Anastasio Somoza, 1936-1956. The University of North Carolina Press. pp. 10–12. ISBN 0-8078-2106-3.
Jump up ^ Walker, Thomas W. (2003). Nicaragua: Living in the Shadow of the Eagle, 4th Edition. Westview Press. pp. 25–27. ISBN 0-8133-4033-0.
Jump up ^ Zimmerman, Matilde (2000). Sandinista: Carlos Fonseca and the Nicaraguan Revolution. Duke University Press. pp. 173, 209–210. ISBN 0-8223-2595-0.
Jump up ^ Dent, David W. (2005). Historical Dictionary of US-Latin American Relations. Greenwood Press. p. 129. ISBN 0-313-32196-5.
Jump up ^ "United States Decides Not to Participate in World Court Case Initiated by Nicaragua". UN Chronicle. 22 (January). January 1985.
Jump up ^ {broken link} "International Court of Justice Year 1986, 27 June 1986, General list No. 70, paragraphs 251, 252, 157, 158, 233.". International Court of Justice. Retrieved 2006-07-30. Large PDF file from the ICJ website
^ Jump up to: a b c "Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)". icj-cij.org. CITATION BRINGS TO UNKNOWN PAGE
Jump up ^ "United States Decides Not to Participate in World Court Case Initiated by Nicaragua". UN Chronicle. 22 and 9 (January). January 1985 and 1984. Check date values in: |date= (help)
Jump up ^ Robert J. Delahunty, John Yoo (2006). "Executive Power V. International Law". Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy. 30.
Jump up ^ [1]
Jump up ^ Constanze Schulte (January 2004). COMPLIANCE WITH DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. 81. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 282–285. ISBN 0-19-927672-2.
Jump up ^ resolution
Jump up ^ [2]
Jump up ^ UN Charter art.2(4) and art. 51, both considered to be customary international law
Jump up ^ Dissent of Judge Schwebel International Court of Justice
^ Jump up to: a b Gill, Terry D. (1989). Litigation strategy at the International Court a case study of the Nicaragua v United States dispute. Dordrecht. ISBN 0-7923-0332-6. p. 187-191
Jump up ^ "Nicaragua Mining: Self-defense or Terrorism?;Recovery: Is It Reagan's?;Ancestors -- Fifty-Three Fossils Transcript #2229". The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour. April 12, 1984. Senator Barry Goldwater said he was told in a letter from CIA Director William Casey that President Reagan himself had approved the mining in writing. This was confirmed by Secretary Dam on the MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour: "Well, let me put it this way. All covert action programs are approved by the President or they don't go forward."
^ Jump up to: a b "World Court Hears Charges vs. U.S". Facts on File World News Digest: 702 D1. September 20, 1985.
^ Jump up to: a b Gill, p. 191-193
Jump up ^ Gill, p. 193-195.
Jump up ^ Gill, p. 195.
Jump up ^ Gill, p. 195-196.
^ Jump up to: a b United Nations Security Council Verbatim Report 2718. S/PV.2718 page 40. 28 October 1986. Retrieved 2007-09-19.
^ Jump up to: a b United Nations Security Council Document S/18428 28 October 1986. Retrieved 2007-09-19.
^ Jump up to: a b United Nations General Assembly Session 41 Resolution 31. A/RES/41/31 3 November 1986. Retrieved 2007-09-19.
Jump up ^ Noam Chomsky (1989). "4". Necessary Illusions, Adjuncts of Government. New York: Oxford University Press.
Jump up ^ "International Law PSCI 0236 > International Law PSCI 0236 > Introduction". middlebury.edu. Retrieved 2006-09-05.
Jump up ^ NY Times, Feb. 22, 1985, at A10, cols. 1, 3
Jump up ^ [3]
Sources[edit]
D'Amato, Anthony (1985). "Modifying U.S. Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court" (PDF). American Journal of International Law. 79 (2): 385–405. JSTOR 2201709. doi:10.2307/2201709.
D'Amato, Anthony (1987). "Trashing Customary International Law" (PDF). American Journal of International Law. 81 (1): 101–105. JSTOR 2202136. doi:10.2307/2202136. "Appraisals of the ICJ's Decision. Nicaragua vs United State (Merits)"
D'Amato, Anthony (1986). "The United States Should Accept, By a New Declaration, The General Compulsory Jurisdiction of The World Court" (PDF). American Journal of International Law. 80 (2): 331–336. JSTOR 2201963. doi:10.2307/2201963.
