Daily Papers

Current large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated emerging capabilities in social intelligence tasks, including implicature resolution (Sravanthi et al. (2024)) and theory-of-mind reasoning (Shapira et al. (2024)), both of which require substantial pragmatic understanding. However, how LLMs acquire this competence throughout the training process remains poorly understood. In this work, we introduce ALTPRAG, a dataset grounded in the pragmatic concept of alternatives, designed to evaluate whether LLMs at different training stages can accurately infer nuanced speaker intentions. Each instance pairs two contextually appropriate but pragmatically distinct continuations, enabling fine-grained assessment of both pragmatic interpretation and contrastive reasoning. We systematically evaluate 22 LLMs across key training stages: pre-training, supervised fine-tuning (SFT), and preference optimization, to examine the development of pragmatic competence. Our results show that even base models exhibit notable sensitivity to pragmatic cues, which improves consistently with increases in model and data scale. Additionally, SFT and RLHF contribute further gains, particularly in cognitive-pragmatic reasoning. These findings highlight pragmatic competence as an emergent and compositional property of LLM training and offer new insights for aligning models with human communicative norms.

In a recent paper, Erasmus et al. (2021) defend the idea that the ambiguity of the term "explanation" in explainable AI (XAI) can be solved by adopting any of four different extant accounts of explanation in the philosophy of science: the Deductive Nomological, Inductive Statistical, Causal Mechanical, and New Mechanist models. In this chapter, I show that the authors' claim that these accounts can be applied to deep neural networks as they would to any natural phenomenon is mistaken. I also provide a more general argument as to why the notion of explainability as it is currently used in the XAI literature bears little resemblance to the traditional concept of scientific explanation. It would be more fruitful to use the label "understandable AI" to avoid the confusion that surrounds the goal and purposes of XAI. In the second half of the chapter, I argue for a pragmatic conception of understanding that is better suited to play the central role attributed to explanation in XAI. Following Kuorikoski & Ylikoski (2015), the conditions of satisfaction for understanding an ML system are fleshed out in terms of an agent's success in using the system, in drawing correct inferences from it.

We present KNOW--the Knowledge Navigator Ontology for the World--the first ontology designed to capture everyday knowledge to augment large language models (LLMs) in real-world generative AI use cases such as personal AI assistants. Our domain is human life, both its everyday concerns and its major milestones. We have limited the initial scope of the modeled concepts to only established human universals: spacetime (places, events) plus social (people, groups, organizations). The inclusion criteria for modeled concepts are pragmatic, beginning with universality and utility. We compare and contrast previous work such as Schema.org and Cyc--as well as attempts at a synthesis of knowledge graphs and language models--noting how LLMs already encode internally much of the commonsense tacit knowledge that took decades to capture in the Cyc project. We also make available code-generated software libraries for the 12 most popular programming languages, enabling the direct use of ontology concepts in software engineering. We emphasize simplicity and developer experience in promoting AI interoperability.

Language use is shaped by pragmatics -- i.e., reasoning about communicative goals and norms in context. As language models (LMs) are increasingly used as conversational agents, it becomes ever more important to understand their pragmatic reasoning abilities. We propose an evaluation framework derived from Wavelength, a popular communication game where a speaker and a listener communicate about a broad range of concepts in a granular manner. We study a range of LMs on both language comprehension and language production using direct and Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, and further explore a Rational Speech Act (RSA) approach to incorporating Bayesian pragmatic reasoning into LM inference. We find that state-of-the-art LMs, but not smaller ones, achieve strong performance on language comprehension, obtaining similar-to-human accuracy and exhibiting high correlations with human judgments even without CoT prompting or RSA. On language production, CoT can outperform direct prompting, and using RSA provides significant improvements over both approaches. Our study helps identify the strengths and limitations in LMs' pragmatic reasoning abilities and demonstrates the potential for improving them with RSA, opening up future avenues for understanding conceptual representation, language understanding, and social reasoning in LMs and humans.

A multi-decade exploration into the theoretical foundations of artificial and natural general intelligence, which has been expressed in a series of books and papers and used to guide a series of practical and research-prototype software systems, is reviewed at a moderate level of detail. The review covers underlying philosophies (patternist philosophy of mind, foundational phenomenological and logical ontology), formalizations of the concept of intelligence, and a proposed high level architecture for AGI systems partly driven by these formalizations and philosophies. The implementation of specific cognitive processes such as logical reasoning, program learning, clustering and attention allocation in the context and language of this high level architecture is considered, as is the importance of a common (e.g. typed metagraph based) knowledge representation for enabling "cognitive synergy" between the various processes. The specifics of human-like cognitive architecture are presented as manifestations of these general principles, and key aspects of machine consciousness and machine ethics are also treated in this context. Lessons for practical implementation of advanced AGI in frameworks such as OpenCog Hyperon are briefly considered.

How can we effectively unlearn selected concepts from pre-trained generative foundation models without resorting to extensive retraining? This research introduces `continual unlearning', a novel paradigm that enables the targeted removal of multiple specific concepts from foundational generative models, incrementally. We propose Decremental Unlearning without Generalization Erosion (DUGE) algorithm which selectively unlearns the generation of undesired concepts while preserving the generation of related, non-targeted concepts and alleviating generalization erosion. For this, DUGE targets three losses: a cross-attention loss that steers the focus towards images devoid of the target concept; a prior-preservation loss that safeguards knowledge related to non-target concepts; and a regularization loss that prevents the model from suffering from generalization erosion. Experimental results demonstrate the ability of the proposed approach to exclude certain concepts without compromising the overall integrity and performance of the model. This offers a pragmatic solution for refining generative models, adeptly handling the intricacies of model training and concept management lowering the risks of copyright infringement, personal or licensed material misuse, and replication of distinctive artistic styles. Importantly, it maintains the non-targeted concepts, thereby safeguarding the model's core capabilities and effectiveness.

The transformative impact of large language models (LLMs) like LLaMA and GPT on natural language processing is countered by their prohibitive computational demands. Pruning has emerged as a pivotal compression strategy, introducing sparsity to enhance both memory and computational efficiency. Yet, traditional global pruning is impractical for LLMs due to scalability issues, while local pruning, despite its efficiency, leads to suboptimal solutions. Addressing these challenges, we propose SparseLLM, a novel framework that redefines the global pruning process into manageable, coordinated subproblems, allowing for resource-efficient optimization with global optimality. SparseLLM's approach, which conceptualizes LLMs as a chain of modular functions and leverages auxiliary variables for problem decomposition, not only facilitates a pragmatic application on LLMs but also demonstrates significant performance improvements, particularly in high-sparsity regimes where it surpasses current state-of-the-art methods.

Drawing on contemporary pragmatist philosophy and linguistic theories on cognition, meaning, and communication, this paper presents a dynamic, metasemantic-metapragmatic taxonomy for grounding and conceptualizing human-like multimodal communicative alignment. The framework is rooted in contemporary developments of the three basic communicative capacities initially identified by American logician and pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce: iconic (sensory and perceptual qualities), indexical (contextual and sociocultural associations), and rule-like (symbolic and intuitive reasoning). Expanding on these developments, I introduce the concept of indexical contextualization and propose the principle of "contextualization directionality" for characterizing the crucial metapragmatic capacity for maintaining, navigating, or transitioning between semantic and pragmatic modes of multimodal communication. I contend that current cognitive-social computational and engineering methodologies disproportionately emphasize the semantic/metasemantic domain, overlooking the pivotal role of metapragmatic indexicality in traversing the semantic-pragmatic spectrum of communication. The framework's broader implications for intentionality, identity, affect, and ethics in within-modal and cross-modal human-machine alignment are also discussed.

LLMs have revolutionized the field of artificial intelligence and have emerged as the de-facto tool for many tasks. The current established technology of LLMs is to process input and generate output at the token level. This is in sharp contrast to humans who operate at multiple levels of abstraction, well beyond single words, to analyze information and to generate creative content. In this paper, we present an attempt at an architecture which operates on an explicit higher-level semantic representation, which we name a concept. Concepts are language- and modality-agnostic and represent a higher level idea or action in a flow. Hence, we build a "Large Concept Model". In this study, as proof of feasibility, we assume that a concept corresponds to a sentence, and use an existing sentence embedding space, SONAR, which supports up to 200 languages in both text and speech modalities. The Large Concept Model is trained to perform autoregressive sentence prediction in an embedding space. We explore multiple approaches, namely MSE regression, variants of diffusion-based generation, and models operating in a quantized SONAR space. These explorations are performed using 1.6B parameter models and training data in the order of 1.3T tokens. We then scale one architecture to a model size of 7B parameters and training data of about 2.7T tokens. We perform an experimental evaluation on several generative tasks, namely summarization and a new task of summary expansion. Finally, we show that our model exhibits impressive zero-shot generalization performance to many languages, outperforming existing LLMs of the same size. The training code of our models is freely available.

