Representational Stability of Truth in Large Language Models
Large language models (LLMs) are widely used for factual tasks such as "What treats asthma?" or "What is the capital of Latvia?". However, it remains unclear how stably LLMs encode distinctions between true, false, and neither-true-nor-false content in their internal probabilistic representations. We introduce representational stability as the robustness of an LLM's veracity representations to perturbations in the operational definition of truth. We assess representational stability by (i) training a linear probe on an LLM's activations to separate true from not-true statements and (ii) measuring how its learned decision boundary shifts under controlled label changes. Using activations from sixteen open-source models and three factual domains, we compare two types of neither statements. The first are fact-like assertions about entities we believe to be absent from any training data. We call these unfamiliar neither statements. The second are nonfactual claims drawn from well-known fictional contexts. We call these familiar neither statements. The unfamiliar statements induce the largest boundary shifts, producing up to 40% flipped truth judgements in fragile domains (such as word definitions), while familiar fictional statements remain more coherently clustered and yield smaller changes (leq 8.2%). These results suggest that representational stability stems more from epistemic familiarity than from linguistic form. More broadly, our approach provides a diagnostic for auditing and training LLMs to preserve coherent truth assignments under semantic uncertainty, rather than optimizing for output accuracy alone.
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Samantha Dies
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Courtney Maynard
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Germans Savcisens
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2025-11-25T15:53:11.665Z
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Germans Savcisens
carlomarxx
user
carlomarxx
6925b8904b7b0d870b18270e
Tina Eliassi-Rad
Representational Stability of Truth in Large Language Models
Large language models (LLMs) are widely used for factual tasks such as "What treats asthma?" or "What is the capital of Latvia?". However, it remains unclear how stably LLMs encode distinctions between true, false, and neither-true-nor-false content in their internal probabilistic representations. We introduce representational stability as the robustness of an LLM's veracity representations to perturbations in the operational definition of truth. We assess representational stability by (i) training a linear probe on an LLM's activations to separate true from not-true statements and (ii) measuring how its learned decision boundary shifts under controlled label changes. Using activations from sixteen open-source models and three factual domains, we compare two types of neither statements. The first are fact-like assertions about entities we believe to be absent from any training data. We call these unfamiliar neither statements. The second are nonfactual claims drawn from well-known fictional contexts. We call these familiar neither statements. The unfamiliar statements induce the largest boundary shifts, producing up to 40% flipped truth judgements in fragile domains (such as word definitions), while familiar fictional statements remain more coherently clustered and yield smaller changes (leq 8.2%). These results suggest that representational stability stems more from epistemic familiarity than from linguistic form. More broadly, our approach provides a diagnostic for auditing and training LLMs to preserve coherent truth assignments under semantic uncertainty, rather than optimizing for output accuracy alone.
LLMs exhibit varying levels of stability in encoding truth representations, influenced more by epistemic familiarity than linguistic form, as assessed through perturbation analysis of their activations.
large language models representational stability veracity representations linear probe activations truth judgements unfamiliar neither statements familiar neither statements epistemic familiarity semantic uncertainty