Falk, Richard (1987). "The World Court's Achievement". American Journal of International Law. 81 (1): 106–112. JSTOR 2202137. doi:10.2307/2202137. Archived from the original on 2006-05-31. "Appraisals of the ICJ's Decision."
Franck, Thomas M. (1987). "Some Observations on the ICJ's Procedural and Substantive Innovations". American Journal of International Law. 81 (1): 116–121. JSTOR 2202139. doi:10.2307/2202139. Archived from the original on 2006-05-31. "Appraisals of the ICJ's Decision. Nicaragua vs United States (Merits)"
Gill, Terry D. (1989). Litigation strategy at the International Court a case study of the Nicaragua v United States dispute. Dordrecht. ISBN 0-7923-0332-6.
Howard Friel; Richard A. Falk (2004). The Record of the Paper: How the New York Times Misreports US Foreign Policy. Verso. p. 184. ISBN 1-84467-019-8.
International Court of Justice (January 1, 2000). Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua V. United States of America). United Nations Publications. ISBN 92-1-070826-1.
Maier, Harold G. (January 1987). "Appraisals Of The ICJ's Decision: Nicaragua V. United States (Merits)". The American Society of International Law. 81 (1): 77–78. JSTOR 2202132. doi:10.2307/2202132. 81 A.J.I.L. 77. Archived from the original on 2006-05-31.
Morrison, Fred L. (January 1987). "Legal Issues in The Nicaragua Opinion". American Journal of International Law. 81 (1): 160–166. JSTOR 2202146. doi:10.2307/2202146. Archived from the original on 2012-02-05. "Appraisals of the ICJ's Decision. Nicaragua vs United State (Merits)"
Schachter, Oscar (April 1989). "Self-Defense and the Rule of Law". American Journal of International Law. 83 (2): 259–277. JSTOR 2202738. doi:10.2307/2202738. Archived from the original on 2006-06-28. 83 A.J.I.L. 259
Scheffer, David J. (July 11, 1986). "U.S. Must Not Be the Outlaw on Nicaragua". Los Angeles Times: 5. Archived from the original on April 9, 2006.
External links[edit]
The Contras and the U.S. from the Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives
Military Aid to the Contras from the Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives
Nicaragua : Whose Side Are We On? from the Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives
"Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States Of America) - overview". International Court of Justice. Retrieved June 16, 2007.
"Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States Of America) - Summary of the Judgment of 27 June 1986". International Court of Justice. Retrieved June 16, 2007.
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1966 FIFA World Cup Final
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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1966 FIFA World Cup Final
The original Wembley Stadium with its twin towers
Event
1966 FIFA World Cup
England
West Germany
4
2
After extra time
Date
30 July 1966
Venue
Wembley Stadium, London
Referee
Gottfried Dienst (Switzerland)
Attendance
96,924
← 1962
1970 →
The 1966 FIFA World Cup Final was the final match in the 1966 FIFA World Cup, the eighth football World Cup.[1] The match was played by England and West Germany on 30 July 1966 at Wembley Stadium in London, and had an attendance of 96,924.[2] The British television audience peaked at 32.3 million viewers, making it the most watched television event ever in the United Kingdom.[3]
England won 4–2 after extra time to win the Jules Rimet Trophy. The England team became known as the "wingless wonders", on account of their then-unconventional narrow attacking formation, described at the time as a 4–4–2.[4] The match is remembered for England's only World Cup trophy, Geoff Hurst's hat-trick – the first, and to date, only one ever scored in a FIFA World Cup Final – and the controversial third goal awarded to England by referee Gottfried Dienst and linesman Tofiq Bahramov.
Contents
1 Road to the final
1.1 England
1.2 West Germany
2 Match
2.1 Summary
2.1.1 Normal time
2.1.2 Extra time
2.2 Details
3 Champions photograph and statue
4 Cultural impact
5 2009 receipt of winners medals
6 See also
7 References
Road to the final[edit]
Both teams were strong throughout the tournament. Each won two and drew one of their three matches in the group stages. England did not concede a goal until their semi-final against Portugal.
