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byAK and the research community

Nov 18

Claw-R1: A Step-Level Data Middleware System for Agentic Reinforcement Learning

Agentic reinforcement learning (RL) has become an important post-training paradigm for turning LLMs from static chatbots into interactive agents, giving rise to representative applications such as OpenClaw. Existing work mainly focuses on policy optimization algorithms and training frameworks, but pays less attention to the full data lifecycle of agent-environment interactions, from data production to training consumption. To bridge this gap, we present Claw-R1, an interactive step-level data middleware system for agentic RL. Claw-R1 connects heterogeneous agent runtimes with RL training backends through two core components: a Gateway Server and a Data Pool. The Gateway Server captures multi-turn interaction steps through a unified LLM API entry point, while the Data Pool organizes them into step-level records consisting of prompt IDs, response IDs, rewards and other metadata. In our demo, users can interactively inspect live trajectories, examine the state, action, and reward of each step, curate data by quality and readiness, and configure training-ready batches for different downstream RL algorithms. Overall, Claw-R1 treats agent interaction traces as managed data assets rather than temporary runtime logs. Through this demonstration, we hope to encourage the community to recognize the importance of data management in agentic RL. Our code is available at https://github.com/AgentR1/Claw-R1 and the demonstration video can be found at link https://youtu.be/Pw47dAOw6B0.

  • 6 authors
·
Jun 7

OpenPort Protocol: A Security Governance Specification for AI Agent Tool Access

AI agents increasingly require direct, structured access to application data and actions, but production deployments still struggle to express and verify the governance properties that matter in practice: least-privilege authorization, controlled write execution, predictable failure handling, abuse resistance, and auditability. This paper introduces OpenPort Protocol (OPP), a governance-first specification for exposing application tools through a secure server-side gateway that is model- and runtime-neutral and can bind to existing tool ecosystems. OpenPort defines authorization-dependent discovery, stable response envelopes with machine-actionable agent.* reason codes, and an authorization model combining integration credentials, scoped permissions, and ABAC-style policy constraints. For write operations, OpenPort specifies a risk-gated lifecycle that defaults to draft creation and human review, supports time-bounded auto-execution under explicit policy, and enforces high-risk safeguards including preflight impact binding and idempotency. To address time-of-check/time-of-use drift in delayed approval flows, OpenPort also specifies an optional State Witness profile that revalidates execution-time preconditions and fails closed on state mismatch. Operationally, the protocol requires admission control (rate limits/quotas) with stable 429 semantics and structured audit events across allow/deny/fail paths so that client recovery and incident analysis are deterministic. We present a reference runtime and an executable governance toolchain (layered conformance profiles, negative security tests, fuzz/abuse regression, and release-gate scans) and evaluate the core profile at a pinned release tag using artifact-based, externally reproducible validation.

  • 5 authors
·
Feb 21

MCP Server Architecture Patterns for LLM-Integrated Applications

The Model Context Protocol (MCP), introduced by Anthropic in November 2024, defines a standardized interface for connecting large language models (LLMs) to external tools, data sources, and services. Within months of release, hundreds of community-built MCP servers appeared on GitHub, but no software-maintenance literature has yet described how the ecosystem is being structured in production. This industry experience paper catalogues five recurring MCP server architectural patterns observed across an enumerated corpus of fifteen independently developed servers (five production servers from the ANSYR voice AI platform plus ten public servers from the official MCP registry): Resource Gateway, Tool Orchestrator, Stateful Session Server, Proxy Aggregator, and Domain-Specific Adapter. Each pattern is described in the structured form of Gamma et al.: context, problem, solution, and consequences. We also document four anti-patterns and a set of cross-cutting concerns around authentication, versioning, and observability. The quantitative evaluation contributes three measurements: inter-rater reliability of the taxonomy across two independent LLM raters on 54 held-out servers (Cohen's kappa = 0.76), which also localizes three pattern-boundary ambiguities; transport overhead measured end-to-end on loopback and modeled for cross-host paths; and a tool-count study showing tool-selection accuracy drops below 90% between 10 and 15 tools per context for Claude Haiku 4.5 and between 20 and 30 tools for Sonnet 4. Code, corpus, and prompts are released as a replication package.

  • 2 authors
·
Jun 28