Current Large Language Models (LLMs) are unparalleled in their ability to generate grammatically correct, fluent text. LLMs are appearing rapidly, and debates on LLM capacities have taken off, but reflection is lagging behind. Thus, in this position paper, we first zoom in on the debate and critically assess three points recurring in critiques of LLM capacities: i) that LLMs only parrot statistical patterns in the training data; ii) that LLMs master formal but not functional language competence; and iii) that language learning in LLMs cannot inform human language learning. Drawing on empirical and theoretical arguments, we show that these points need more nuance. Second, we outline a pragmatic perspective on the issue of `real' understanding and intentionality in LLMs. Understanding and intentionality pertain to unobservable mental states we attribute to other humans because they have pragmatic value: they allow us to abstract away from complex underlying mechanics and predict behaviour effectively. We reflect on the circumstances under which it would make sense for humans to similarly attribute mental states to LLMs, thereby outlining a pragmatic philosophical context for LLMs as an increasingly prominent technology in society.

Pragmatic reasoning plays a pivotal role in deciphering implicit meanings that frequently arise in real-life conversations and is essential for the development of communicative social agents. In this paper, we introduce a novel challenge, DiPlomat, aiming at benchmarking machines' capabilities on pragmatic reasoning and situated conversational understanding. Compared with previous works that treat different figurative expressions (e.g. metaphor, sarcasm) as individual tasks, DiPlomat provides a cohesive framework towards general pragmatic understanding. Our dataset is created through the utilization of Amazon Mechanical Turk ( AMT ), resulting in a total of 4, 177 multi-turn dialogues. In conjunction with the dataset, we propose two tasks, Pragmatic Identification and Reasoning (PIR) and Conversational Question Answering (CQA). Experimental results with state-of-the-art (SOTA) neural architectures reveal several significant findings: 1) large language models ( LLMs) exhibit poor performance in tackling this subjective domain; 2) comprehensive comprehension of context emerges as a critical factor for establishing benign human-machine interactions; 3) current models defect in the application of pragmatic reasoning. As a result, we call on more attention to improve the ability of context understanding, reasoning, and implied meaning modeling.

Pragmatics and non-literal language understanding are essential to human communication, and present a long-standing challenge for artificial language models. We perform a fine-grained comparison of language models and humans on seven pragmatic phenomena, using zero-shot prompting on an expert-curated set of English materials. We ask whether models (1) select pragmatic interpretations of speaker utterances, (2) make similar error patterns as humans, and (3) use similar linguistic cues as humans to solve the tasks. We find that the largest models achieve high accuracy and match human error patterns: within incorrect responses, models favor literal interpretations over heuristic-based distractors. We also find preliminary evidence that models and humans are sensitive to similar linguistic cues. Our results suggest that pragmatic behaviors can emerge in models without explicitly constructed representations of mental states. However, models tend to struggle with phenomena relying on social expectation violations.

Despite widespread use of LLMs as conversational agents, evaluations of performance fail to capture a crucial aspect of communication: interpreting language in context -- incorporating its pragmatics. Humans interpret language using beliefs and prior knowledge about the world. For example, we intuitively understand the response "I wore gloves" to the question "Did you leave fingerprints?" as meaning "No". To investigate whether LLMs have the ability to make this type of inference, known as an implicature, we design a simple task and evaluate four categories of widely used state-of-the-art models. We find that, despite only evaluating on utterances that require a binary inference (yes or no), models in three of these categories perform close to random. However, LLMs instruction-tuned at the example-level perform significantly better. These results suggest that certain fine-tuning strategies are far better at inducing pragmatic understanding in models. We present our findings as the starting point for further research into evaluating how LLMs interpret language in context and to drive the development of more pragmatic and useful models of human discourse.

Linguistic commentary on LLMs, heavily influenced by the theoretical frameworks of de Saussure and Chomsky, is often speculative and unproductive. Critics challenge whether LLMs can legitimately model language, citing the need for "deep structure" or "grounding" to achieve an idealized linguistic "competence." We argue for a radical shift in perspective towards the empiricist principles of Witold Ma\'nczak, a prominent general and historical linguist. He defines language not as a "system of signs" or a "computational system of the brain" but as the totality of all that is said and written. Above all, he identifies frequency of use of particular language elements as language's primary governing principle. Using his framework, we challenge prior critiques of LLMs and provide a constructive guide for designing, evaluating, and interpreting language models.

Thanks to rapid progress in artificial intelligence, we have entered an era when technology and philosophy intersect in interesting ways. Sitting squarely at the centre of this intersection are large language models (LLMs). The more adept LLMs become at mimicking human language, the more vulnerable we become to anthropomorphism, to seeing the systems in which they are embedded as more human-like than they really are. This trend is amplified by the natural tendency to use philosophically loaded terms, such as "knows", "believes", and "thinks", when describing these systems. To mitigate this trend, this paper advocates the practice of repeatedly stepping back to remind ourselves of how LLMs, and the systems of which they form a part, actually work. The hope is that increased scientific precision will encourage more philosophical nuance in the discourse around artificial intelligence, both within the field and in the public sphere.

This position paper argues that, in order to understand AI, we cannot rely on our existing vocabulary of human words. Instead, we should strive to develop neologisms: new words that represent precise human concepts that we want to teach machines, or machine concepts that we need to learn. We start from the premise that humans and machines have differing concepts. This means interpretability can be framed as a communication problem: humans must be able to reference and control machine concepts, and communicate human concepts to machines. Creating a shared human-machine language through developing neologisms, we believe, could solve this communication problem. Successful neologisms achieve a useful amount of abstraction: not too detailed, so they're reusable in many contexts, and not too high-level, so they convey precise information. As a proof of concept, we demonstrate how a "length neologism" enables controlling LLM response length, while a "diversity neologism" allows sampling more variable responses. Taken together, we argue that we cannot understand AI using our existing vocabulary, and expanding it through neologisms creates opportunities for both controlling and understanding machines better.

We revisit a pragmatic inference problem in dialog: understanding indirect responses to questions. Humans can interpret 'I'm starving.' in response to 'Hungry?', even without direct cue words such as 'yes' and 'no'. In dialog systems, allowing natural responses rather than closed vocabularies would be similarly beneficial. However, today's systems are only as sensitive to these pragmatic moves as their language model allows. We create and release the first large-scale English language corpus 'Circa' with 34,268 (polar question, indirect answer) pairs to enable progress on this task. The data was collected via elaborate crowdsourcing, and contains utterances with yes/no meaning, as well as uncertain, middle-ground, and conditional responses. We also present BERT-based neural models to predict such categories for a question-answer pair. We find that while transfer learning from entailment works reasonably, performance is not yet sufficient for robust dialog. Our models reach 82-88% accuracy for a 4-class distinction, and 74-85% for 6 classes.

The field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) continues to drive transformative innovations, with significant progress in conversational interfaces, autonomous vehicles, and intelligent content creation. Since the launch of ChatGPT in late 2022, the rise of Generative AI has marked a pivotal era, with the term Large Language Models (LLMs) becoming a ubiquitous part of daily life. LLMs have demonstrated exceptional capabilities in tasks such as text summarization, code generation, and creative writing. However, these models are inherently limited by their token-level processing, which restricts their ability to perform abstract reasoning, conceptual understanding, and efficient generation of long-form content. To address these limitations, Meta has introduced Large Concept Models (LCMs), representing a significant shift from traditional token-based frameworks. LCMs use concepts as foundational units of understanding, enabling more sophisticated semantic reasoning and context-aware decision-making. Given the limited academic research on this emerging technology, our study aims to bridge the knowledge gap by collecting, analyzing, and synthesizing existing grey literature to provide a comprehensive understanding of LCMs. Specifically, we (i) identify and describe the features that distinguish LCMs from LLMs, (ii) explore potential applications of LCMs across multiple domains, and (iii) propose future research directions and practical strategies to advance LCM development and adoption.

Referring Expression Generation (REG) is a core task for evaluating the pragmatic competence of vision-language systems, requiring not only accurate semantic grounding but also adherence to principles of cooperative communication (Grice, 1975). However, current evaluations of vision-language models (VLMs) often overlook the pragmatic dimension, reducing REG to a region-based captioning task and neglecting Gricean maxims. In this work, we revisit REG from a pragmatic perspective, introducing a new dataset (RefOI) of 1.5k images annotated with both written and spoken referring expressions. Through a systematic evaluation of state-of-the-art VLMs, we identify three key failures of pragmatic competence: (1) failure to uniquely identify the referent, (2) inclusion of excessive or irrelevant information, and (3) misalignment with human pragmatic preference, such as the underuse of minimal spatial cues. We also show that standard automatic evaluations fail to capture these pragmatic violations, reinforcing superficial cues rather than genuine referential success. Our findings call for a renewed focus on pragmatically informed models and evaluation frameworks that align with real human communication.

We introduce a new language learning setting relevant to building adaptive natural language interfaces. It is inspired by Wittgenstein's language games: a human wishes to accomplish some task (e.g., achieving a certain configuration of blocks), but can only communicate with a computer, who performs the actual actions (e.g., removing all red blocks). The computer initially knows nothing about language and therefore must learn it from scratch through interaction, while the human adapts to the computer's capabilities. We created a game in a blocks world and collected interactions from 100 people playing it. First, we analyze the humans' strategies, showing that using compositionality and avoiding synonyms correlates positively with task performance. Second, we compare computer strategies, showing how to quickly learn a semantic parsing model from scratch, and that modeling pragmatics further accelerates learning for successful players.