England[edit]
Team
Score
Venue
Round
Uruguay 0–0 Wembley Stadium, London Group 1
Mexico 2–0 Group 1
France 2–0 Group 1
Argentina 1–0 Quarter-final
Portugal 2–1 Semi-final
West Germany[edit]
Team
Score
Venue
Round
Switzerland 5–0 Hillsborough Stadium, Sheffield Group 2
Argentina 0–0 Villa Park, Birmingham Group 2
Spain 2–1 Group 2
Uruguay 4–0 Hillsborough Stadium, Sheffield Quarter-final
Soviet Union 2–1 Goodison Park, Liverpool Semi-final

Match[edit]
Summary[edit]
Normal time[edit]
England, managed by Alf Ramsey and captained by Bobby Moore, won the toss and elected to kick off. After 12 minutes, Sigfried Held sent a cross into the English penalty area which Ray Wilson misheaded to Helmut Haller, who got his shot on target. Jack Charlton and goalkeeper Gordon Banks failed to deal with the shot which went in making it 1–0 to West Germany.
In the 19th minute, Wolfgang Overath conceded a free kick, which Moore took immediately, floating a cross into the West German area, where Geoff Hurst rose unchallenged and levelled the scores with a downward glancing header. The teams were level at half-time, and after 77 minutes England won a corner. Alan Ball delivered the ball to Geoff Hurst whose deflected shot from the edge of the area found Martin Peters. He produced the final shot, beating the West German keeper from eight yards to make the score 2–1 to England.[5]
Germany pressed for an equaliser in the closing moments, and in the 89th minute Jack Charlton conceded a free kick for climbing on Uwe Seeler as they both went up for a header.[5] The kick was taken by Lothar Emmerich, who struck it into George Cohen in the wall; the rebound fell to Held, who shot across the face of goal and into the body of Karl-Heinz Schnellinger. The ball deflected across the England six-yard box, wrong-footing the England defence and allowing Wolfgang Weber to level the score at 2–2 and force the match into extra time. Banks protested that the ball had struck Schnellinger on the arm, and reiterated the claim in his 2002 autobiography,[6] but replays showed that it actually struck Schnellinger on the back.[5][7]
Extra time[edit]
Geoff Hurst's "Wembley Goal"
England pressed forward and created several chances. In particular, with five minutes gone, Bobby Charlton struck the post and sent another shot just wide. With 11 minutes of extra time gone, Alan Ball put in a cross and Geoff Hurst swivelled and shot from close range. The ball hit the underside of the crossbar, bounced down and was cleared. The referee Gottfried Dienst was uncertain if it had been a goal and consulted his linesman, Tofiq Bahramov from Azerbaijan in the USSR, who indicated that it was, and the Swiss referee awarded the goal to the home team. The crowd and the audience of 400 million television viewers were left arguing whether the goal should have been given or not.[8]
England's third goal has remained controversial ever since the match. According to the Laws of the Game the definition of a goal is when "the whole of the ball passes over the goal line".[9] English supporters cited the good position of the linesman and the statement of Roger Hunt, the nearest England player to the ball, who claimed it was a goal and that was why he wheeled away in celebration rather than attempting to tap the rebounding ball in.
Modern studies using film analysis and computer simulation have shown that the ball never crossed the line – both Duncan Gillies of the Visual Information Processing Group at Imperial College London and Ian Reid and Andrew Zisserman of the Department of Engineering Science at University of Oxford have stated that the ball would have needed to travel a further 2.5–6.0 cm to fully cross the line.[10]
Some Germans cited possible bias of the Soviet linesman,[11] especially as the USSR had just been defeated in the semi-finals by West Germany.[12] Bahramov later stated in his memoirs that he believed the ball had bounced back not from the crossbar but from the net, and that he was not able to observe the rest of the scene, so it did not matter where the ball hit the ground anyway.
Queen Elizabeth II presented England captain Bobby Moore with the FIFA World Cup trophy (Jules Rimet).
One minute before the end of play, the West Germans sent their defenders forward in a desperate attempt to score a last-minute equaliser. Winning the ball, Bobby Moore picked out the unmarked Geoff Hurst with a long pass, which Hurst carried forward while some spectators began streaming onto the field and Hurst scored moments later. Hurst later admitted that his blistering shot was as much intended to send the ball as far into the Wembley stands as possible should it miss, in order to kill time on the clock.[13]
The final goal gave rise to one of the most famous sayings in English football, when BBC commentator Kenneth Wolstenholme described the situation as follows: "And here comes Hurst. He's got... some people are on the pitch, they think it's all over. It is now! It's four!"[14]
One of the balls from the final is on display in the National Football Museum in Manchester.
Details[edit]
30 July 196615:00 BST
England
4–2 (a.e.t.)
West Germany
Hurst 18', 101', 120'
Peters 78' Report Haller 12'
Weber 89'
Wembley Stadium, London
Attendance: 96,924
Referee: Gottfried Dienst (Switzerland)
England
West Germany
GK 1 Gordon Banks
RB 2 George Cohen
CB 5 Jack Charlton
CB 6 Bobby Moore (c)
LB 3 Ray Wilson
DM 4 Nobby Stiles
RM 7 Alan Ball
AM 9 Bobby Charlton
LM 16 Martin Peters 20'
CF 10 Geoff Hurst
CF 21 Roger Hunt
Manager:
Alf Ramsey
GK 1 Hans Tilkowski
RB 2 Horst-Dieter Höttges
CB 5 Willi Schulz
CB 6 Wolfgang Weber
LB 3 Karl-Heinz Schnellinger
CM 4 Franz Beckenbauer
CM 12 Wolfgang Overath
RF 8 Helmut Haller
CF 9 Uwe Seeler (c)
CF 10 Sigfried Held
LF 11 Lothar Emmerich
Manager:
Helmut Schön
Officials
Linesman: Tofiq Bahramov (Soviet Union)
Linesman: Dr. Karol Galba (Czechoslovakia)
Match rules
90 minutes
30 minutes of extra time if necessary
Replay if scores still level:
19:30 BST, Tuesday, 2 August 1966
Wembley Stadium, London
No substitutions permitted
Champions photograph and statue[edit]
The World Cup Sculpture featuring Moore with the World Cup trophy, on the shoulders of Geoff Hurst and Ray Wilson, together with Martin Peters
One of the enduring images of the celebrations in Wembley immediately after the game was the picture of the captain Bobby Moore holding the Jules Rimet Trophy aloft, on the shoulders of Geoff Hurst and Ray Wilson, together with Martin Peters. In recognition of Moore and other West Ham United players' contribution to the win, the club and Newham Borough Council jointly commissioned a statue of this scene. On 28 April 2003 Prince Andrew as president of The Football Association, duly unveiled the World Cup Sculpture (also called The Champions) in a prominent place near West Ham's ground, at the time, the Boleyn Ground, at the junction of Barking Road and Green Street. The 4-metre (13 ft)-high bronze piece was sculpted by Philip Jackson and weighed 4 tonnes.[15][16]
Cultural impact[edit]
Replica of the England shirt worn for the final
Ball used in the final, located in the National Football Museum, Manchester
The final is the most watched event ever on British television, as of July 2018, attracting 32.30 million viewers.[3] In Germany, a goal resulting from a shot bouncing off the crossbar and hitting the line is called a Wembley-Tor (Wembley Goal) due to the controversial nature of Hurst's second goal. This goal has been parodied a large number of times. Some of the most notable include:
England's third goal was referenced in a 2006 Adidas advertisement, where English midfielder Frank Lampard takes a shot at German keeper Oliver Kahn, and a similar event happens. On 27 June 2010 at that year's World Cup a similar goal by Lampard was wrongly disallowed (TV replays showed the ball landing past the goal line before bouncing away) which would have levelled the second-round game against Germany 2–2 (Germany won 4–1).
Kenneth Wolstenholme's commentary on the third goal that bounced on the line, "It's a goal!" was used (along with the sound of breaking glass) in the tape-looped coda of an early version of The Beatles song "Glass Onion", available on the album Anthology 3.[17]
In August 1966 a special 4d stamp marked ENGLAND WINNERS was issued by the Royal Mail to celebrate the victory and which soared in value to up to 15 shillings each on the back of public enthusiasm for the victory before falling back in value when the public realised it was not rare.