Current captioning datasets, focus on object-centric captions, describing the visible objects in the image, often ending up stating the obvious (for humans), e.g. "people eating food in a park". Although these datasets are useful to evaluate the ability of Vision & Language models to recognize the visual content, they lack in expressing trivial abstract concepts, e.g. "people having a picnic". Such concepts are licensed by human's personal experience and contribute to forming common sense assumptions. We present the High-Level Dataset; a dataset extending 14997 images of the COCO dataset with 134973 human-annotated (high-level) abstract captions collected along three axes: scenes, actions and rationales. We describe and release such dataset and we show how it can be used to assess models' multimodal grounding of abstract concepts and enrich models' visio-lingusitic representations. Moreover, we describe potential tasks enabled by this dataset involving high- and low-level concepts interactions.

In the rapidly evolving field of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a critical need to thoroughly analyze their capabilities and risks. Central to our investigation are two novel elements. Firstly, it is the innovative parallels between the statistical patterns of word relationships within LLMs and Martin Heidegger's concepts of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand," which encapsulate the utilitarian and scientific altitudes humans employ in interacting with the world. This comparison lays the groundwork for positioning LLMs as the digital counterpart to the Faculty of Verbal Knowledge, shedding light on their capacity to emulate certain facets of human reasoning. Secondly, a structural analysis of human reasoning, viewed through Heidegger's notion of truth as "unconcealment" is conducted This foundational principle enables us to map out the inputs and outputs of the reasoning system and divide reasoning into four distinct categories. Respective cognitive faculties are delineated, allowing us to place LLMs within the broader schema of human reasoning, thus clarifying their strengths and inherent limitations. Our findings reveal that while LLMs possess the capability for Direct Explicative Reasoning and Pseudo Rational Reasoning, they fall short in authentic rational reasoning and have no creative reasoning capabilities, due to the current lack of many analogous AI models such as the Faculty of Judgement. The potential and risks of LLMs when they are augmented with other AI technologies are also evaluated. The results indicate that although LLMs have achieved proficiency in some reasoning abilities, the aspiration to match or exceed human intellectual capabilities is yet unattained. This research not only enriches our comprehension of LLMs but also propels forward the discourse on AI's potential and its bounds, paving the way for future explorations into AI's evolving landscape.

We study syllogistic reasoning in LLMs from the logical and natural language perspectives. In process, we explore fundamental reasoning capabilities of the LLMs and the direction this research is moving forward. To aid in our studies, we use 14 large language models and investigate their syllogistic reasoning capabilities in terms of symbolic inferences as well as natural language understanding. Even though this reasoning mechanism is not a uniform emergent property across LLMs, the perfect symbolic performances in certain models make us wonder whether LLMs are becoming more and more formal reasoning mechanisms, rather than making explicit the nuances of human reasoning.

"An idea is nothing more nor less than a new combination of old elements" (Young, J.W.). The widespread adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) and publicly available ChatGPT have marked a significant turning point in the integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) into people's everyday lives. This study explores the capability of LLMs in generating novel research ideas based on information from research papers. We conduct a thorough examination of 4 LLMs in five domains (e.g., Chemistry, Computer, Economics, Medical, and Physics). We found that the future research ideas generated by Claude-2 and GPT-4 are more aligned with the author's perspective than GPT-3.5 and Gemini. We also found that Claude-2 generates more diverse future research ideas than GPT-4, GPT-3.5, and Gemini 1.0. We further performed a human evaluation of the novelty, relevancy, and feasibility of the generated future research ideas. This investigation offers insights into the evolving role of LLMs in idea generation, highlighting both its capability and limitations. Our work contributes to the ongoing efforts in evaluating and utilizing language models for generating future research ideas. We make our datasets and codes publicly available.

Given the growing importance of AI literacy, we decided to write this tutorial to help narrow the gap between the discourse among those who study language models -- the core technology underlying ChatGPT and similar products -- and those who are intrigued and want to learn more about them. In short, we believe the perspective of researchers and educators can add some clarity to the public's understanding of the technologies beyond what's currently available, which tends to be either extremely technical or promotional material generated about products by their purveyors. Our approach teases apart the concept of a language model from products built on them, from the behaviors attributed to or desired from those products, and from claims about similarity to human cognition. As a starting point, we (1) offer a scientific viewpoint that focuses on questions amenable to study through experimentation; (2) situate language models as they are today in the context of the research that led to their development; and (3) describe the boundaries of what is known about the models at this writing.

Writing Assistants (e.g., Grammarly, Microsoft Copilot) traditionally generate diverse image captions by employing syntactic and semantic variations to describe image components. However, human-written captions prioritize conveying a central message alongside visual descriptions using pragmatic cues. To enhance pragmatic diversity, it is essential to explore alternative ways of communicating these messages in conjunction with visual content. To address this challenge, we propose RONA, a novel prompting strategy for Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLM) that leverages Coherence Relations as an axis for variation. We demonstrate that RONA generates captions with better overall diversity and ground-truth alignment, compared to MLLM baselines across multiple domains. Our code is available at: https://github.com/aashish2000/RONA

LLMs have demonstrated remarkable capability for understanding semantics, but they often struggle with understanding pragmatics. To demonstrate this fact, we release a Pragmatics Understanding Benchmark (PUB) dataset consisting of fourteen tasks in four pragmatics phenomena, namely, Implicature, Presupposition, Reference, and Deixis. We curated high-quality test sets for each task, consisting of Multiple Choice Question Answers (MCQA). PUB includes a total of 28k data points, 6.1k of which have been created by us, and the rest are adapted from existing datasets. We evaluated nine models varying in the number of parameters and type of training. Our study indicates that fine-tuning for instruction-following and chat significantly enhances the pragmatics capabilities of smaller language models. However, for larger models, the base versions perform comparably with their chat-adapted counterparts. Additionally, there is a noticeable performance gap between human capabilities and model capabilities. Furthermore, unlike the consistent performance of humans across various tasks, the models demonstrate variability in their proficiency, with performance levels fluctuating due to different hints and the complexities of tasks within the same dataset. Overall, the benchmark aims to provide a comprehensive evaluation of LLM's ability to handle real-world language tasks that require pragmatic reasoning.

Image Schemas are repetitive cognitive patterns that influence the way we conceptualize and reason about various concepts present in speech. These patterns are deeply embedded within our cognitive processes and are reflected in our bodily expressions including gestures. Particularly, metaphoric gestures possess essential characteristics and semantic meanings that align with Image Schemas, to visually represent abstract concepts. The shape and form of gestures can convey abstract concepts, such as extending the forearm and hand or tracing a line with hand movements to visually represent the image schema of PATH. Previous behavior generation models have primarily focused on utilizing speech (acoustic features and text) to drive the generation model of virtual agents. They have not considered key semantic information as those carried by Image Schemas to effectively generate metaphoric gestures. To address this limitation, we introduce META4, a deep learning approach that generates metaphoric gestures from both speech and Image Schemas. Our approach has two primary goals: computing Image Schemas from input text to capture the underlying semantic and metaphorical meaning, and generating metaphoric gestures driven by speech and the computed image schemas. Our approach is the first method for generating speech driven metaphoric gestures while leveraging the potential of Image Schemas. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach and highlight the importance of both speech and image schemas in modeling metaphoric gestures.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

Concept guidance has emerged as a cheap and simple way to control the behavior of language models by probing their hidden representations for concept vectors and using them to perturb activations at inference time. While the focus of previous work has largely been on truthfulness, in this paper we extend this framework to a richer set of concepts such as appropriateness, humor, creativity and quality, and explore to what degree current detection and guidance strategies work in these challenging settings. To facilitate evaluation, we develop a novel metric for concept guidance that takes into account both the success of concept elicitation as well as the potential degradation in fluency of the guided model. Our extensive experiments reveal that while some concepts such as truthfulness more easily allow for guidance with current techniques, novel concepts such as appropriateness or humor either remain difficult to elicit, need extensive tuning to work, or even experience confusion. Moreover, we find that probes with optimal detection accuracies do not necessarily make for the optimal guides, contradicting previous observations for truthfulness. Our work warrants a deeper investigation into the interplay between detectability, guidability, and the nature of the concept, and we hope that our rich experimental test-bed for guidance research inspires stronger follow-up approaches.

Empathy is a complex cognitive ability based on the reasoning of others' affective states. In order to better understand others and express stronger empathy in dialogues, we argue that two issues must be tackled at the same time: (i) identifying which word is the cause for the other's emotion from his or her utterance and (ii) reflecting those specific words in the response generation. However, previous approaches for recognizing emotion cause words in text require sub-utterance level annotations, which can be demanding. Taking inspiration from social cognition, we leverage a generative estimator to infer emotion cause words from utterances with no word-level label. Also, we introduce a novel method based on pragmatics to make dialogue models focus on targeted words in the input during generation. Our method is applicable to any dialogue models with no additional training on the fly. We show our approach improves multiple best-performing dialogue agents on generating more focused empathetic responses in terms of both automatic and human evaluation.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Implicit meanings are integral to human communication, making it essential for language models to be capable of identifying and interpreting them. Grice (1975) proposed a set of conversational maxims that guide cooperative dialogue, noting that speakers may deliberately violate these principles to express meanings beyond literal words, and that listeners, in turn, recognize such violations to draw pragmatic inferences. Building on Surian et al. (1996)'s study of children's sensitivity to violations of Gricean maxims, we introduce a novel benchmark to test whether language models pretrained on less than 10M and less than 100M tokens can distinguish maxim-adhering from maxim-violating utterances. We compare these BabyLMs across five maxims and situate their performance relative to children and a Large Language Model (LLM) pretrained on 3T tokens. We find that overall, models trained on less than 100M tokens outperform those trained on less than 10M, yet fall short of child-level and LLM competence. Our results suggest that modest data increases improve some aspects of pragmatic behavior, leading to finer-grained differentiation between pragmatic dimensions.

Are LLMs cultural technologies like photocopiers or printing presses, which transmit information but cannot create new content? A challenge for this idea, which we call bibliotechnism, is that LLMs generate novel text. We begin with a defense of bibliotechnism, showing how even novel text may inherit its meaning from original human-generated text. We then argue that bibliotechnism faces an independent challenge from examples in which LLMs generate novel reference, using new names to refer to new entities. Such examples could be explained if LLMs were not cultural technologies but had beliefs, desires, and intentions. According to interpretationism in the philosophy of mind, a system has such attitudes if and only if its behavior is well explained by the hypothesis that it does. Interpretationists may hold that LLMs have attitudes, and thus have a simple solution to the novel reference problem. We emphasize, however, that interpretationism is compatible with very simple creatures having attitudes and differs sharply from views that presuppose these attitudes require consciousness, sentience, or intelligence (topics about which we make no claims).

This paper introduces 26 guiding principles designed to streamline the process of querying and prompting large language models. Our goal is to simplify the underlying concepts of formulating questions for various scales of large language models, examining their abilities, and enhancing user comprehension on the behaviors of different scales of large language models when feeding into different prompts. Extensive experiments are conducted on LLaMA-1/2 (7B, 13B and 70B), GPT-3.5/4 to verify the effectiveness of the proposed principles on instructions and prompts design. We hope that this work can provide a better guide for researchers working on the prompting of large language models. Project page is available at https://github.com/VILA-Lab/ATLAS.

Reviewing the progress in artificial intelligence over the past decade, various significant advances (e.g. object detection, image generation, large language models) have enabled AI systems to produce more semantically meaningful outputs and achieve widespread adoption in internet scenarios. Nevertheless, AI systems still struggle when it comes to understanding and interacting with the physical world. This reveals an important issue: relying solely on semantic-level concepts learned from internet data (e.g. texts, images) to understand the physical world is far from sufficient -- machine intelligence currently lacks an effective way to learn about the physical world. This research introduces the idea of analytic concept -- representing the concepts related to the physical world through programs of mathematical procedures, providing machine intelligence a portal to perceive, reason about, and interact with the physical world. Except for detailing the design philosophy and providing guidelines for the application of analytic concepts, this research also introduce about the infrastructure that has been built around analytic concepts. I aim for my research to contribute to addressing these questions: What is a proper abstraction of general concepts in the physical world for machine intelligence? How to systematically integrate structured priors with neural networks to constrain AI systems to comply with physical laws?

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

As dialogue agents become increasingly human-like in their performance, it is imperative that we develop effective ways to describe their behaviour in high-level terms without falling into the trap of anthropomorphism. In this paper, we foreground the concept of role-play. Casting dialogue agent behaviour in terms of role-play allows us to draw on familiar folk psychological terms, without ascribing human characteristics to language models they in fact lack. Two important cases of dialogue agent behaviour are addressed this way, namely (apparent) deception and (apparent) self-awareness.

Honesty is a fundamental principle for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, requiring these models to recognize what they know and don't know and be able to faithfully express their knowledge. Despite promising, current LLMs still exhibit significant dishonest behaviors, such as confidently presenting wrong answers or failing to express what they know. In addition, research on the honesty of LLMs also faces challenges, including varying definitions of honesty, difficulties in distinguishing between known and unknown knowledge, and a lack of comprehensive understanding of related research. To address these issues, we provide a survey on the honesty of LLMs, covering its clarification, evaluation approaches, and strategies for improvement. Moreover, we offer insights for future research, aiming to inspire further exploration in this important area.

Prompt design and engineering has become an important discipline in just the past few months. In this paper, we provide an introduction to the main concepts and design approaches. We also provide more advanced techniques all the way to those needed to design LLM-based agents. We finish by providing a list of existing tools for prompt engineering.

Much of the recent discourse within the NLP research community has been centered around Large Language Models (LLMs), their functionality and potential -- yet not only do we not have a working definition of LLMs, but much of this discourse relies on claims and assumptions that are worth re-examining. This position paper contributes a definition of LLMs, explicates some of the assumptions made regarding their functionality, and outlines the existing evidence for and against them. We conclude with suggestions for research directions and their framing in future work.

Probabilistic models of language understanding are valuable tools for investigating human language use. However, they need to be hand-designed for a particular domain. In contrast, large language models (LLMs) are trained on text that spans a wide array of domains, but they lack the structure and interpretability of probabilistic models. In this paper, we use chain-of-thought prompts to introduce structures from probabilistic models into LLMs. We explore this approach in the case of metaphor understanding. Our chain-of-thought prompts lead language models to infer latent variables and reason about their relationships in order to choose appropriate paraphrases for metaphors. The latent variables and relationships chosen are informed by theories of metaphor understanding from cognitive psychology. We apply these prompts to the two largest versions of GPT-3 and show that they can improve performance in a paraphrase selection task.

Language has long been conceived as an essential tool for human reasoning. The breakthrough of Large Language Models (LLMs) has sparked significant research interest in leveraging these models to tackle complex reasoning tasks. Researchers have moved beyond simple autoregressive token generation by introducing the concept of "thought" -- a sequence of tokens representing intermediate steps in the reasoning process. This innovative paradigm enables LLMs' to mimic complex human reasoning processes, such as tree search and reflective thinking. Recently, an emerging trend of learning to reason has applied reinforcement learning (RL) to train LLMs to master reasoning processes. This approach enables the automatic generation of high-quality reasoning trajectories through trial-and-error search algorithms, significantly expanding LLMs' reasoning capacity by providing substantially more training data. Furthermore, recent studies demonstrate that encouraging LLMs to "think" with more tokens during test-time inference can further significantly boost reasoning accuracy. Therefore, the train-time and test-time scaling combined to show a new research frontier -- a path toward Large Reasoning Model. The introduction of OpenAI's o1 series marks a significant milestone in this research direction. In this survey, we present a comprehensive review of recent progress in LLM reasoning. We begin by introducing the foundational background of LLMs and then explore the key technical components driving the development of large reasoning models, with a focus on automated data construction, learning-to-reason techniques, and test-time scaling. We also analyze popular open-source projects at building large reasoning models, and conclude with open challenges and future research directions.

This paper proposes a novel framework for understanding large language models (LLMs) by reconceptualizing them as semiotic machines rather than as imitations of human cognition. Drawing from structuralist and post-structuralist theories of language-specifically the works of Ferdinand de Saussure and Jacques Derrida-I argue that LLMs should be understood as models of language itself, aligning with Derrida's concept of 'writing' (l'ecriture). The paper is structured into three parts. First, I lay the theoretical groundwork by explaining how the word2vec embedding algorithm operates within Saussure's framework of language as a relational system of signs. Second, I apply Derrida's critique of Saussure to position 'writing' as the object modeled by LLMs, offering a view of the machine's 'mind' as a statistical approximation of sign behavior. Finally, the third section addresses how modern LLMs reflect post-structuralist notions of unfixed meaning, arguing that the "next token generation" mechanism effectively captures the dynamic nature of meaning. By reconceptualizing LLMs as semiotic machines rather than cognitive models, this framework provides an alternative lens through which to assess the strengths and limitations of LLMs, offering new avenues for future research.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly utilized in autonomous decision-making, where they sample options from vast action spaces. However, the heuristics that guide this sampling process remain under-explored. We study this sampling behavior and show that this underlying heuristics resembles that of human decision-making: comprising a descriptive component (reflecting statistical norm) and a prescriptive component (implicit ideal encoded in the LLM) of a concept. We show that this deviation of a sample from the statistical norm towards a prescriptive component consistently appears in concepts across diverse real-world domains like public health, and economic trends. To further illustrate the theory, we demonstrate that concept prototypes in LLMs are affected by prescriptive norms, similar to the concept of normality in humans. Through case studies and comparison with human studies, we illustrate that in real-world applications, the shift of samples toward an ideal value in LLMs' outputs can result in significantly biased decision-making, raising ethical concerns.

Natural language inference (NLI) is an increasingly important task for natural language understanding, which requires one to infer whether a sentence entails another. However, the ability of NLI models to make pragmatic inferences remains understudied. We create an IMPlicature and PRESupposition diagnostic dataset (IMPPRES), consisting of >25k semiautomatically generated sentence pairs illustrating well-studied pragmatic inference types. We use IMPPRES to evaluate whether BERT, InferSent, and BOW NLI models trained on MultiNLI (Williams et al., 2018) learn to make pragmatic inferences. Although MultiNLI appears to contain very few pairs illustrating these inference types, we find that BERT learns to draw pragmatic inferences. It reliably treats scalar implicatures triggered by "some" as entailments. For some presupposition triggers like "only", BERT reliably recognizes the presupposition as an entailment, even when the trigger is embedded under an entailment canceling operator like negation. BOW and InferSent show weaker evidence of pragmatic reasoning. We conclude that NLI training encourages models to learn some, but not all, pragmatic inferences.