The 1991 BBC miniseries Sleepers, about a pair of deep-cover KGB agents placed in England in the mid-1960s and then forgotten includes a subplot about an archive film of the match recorded by Soviet agents and then placed in archives. A KGB officer who sees the film in the early 1990s is excited to discover it includes footage of the disputed goal and attempts to sell it to a contact at a television network (pointedly described as not the BBC). Sleepers is coy about what the film depicts and in the course of the story, the film is destroyed.
Marking the 50th anniversary of England's World Cup victory in July 2016, ITV broadcast 1966 – A Nation Remembers, which was narrated by the actor Terence Stamp who attended every England game at the tournament.[18]
The World Cup win features in the song "Three Lions" (known by its chorus "Football's Coming Home"), the unofficial anthem of the England football team.[19] England's win in the final also helped fans to create the "Two World Wars and One World Cup" chant.[12]
2009 receipt of winners medals[edit]
The players and staff of England's winning squad who did not get medals in 1966 received them on 10 June 2009 after a ceremony at 10 Downing Street in London. Initially, only the 11 players on the pitch at the end of the match received medals, but FIFA later awarded medals to every non-playing squad and staff member from every World Cup-winning country from 1930 to 1974.[20]
See also[edit]
England–Germany football rivalry
Ghost goal
References[edit]
Jump up ^ "Hurst the hero for England in the home of football". FIFA. Retrieved 11 November 2014
Jump up ^ "1966 FIFA World Cup England". FIFA. Retrieved 21 June 2014.
^ Jump up to: a b "Tracking 30 years of TV's most watched programmes". BBC. Retrieved 2 February 2015
Jump up ^ "Alf Ramsey – England's Anonymous Hero". FIFA. Retrieved 28 January 2013.
^ Jump up to: a b c Smyth, Rob; Murray, Scott (30 May 2014). "World Cup final 1966: England v West Germany – live!". theguardian.com (Guardian News and Media). Retrieved 30 May 2014.
Jump up ^ Banks, Gordon (2002). Banksy. Penguin Books. p. 136. ISBN 978-0-7181-4582-8.
Jump up ^ Glanville, Brian (2010) [1973]. The Story of the World Cup. London: Faber and Faber. p. 154. ISBN 978-0-571-23605-3.
Jump up ^ "Team Spirit Gains England the cup". Glasgow Herald (Page 4). 1 August 1966. Retrieved 30 April 2014.
Jump up ^ https://www.fifa.com/en/laws/Laws10_01.htm Archived 23 May 2007 at the Wayback Machine.
Jump up ^ Reid, Ian; Zisserman, Andrew (1996). Cipolla, R.; Buxton, B., eds. "Goal-directed Video Metrology" (PDF). Proceedings of the 4th European Conference on Computer Vision. New York City: Springer. II: 647–658. LNCS 1065. Archived (PDF) from the original on 19 May 2012. Retrieved 19 May 2012.
Jump up ^ Ken Jones (4 December 1997). "Football: It is possible to forget that England's overall World Cup record is nothing much to shout about". The Independent. Retrieved 21 June 2012.
^ Jump up to: a b Lister, Graham (26 June 2010). "Two World Wars, One World Cup And The 'Achtung!' Chaos – The Complex And Violent History Of England Vs Germany". Goal.com. Retrieved 21 June 2012.
Jump up ^ "1966: England – Federal Republic of Germany". Archived from the original on 8 February 2007. Retrieved 7 March 2013.
Jump up ^ "Class of '66 pay tribute to voice of football". The Daily Telegraph. 26 March 2002.
Jump up ^ "World Cup tribute unveiled". BBC News. 28 April 2003. Archived from the original on 3 February 2006. Retrieved 5 May 2010.
Jump up ^ "Champions Sculpture". www.newham.com. Retrieved 15 August 2016.
Jump up ^ Anthology 3 – The Beatles
Jump up ^ "1966 – A Nation Remembers". ITV. 5 October 2016.
Jump up ^ "'It's coming home': England are winning the meme World Cup". The Guardian. 5 July 2018. Retrieved 7 July 2018.
Jump up ^ "World Cup 1966 winners honoured". BBC News. 10 June 2009. Archived from the original on 12 June 2009. Retrieved 10 June 2009.
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