Current language models are unable to quickly learn new concepts on the fly, often requiring a more involved finetuning process to learn robustly. Prompting in-context is not robust to context distractions, and often fails to confer much information about the new concepts. Classic methods for few-shot word learning in NLP, relying on global word vectors, are less applicable to large language models. In this paper, we introduce a novel approach named CoLLEGe (Concept Learning with Language Embedding Generation) to modernize few-shot concept learning. CoLLEGe is a meta-learning framework capable of generating flexible embeddings for new concepts using a small number of example sentences or definitions. Our primary meta-learning objective is simply to facilitate a language model to make next word predictions in forthcoming sentences, making it compatible with language model pretraining. We design a series of tasks to test new concept learning in challenging real-world scenarios, including new word acquisition, definition inference, and verbal reasoning, and demonstrate that our method succeeds in each setting without task-specific training.

We present a comprehensive evaluation of the ability of large language models (LLMs) to process culturally grounded language, specifically to understand and pragmatically use figurative expressions that encode local knowledge and cultural nuance. Using figurative language as a proxy for cultural nuance and local knowledge, we design evaluation tasks for contextual understanding, pragmatic use, and connotation interpretation in Arabic and English. We evaluate 22 open- and closed-source LLMs on Egyptian Arabic idioms, multidialectal Arabic proverbs, and English proverbs. Our results show a consistent hierarchy: the average accuracy for Arabic proverbs is 4.29% lower than for English proverbs, and performance for Egyptian idioms is 10.28% lower than for Arabic proverbs. For the pragmatic use task, accuracy drops by 14.07% relative to understanding, though providing contextual idiomatic sentences improves accuracy by 10.66%. Models also struggle with connotative meaning, reaching at most 85.58% agreement with human annotators on idioms with 100% inter-annotator agreement. These findings demonstrate that figurative language serves as an effective diagnostic for cultural reasoning: while LLMs can often interpret figurative meaning, they face challenges in using it appropriately. To support future research, we release Kinayat, the first dataset of Egyptian Arabic idioms designed for both figurative understanding and pragmatic use evaluation.

Our understanding of the visual world is centered around various concept axes, characterizing different aspects of visual entities. While different concept axes can be easily specified by language, e.g. color, the exact visual nuances along each axis often exceed the limitations of linguistic articulations, e.g. a particular style of painting. In this work, our goal is to learn a language-informed visual concept representation, by simply distilling large pre-trained vision-language models. Specifically, we train a set of concept encoders to encode the information pertinent to a set of language-informed concept axes, with an objective of reproducing the input image through a pre-trained Text-to-Image (T2I) model. To encourage better disentanglement of different concept encoders, we anchor the concept embeddings to a set of text embeddings obtained from a pre-trained Visual Question Answering (VQA) model. At inference time, the model extracts concept embeddings along various axes from new test images, which can be remixed to generate images with novel compositions of visual concepts. With a lightweight test-time finetuning procedure, it can also generalize to novel concepts unseen at training.

Interpretability is a key challenge in fostering trust for Large Language Models (LLMs), which stems from the complexity of extracting reasoning from model's parameters. We present the Frame Representation Hypothesis, a theoretically robust framework grounded in the Linear Representation Hypothesis (LRH) to interpret and control LLMs by modeling multi-token words. Prior research explored LRH to connect LLM representations with linguistic concepts, but was limited to single token analysis. As most words are composed of several tokens, we extend LRH to multi-token words, thereby enabling usage on any textual data with thousands of concepts. To this end, we propose words can be interpreted as frames, ordered sequences of vectors that better capture token-word relationships. Then, concepts can be represented as the average of word frames sharing a common concept. We showcase these tools through Top-k Concept-Guided Decoding, which can intuitively steer text generation using concepts of choice. We verify said ideas on Llama 3.1, Gemma 2, and Phi 3 families, demonstrating gender and language biases, exposing harmful content, but also potential to remediate them, leading to safer and more transparent LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/phvv-me/frame-representation-hypothesis.git

Recently, with the application progress of AIGC tools based on large language models (LLMs), led by ChatGPT, many AI experts and more non-professionals are trumpeting the "reasoning ability" of the LLMs. The present author considers that the so-called "reasoning ability" of LLMs are just illusions of those people who with vague concepts. In fact, the LLMs can never have the true reasoning ability. This paper intents to explain that, because the essential limitations of their working principle, the LLMs can never have the ability of true correct reasoning.

Many believe that Large Language Models (LLMs) open the era of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Some see opportunities while others see dangers. Yet both proponents and opponents grasp AI through the imagery popularised by science fiction. Will the machine become sentient and rebel against its creators? Will we experience a paperclip apocalypse? Before answering such questions, we should first ask whether this mental imagery provides a good description of the phenomenon at hand. Understanding weather patterns through the moods of the gods only goes so far. The present paper instead advocates understanding LLMs and their connection to AI through the imagery of Jorge Luis Borges, a master of 20th century literature, forerunner of magical realism, and precursor to postmodern literature. This exercise leads to a new perspective that illuminates the relation between language modelling and artificial intelligence.

The concept of Artificial Intelligence has gained a lot of attention over the last decade. In particular, AI-based tools have been employed in several scenarios and are, by now, pervading our everyday life. Nonetheless, most of these systems lack many capabilities that we would naturally consider to be included in a notion of "intelligence". In this work, we present an architecture that, inspired by the cognitive theory known as Thinking Fast and Slow by D. Kahneman, is tasked with solving planning problems in different settings, specifically: classical and multi-agent epistemic. The system proposed is an instance of a more general AI paradigm, referred to as SOFAI (for Slow and Fast AI). SOFAI exploits multiple solving approaches, with different capabilities that characterize them as either fast or slow, and a metacognitive module to regulate them. This combination of components, which roughly reflects the human reasoning process according to D. Kahneman, allowed us to enhance the reasoning process that, in this case, is concerned with planning in two different settings. The behavior of this system is then compared to state-of-the-art solvers, showing that the newly introduced system presents better results in terms of generality, solving a wider set of problems with an acceptable trade-off between solving times and solution accuracy.

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems based on large-scale pretrained foundation models (PFMs) such as vision-language models, large language models (LLMs), diffusion models and vision-language-action (VLA) models have demonstrated the ability to solve complex and truly non-trivial AI problems in a wide variety of domains and contexts. Multimodal large language models (MLLMs), in particular, learn from vast and diverse data sources, allowing rich and nuanced representations of the world and, thereby, providing extensive capabilities, including the ability to reason, engage in meaningful dialog; collaborate with humans and other agents to jointly solve complex problems; and understand social and emotional aspects of humans. Despite this impressive feat, the cognitive abilities of state-of-the-art LLMs trained on large-scale datasets are still superficial and brittle. Consequently, generic LLMs are severely limited in their generalist capabilities. A number of foundational problems -- embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory -- are required to be addressed for LLMs to attain human-level general intelligence. These concepts are more aligned with human cognition and provide LLMs with inherent human-like cognitive properties that support the realization of physically-plausible, semantically meaningful, flexible and more generalizable knowledge and intelligence. In this work, we discuss the aforementioned foundational issues and survey state-of-the art approaches for implementing these concepts in LLMs. Specifically, we discuss how the principles of embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory can be leveraged toward the attainment of artificial general intelligence (AGI) in an organic manner.

Human feedback can prevent overtly harmful utterances in conversational models, but may not automatically mitigate subtle problematic behaviors such as a stated desire for self-preservation or power. Constitutional AI offers an alternative, replacing human feedback with feedback from AI models conditioned only on a list of written principles. We find this approach effectively prevents the expression of such behaviors. The success of simple principles motivates us to ask: can models learn general ethical behaviors from only a single written principle? To test this, we run experiments using a principle roughly stated as "do what's best for humanity". We find that the largest dialogue models can generalize from this short constitution, resulting in harmless assistants with no stated interest in specific motivations like power. A general principle may thus partially avoid the need for a long list of constitutions targeting potentially harmful behaviors. However, more detailed constitutions still improve fine-grained control over specific types of harms. This suggests both general and specific principles have value for steering AI safely.

Unlike human reasoning in abstract conceptual spaces, large language models (LLMs) typically reason by generating discrete tokens, which potentially limit their expressive power. The recent work Soft Thinking has shown that LLMs' latent reasoning via soft concepts is a promising direction, but LLMs are trained on discrete tokens. To reduce this gap between the soft concepts in reasoning and the discrete tokens in training, we propose Soft Concept Mixing (SCM), a soft concept aware training scheme that directly exposes the model to soft representations during training. Specifically, SCM constructs a soft concept vector by forming a probability-weighted average of embeddings. Then, this vector is mixed into the model's hidden states, which embody rich contextual information. Finally, the entire latent reasoning process is optimized with Reinforcement Learning (RL). Experiments on five reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that SCM improves the reasoning performance of LLMs, and simultaneously maintains a stable training dynamic.

The rapid rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) has created new disruptive possibilities for persuasive communication, by enabling fully-automated personalized and interactive content generation at an unprecedented scale. In this paper, we survey the research field of LLM-based persuasion that has emerged as a result. We begin by exploring the different modes in which LLM Systems are used to influence human attitudes and behaviors. In areas such as politics, marketing, public health, e-commerce, and charitable giving, such LLM Systems have already achieved human-level or even super-human persuasiveness. We identify key factors influencing their effectiveness, such as the manner of personalization and whether the content is labelled as AI-generated. We also summarize the experimental designs that have been used to evaluate progress. Our survey suggests that the current and future potential of LLM-based persuasion poses profound ethical and societal risks, including the spread of misinformation, the magnification of biases, and the invasion of privacy. These risks underscore the urgent need for ethical guidelines and updated regulatory frameworks to avoid the widespread deployment of irresponsible and harmful LLM Systems.

Today's large language models (LLMs) routinely generate coherent, grammatical and seemingly meaningful paragraphs of text. This achievement has led to speculation that these networks are -- or will soon become -- "thinking machines", capable of performing tasks that require abstract knowledge and reasoning. Here, we review the capabilities of LLMs by considering their performance on two different aspects of language use: 'formal linguistic competence', which includes knowledge of rules and patterns of a given language, and 'functional linguistic competence', a host of cognitive abilities required for language understanding and use in the real world. Drawing on evidence from cognitive neuroscience, we show that formal competence in humans relies on specialized language processing mechanisms, whereas functional competence recruits multiple extralinguistic capacities that comprise human thought, such as formal reasoning, world knowledge, situation modeling, and social cognition. In line with this distinction, LLMs show impressive (although imperfect) performance on tasks requiring formal linguistic competence, but fail on many tests requiring functional competence. Based on this evidence, we argue that (1) contemporary LLMs should be taken seriously as models of formal linguistic skills; (2) models that master real-life language use would need to incorporate or develop not only a core language module, but also multiple non-language-specific cognitive capacities required for modeling thought. Overall, a distinction between formal and functional linguistic competence helps clarify the discourse surrounding LLMs' potential and provides a path toward building models that understand and use language in human-like ways.

Many socio-linguistic cues are used in conversational analysis, such as emotion, sentiment, and dialogue acts. One of the fundamental cues is politeness, which linguistically possesses properties such as social manners useful in conversational analysis. This article presents findings of polite emotional dialogue act associations, where we can correlate the relationships between the socio-linguistic cues. We confirm our hypothesis that the utterances with the emotion classes Anger and Disgust are more likely to be impolite. At the same time, Happiness and Sadness are more likely to be polite. A less expectable phenomenon occurs with dialogue acts Inform and Commissive which contain more polite utterances than Question and Directive. Finally, we conclude on the future work of these findings to extend the learning of social behaviours using politeness.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) provide a new opportunity to address the long-standing question of how concepts are represented and organized in the mind, which is central to unravelling the nature of human cognition. Here, we reframed the classic reverse dictionary task to simulate human concept inference in context and investigated the emergence of human-like conceptual representations within LLMs. We found that LLMs were able to infer concepts from definitional descriptions and construct representation spaces that converge towards a shared, context-independent structure. These representations effectively predicted human behavioural judgments and aligned well with neural activity patterns in the human brain, offering evidence for biological plausibility. These findings demonstrate that human-like conceptual representations and organization can naturally emerge from language prediction, even without real-world grounding. Our work supports the view that LLMs serve as valuable tools for understanding complex human cognition and paves the way for better alignment between artificial and human intelligence.

Introduction. AI Ethics is framed distinctly across actors and stakeholder groups. We report results from a case study of OpenAI analysing ethical AI discourse. Method. Research addressed: How has OpenAI's public discourse leveraged 'ethics', 'safety', 'alignment' and adjacent related concepts over time, and what does discourse signal about framing in practice? A structured corpus, differentiating between communication for a general audience and communication with an academic audience, was assembled from public documentation. Analysis. Qualitative content analysis of ethical themes combined inductively derived and deductively applied codes. Quantitative analysis leveraged computational content analysis methods via NLP to model topics and quantify changes in rhetoric over time. Visualizations report aggregate results. For reproducible results, we have released our code at https://github.com/famous-blue-raincoat/AI_Ethics_Discourse. Results. Results indicate that safety and risk discourse dominate OpenAI's public communication and documentation, without applying academic and advocacy ethics frameworks or vocabularies. Conclusions. Implications for governance are presented, along with discussion of ethics-washing practices in industry.

Reasoning is a fundamental aspect of human intelligence that plays a crucial role in activities such as problem solving, decision making, and critical thinking. In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have made significant progress in natural language processing, and there is observation that these models may exhibit reasoning abilities when they are sufficiently large. However, it is not yet clear to what extent LLMs are capable of reasoning. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the current state of knowledge on reasoning in LLMs, including techniques for improving and eliciting reasoning in these models, methods and benchmarks for evaluating reasoning abilities, findings and implications of previous research in this field, and suggestions on future directions. Our aim is to provide a detailed and up-to-date review of this topic and stimulate meaningful discussion and future work.

Large language models (LLMs) have a substantial capacity for high-level analogical reasoning: reproducing patterns in linear text that occur in their training data (zero-shot evaluation) or in the provided context (few-shot in-context learning). However, recent studies show that even the more advanced LLMs fail in scenarios that require reasoning over multiple objects or facts and making sequences of logical deductions. We propose a two-stage probabilistic inference paradigm, ThinkSum, which reasons over sets of objects or facts in a structured manner. In the first stage (Think - retrieval of associations), a LLM is queried in parallel over a set of phrases extracted from the prompt or an auxiliary model call. In the second stage (Sum - probabilistic inference or reasoning), the results of these queries are aggregated to make the final prediction. We demonstrate the possibilities and advantages of ThinkSum on the BIG-bench suite of LLM evaluation tasks, achieving improvements over the state of the art using GPT-family models on thirteen difficult tasks, often with far smaller model variants. We also compare and contrast ThinkSum with other proposed modifications to direct prompting of LLMs, such as variants of chain-of-thought prompting. Our results suggest that because the probabilistic inference in ThinkSum is performed outside of calls to the LLM, ThinkSum is less sensitive to prompt design, yields more interpretable predictions, and can be flexibly combined with latent variable models to extract structured knowledge from LLMs. Overall, our proposed paradigm represents a promising approach for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of LLMs.

In this paper we argue that key, often sensational and misleading, claims regarding linguistic capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) are based on at least two unfounded assumptions; the assumption of language completeness and the assumption of data completeness. Language completeness assumes that a distinct and complete thing such as `a natural language' exists, the essential characteristics of which can be effectively and comprehensively modelled by an LLM. The assumption of data completeness relies on the belief that a language can be quantified and wholly captured by data. Work within the enactive approach to cognitive science makes clear that, rather than a distinct and complete thing, language is a means or way of acting. Languaging is not the kind of thing that can admit of a complete or comprehensive modelling. From an enactive perspective we identify three key characteristics of enacted language; embodiment, participation, and precariousness, that are absent in LLMs, and likely incompatible in principle with current architectures. We argue that these absences imply that LLMs are not now and cannot in their present form be linguistic agents the way humans are. We illustrate the point in particular through the phenomenon of `algospeak', a recently described pattern of high stakes human language activity in heavily controlled online environments. On the basis of these points, we conclude that sensational and misleading claims about LLM agency and capabilities emerge from a deep misconception of both what human language is and what LLMs are.

This technical paper introduces a chatting robot system that utilizes recent advancements in large-scale language models (LLMs) such as GPT-3 and ChatGPT. The system is integrated with a co-speech gesture generation system, which selects appropriate gestures based on the conceptual meaning of speech. Our motivation is to explore ways of utilizing the recent progress in LLMs for practical robotic applications, which benefits the development of both chatbots and LLMs. Specifically, it enables the development of highly responsive chatbot systems by leveraging LLMs and adds visual effects to the user interface of LLMs as an additional value. The source code for the system is available on GitHub for our in-house robot (https://github.com/microsoft/LabanotationSuite/tree/master/MSRAbotChatSimulation) and GitHub for Toyota HSR (https://github.com/microsoft/GPT-Enabled-HSR-CoSpeechGestures).

When answering a question, people often draw upon their rich world knowledge in addition to the particular context. Recent work has focused primarily on answering questions given some relevant document or context, and required very little general background. To investigate question answering with prior knowledge, we present CommonsenseQA: a challenging new dataset for commonsense question answering. To capture common sense beyond associations, we extract from ConceptNet (Speer et al., 2017) multiple target concepts that have the same semantic relation to a single source concept. Crowd-workers are asked to author multiple-choice questions that mention the source concept and discriminate in turn between each of the target concepts. This encourages workers to create questions with complex semantics that often require prior knowledge. We create 12,247 questions through this procedure and demonstrate the difficulty of our task with a large number of strong baselines. Our best baseline is based on BERT-large (Devlin et al., 2018) and obtains 56% accuracy, well below human performance, which is 89%.

Intent, typically clearly formulated and planned, functions as a cognitive framework for reasoning and problem-solving. This paper introduces the concept of Speaking with Intent (SWI) in large language models (LLMs), where the explicitly generated intent encapsulates the model's underlying intention and provides high-level planning to guide subsequent analysis and communication. By emulating deliberate and purposeful thoughts in the human mind, SWI is hypothesized to enhance the reasoning capabilities and generation quality of LLMs. Extensive experiments on mathematical reasoning benchmarks consistently demonstrate the superiority of Speaking with Intent over Baseline (i.e., generation without explicit intent). Moreover, SWI outperforms answer-trigger prompting methods Chain-of-Thought and Plan-and-Solve and maintains competitive performance with the strong method ARR (Analyzing, Retrieving, and Reasoning). Additionally, the effectiveness and generalizability of SWI are solidified on reasoning-intensive question answering (QA) and text summarization benchmarks, where SWI brings consistent improvement to the Baseline generation. In text summarization, SWI-generated summaries exhibit greater accuracy, conciseness, and factual correctness, with fewer hallucinations. Furthermore, human evaluations verify the coherence, effectiveness, and interpretability of the intent produced by SWI. This proof-of-concept study creates a novel avenue for enhancing LLMs' reasoning abilities with cognitive notions.

In the last decade, several organizations have produced documents intended to standardize, in the normative sense, and promote guidance to our recent and rapid AI development. However, the full spectrum of ideas presented in these documents has not yet been analyzed, except for a few meta-analyses and critical reviews of the field. In this work, we seek to expand on the work done by past researchers and create a tool for better data visualization of the contents and nature of these documents, to understand whether there is consensus or similarity between the principles espoused by various institutions, which may inspire debates on future regulations. We also provide some preliminary thoughts and questions that could guide the continuity of the research through a critical analysis of the results acquired by our methodology into a sample size of 200 documents.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

State-of-the-art solutions in the areas of "Language Modelling & Generating Text", "Speech Recognition", "Generating Image Descriptions" or "Video Tagging" have been using Recurrent Neural Networks as the foundation for their approaches. Understanding the underlying concepts is therefore of tremendous importance if we want to keep up with recent or upcoming publications in those areas. In this work we give a short overview over some of the most important concepts in the realm of Recurrent Neural Networks which enables readers to easily understand the fundamentals such as but not limited to "Backpropagation through Time" or "Long Short-Term Memory Units" as well as some of the more recent advances like the "Attention Mechanism" or "Pointer Networks". We also give recommendations for further reading regarding more complex topics where it is necessary.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Every fiscal quarter, companies hold earnings calls in which company executives respond to questions from analysts. After these calls, analysts often change their price target recommendations, which are used in equity research reports to help investors make decisions. In this paper, we examine analysts' decision making behavior as it pertains to the language content of earnings calls. We identify a set of 20 pragmatic features of analysts' questions which we correlate with analysts' pre-call investor recommendations. We also analyze the degree to which semantic and pragmatic features from an earnings call complement market data in predicting analysts' post-call changes in price targets. Our results show that earnings calls are moderately predictive of analysts' decisions even though these decisions are influenced by a number of other factors including private communication with company executives and market conditions. A breakdown of model errors indicates disparate performance on calls from different market sectors.

The idea of personality in descriptive psychology, traditionally defined through observable behavior, has now been extended to Large Language Models (LLMs) to better understand their behavior. This raises a question: do LLMs exhibit distinct and consistent personality traits, similar to humans? Existing self-assessment personality tests, while applicable, lack the necessary validity and reliability for precise personality measurements. To address this, we introduce TRAIT, a new tool consisting of 8K multi-choice questions designed to assess the personality of LLMs with validity and reliability. TRAIT is built on the psychometrically validated human questionnaire, Big Five Inventory (BFI) and Short Dark Triad (SD-3), enhanced with the ATOMIC10X knowledge graph for testing personality in a variety of real scenarios. TRAIT overcomes the reliability and validity issues when measuring personality of LLM with self-assessment, showing the highest scores across three metrics: refusal rate, prompt sensitivity, and option order sensitivity. It reveals notable insights into personality of LLM: 1) LLMs exhibit distinct and consistent personality, which is highly influenced by their training data (i.e., data used for alignment tuning), and 2) current prompting techniques have limited effectiveness in eliciting certain traits, such as high psychopathy or low conscientiousness, suggesting the need for further research in this direction.

In this work, we describe strategies and provide case-study activities that can be used to examine the properties of superposition, entanglement, tagging, complementarity, and measurement in quantum curricula geared for teacher training. Having a solid foundation in these conceptual ideas is critical for educators who will be adopting quantum ideas within the classroom. Yet they are some of the most difficult concepts to master. We show how one can systematically develop these conceptual foundations with thought experiments on light and with thought experiments that employ the Stern-Gerlach experiment. We emphasize the importance of computer animations in aiding the instruction on these concepts.

Metonymy plays an important role in our daily communication. People naturally think about things using their most salient properties or commonly related concepts. For example, by saying "The bus decided to skip our stop today," we actually mean that the bus driver made the decision, not the bus. Prior work on metonymy resolution has mainly focused on named entities. However, metonymy involving common nouns (such as desk, baby, and school) is also a frequent and challenging phenomenon. We argue that NLP systems should be capable of identifying the metonymic use of common nouns in context. We create a new metonymy dataset ConMeC, which consists of 6,000 sentences, where each sentence is paired with a target common noun and annotated by humans to indicate whether that common noun is used metonymically or not in that context. We also introduce a chain-of-thought based prompting method for detecting metonymy using large language models (LLMs). We evaluate our LLM-based pipeline, as well as a supervised BERT model on our dataset and three other metonymy datasets. Our experimental results demonstrate that LLMs could achieve performance comparable to the supervised BERT model on well-defined metonymy categories, while still struggling with instances requiring nuanced semantic understanding. Our dataset is publicly available at: https://github.com/SaptGhosh/ConMeC.

Generalist robots that can perform a range of different tasks in open-world settings must be able to not only reason about the steps needed to accomplish their goals, but also process complex instructions, prompts, and even feedback during task execution. Intricate instructions (e.g., "Could you make me a vegetarian sandwich?" or "I don't like that one") require not just the ability to physically perform the individual steps, but the ability to situate complex commands and feedback in the physical world. In this work, we describe a system that uses vision-language models in a hierarchical structure, first reasoning over complex prompts and user feedback to deduce the most appropriate next step to fulfill the task, and then performing that step with low-level actions. In contrast to direct instruction following methods that can fulfill simple commands ("pick up the cup"), our system can reason through complex prompts and incorporate situated feedback during task execution ("that's not trash"). We evaluate our system across three robotic platforms, including single-arm, dual-arm, and dual-arm mobile robots, demonstrating its ability to handle tasks such as cleaning messy tables, making sandwiches, and grocery shopping. Videos are available at https://www.pi.website/research/hirobot

We examine recent research that asks whether current AI systems may be developing a capacity for "scheming" (covertly and strategically pursuing misaligned goals). We compare current research practices in this field to those adopted in the 1970s to test whether non-human primates could master natural language. We argue that there are lessons to be learned from that historical research endeavour, which was characterised by an overattribution of human traits to other agents, an excessive reliance on anecdote and descriptive analysis, and a failure to articulate a strong theoretical framework for the research. We recommend that research into AI scheming actively seeks to avoid these pitfalls. We outline some concrete steps that can be taken for this research programme to advance in a productive and scientifically rigorous fashion.

There is an emerging consensus that we need to align AI systems with human values (Gabriel, 2020; Ji et al., 2024), but it remains unclear how to apply this to language models in practice. We split the problem of "aligning to human values" into three parts: first, eliciting values from people; second, reconciling those values into an alignment target for training ML models; and third, actually training the model. In this paper, we focus on the first two parts, and ask the question: what are "good" ways to synthesize diverse human inputs about values into a target for aligning language models? To answer this question, we first define a set of 6 criteria that we believe must be satisfied for an alignment target to shape model behavior in accordance with human values. We then propose a process for eliciting and reconciling values called Moral Graph Elicitation (MGE), which uses a large language model to interview participants about their values in particular contexts; our approach is inspired by the philosophy of values advanced by Taylor (1977), Chang (2004), and others. We trial MGE with a representative sample of 500 Americans, on 3 intentionally divisive prompts (e.g. advice about abortion). Our results demonstrate that MGE is promising for improving model alignment across all 6 criteria. For example, almost all participants (89.1%) felt well represented by the process, and (89%) thought the final moral graph was fair, even if their value wasn't voted as the wisest. Our process often results in "expert" values (e.g. values from women who have solicited abortion advice) rising to the top of the moral graph, without defining who is considered an expert in advance.

In classic instruction following, language like "I'd like the JetBlue flight" maps to actions (e.g., selecting that flight). However, language also conveys information about a user's underlying reward function (e.g., a general preference for JetBlue), which can allow a model to carry out desirable actions in new contexts. We present a model that infers rewards from language pragmatically: reasoning about how speakers choose utterances not only to elicit desired actions, but also to reveal information about their preferences. On a new interactive flight-booking task with natural language, our model more accurately infers rewards and predicts optimal actions in unseen environments, in comparison to past work that first maps language to actions (instruction following) and then maps actions to rewards (inverse reinforcement learning).

Thinking about the future is one of the important activities that people do in daily life. Futurists also pay a lot of effort into figuring out possible scenarios for the future. We argue that the exploration of this direction is still in an early stage in the NLP research. To this end, we propose three argument generation tasks in the financial application scenario. Our experimental results show these tasks are still big challenges for representative generation models. Based on our empirical results, we further point out several unresolved issues and challenges in this research direction.

We describe a method, based on Jennifer Nado's proposal for classification procedures as targets of conceptual engineering, that implements such procedures by prompting a large language model. We apply this method, using data from the Wikidata knowledge graph, to evaluate stipulative definitions related to two paradigmatic conceptual engineering projects: the International Astronomical Union's redefinition of PLANET and Haslanger's ameliorative analysis of WOMAN. Our results show that classification procedures built using our approach can exhibit good classification performance and, through the generation of rationales for their classifications, can contribute to the identification of issues in either the definitions or the data against which they are being evaluated. We consider objections to this method, and discuss implications of this work for three aspects of theory and practice of conceptual engineering: the definition of its targets, empirical methods for their investigation, and their practical roles. The data and code used for our experiments, together with the experimental results, are available in a Github repository.

Large language model (LLM) prompting is a promising new approach for users to create and customize their own chatbots. However, current methods for steering a chatbot's outputs, such as prompt engineering and fine-tuning, do not support users in converting their natural feedback on the model's outputs to changes in the prompt or model. In this work, we explore how to enable users to interactively refine model outputs through their feedback, by helping them convert their feedback into a set of principles (i.e. a constitution) that dictate the model's behavior. From a formative study, we (1) found that users needed support converting their feedback into principles for the chatbot and (2) classified the different principle types desired by users. Inspired by these findings, we developed ConstitutionMaker, an interactive tool for converting user feedback into principles, to steer LLM-based chatbots. With ConstitutionMaker, users can provide either positive or negative feedback in natural language, select auto-generated feedback, or rewrite the chatbot's response; each mode of feedback automatically generates a principle that is inserted into the chatbot's prompt. In a user study with 14 participants, we compare ConstitutionMaker to an ablated version, where users write their own principles. With ConstitutionMaker, participants felt that their principles could better guide the chatbot, that they could more easily convert their feedback into principles, and that they could write principles more efficiently, with less mental demand. ConstitutionMaker helped users identify ways to improve the chatbot, formulate their intuitive responses to the model into feedback, and convert this feedback into specific and clear principles. Together, these findings inform future tools that support the interactive critiquing of LLM outputs.

How does language inform our downstream thinking? In particular, how do humans make meaning from language -- and how can we leverage a theory of linguistic meaning to build machines that think in more human-like ways? In this paper, we propose rational meaning construction, a computational framework for language-informed thinking that combines neural models of language with probabilistic models for rational inference. We frame linguistic meaning as a context-sensitive mapping from natural language into a probabilistic language of thought (PLoT) -- a general-purpose symbolic substrate for probabilistic, generative world modeling. Our architecture integrates two powerful computational tools that have not previously come together: we model thinking with probabilistic programs, an expressive representation for flexible commonsense reasoning; and we model meaning construction with large language models (LLMs), which support broad-coverage translation from natural language utterances to code expressions in a probabilistic programming language. We illustrate our framework in action through examples covering four core domains from cognitive science: probabilistic reasoning, logical and relational reasoning, visual and physical reasoning, and social reasoning about agents and their plans. In each, we show that LLMs can generate context-sensitive translations that capture pragmatically-appropriate linguistic meanings, while Bayesian inference with the generated programs supports coherent and robust commonsense reasoning. We extend our framework to integrate cognitively-motivated symbolic modules to provide a unified commonsense thinking interface from language. Finally, we explore how language can drive the construction of world models themselves.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are revolutionizing several areas of Artificial Intelligence. One of the most remarkable applications is creative writing, e.g., poetry or storytelling: the generated outputs are often of astonishing quality. However, a natural question arises: can LLMs be really considered creative? In this article, we first analyze the development of LLMs under the lens of creativity theories, investigating the key open questions and challenges. In particular, we focus our discussion on the dimensions of value, novelty, and surprise as proposed by Margaret Boden in her work. Then, we consider different classic perspectives, namely product, process, press, and person. We discuss a set of ``easy'' and ``hard'' problems in machine creativity, presenting them in relation to LLMs. Finally, we examine the societal impact of these technologies with a particular focus on the creative industries, analyzing the opportunities offered, the challenges arising from them, and the potential associated risks, from both legal and ethical points of view.

Self-consciousness, the introspection of one's existence and thoughts, represents a high-level cognitive process. As language models advance at an unprecedented pace, a critical question arises: Are these models becoming self-conscious? Drawing upon insights from psychological and neural science, this work presents a practical definition of self-consciousness for language models and refines ten core concepts. Our work pioneers an investigation into self-consciousness in language models by, for the first time, leveraging causal structural games to establish the functional definitions of the ten core concepts. Based on our definitions, we conduct a comprehensive four-stage experiment: quantification (evaluation of ten leading models), representation (visualization of self-consciousness within the models), manipulation (modification of the models' representation), and acquisition (fine-tuning the models on core concepts). Our findings indicate that although models are in the early stages of developing self-consciousness, there is a discernible representation of certain concepts within their internal mechanisms. However, these representations of self-consciousness are hard to manipulate positively at the current stage, yet they can be acquired through targeted fine-tuning. Our datasets and code are at https://github.com/OpenCausaLab/SelfConsciousness.

The wording of natural language prompts has been shown to influence the performance of large language models (LLMs), yet the role of politeness and tone remains underexplored. In this study, we investigate how varying levels of prompt politeness affect model accuracy on multiple-choice questions. We created a dataset of 50 base questions spanning mathematics, science, and history, each rewritten into five tone variants: Very Polite, Polite, Neutral, Rude, and Very Rude, yielding 250 unique prompts. Using ChatGPT 4o, we evaluated responses across these conditions and applied paired sample t-tests to assess statistical significance. Contrary to expectations, impolite prompts consistently outperformed polite ones, with accuracy ranging from 80.8% for Very Polite prompts to 84.8% for Very Rude prompts. These findings differ from earlier studies that associated rudeness with poorer outcomes, suggesting that newer LLMs may respond differently to tonal variation. Our results highlight the importance of studying pragmatic aspects of prompting and raise broader questions about the social dimensions of human-AI interaction.

Cross-modal reasoning (CMR), the intricate process of synthesizing and drawing inferences across divergent sensory modalities, is increasingly recognized as a crucial capability in the progression toward more sophisticated and anthropomorphic artificial intelligence systems. Large Language Models (LLMs) represent a class of AI algorithms specifically engineered to parse, produce, and engage with human language on an extensive scale. The recent trend of deploying LLMs to tackle CMR tasks has marked a new mainstream of approaches for enhancing their effectiveness. This survey offers a nuanced exposition of current methodologies applied in CMR using LLMs, classifying these into a detailed three-tiered taxonomy. Moreover, the survey delves into the principal design strategies and operational techniques of prototypical models within this domain. Additionally, it articulates the prevailing challenges associated with the integration of LLMs in CMR and identifies prospective research directions. To sum up, this survey endeavors to expedite progress within this burgeoning field by endowing scholars with a holistic and detailed vista, showcasing the vanguard of current research whilst pinpointing potential avenues for advancement. An associated GitHub repository that collects the relevant papers can be found at https://github.com/ZuyiZhou/Awesome-Cross-modal-Reasoning-with-LLMs

This paper proposes a research direction to advance AI which draws inspiration from cognitive theories of human decision making. The premise is that if we gain insights about the causes of some human capabilities that are still lacking in AI (for instance, adaptability, generalizability, common sense, and causal reasoning), we may obtain similar capabilities in an AI system by embedding these causal components. We hope that the high-level description of our vision included in this paper, as well as the several research questions that we propose to consider, can stimulate the AI research community to define, try and evaluate new methodologies, frameworks, and evaluation metrics, in the spirit of achieving a better understanding of both human and machine intelligence.

The recently proposed Large Concept Model (LCM) generates text by predicting a sequence of sentence-level embeddings and training with either mean-squared error or diffusion objectives. We present SONAR-LLM, a decoder-only transformer that "thinks" in the same continuous SONAR embedding space, yet is supervised through token-level cross-entropy propagated via the frozen SONAR decoder. This hybrid objective retains the semantic abstraction of LCM while eliminating its diffusion sampler and restoring a likelihood-based training signal. Across model sizes from 39M to 1.3B parameters, SONAR-LLM attains competitive generation quality. We report scaling trends, ablations, benchmark results, and release the complete training code and all pretrained checkpoints to foster reproducibility and future research.

This is a book about large language models. As indicated by the title, it primarily focuses on foundational concepts rather than comprehensive coverage of all cutting-edge technologies. The book is structured into four main chapters, each exploring a key area: pre-training, generative models, prompting techniques, and alignment methods. It is intended for college students, professionals, and practitioners in natural language processing and related fields, and can serve as a reference for anyone interested in large language models.

This article presents the Cogni-CISMeF project, which aims at improving medical information search in the CISMeF system (Catalog and Index of French-language health resources) by including a conversational agent to interact with the user in natural language. To study the cognitive processes involved during the information search, a bottom-up methodology was adopted. Experimentation has been set up to obtain human dialogs between a user (playing the role of patient) dealing with medical information search and a CISMeF expert refining the request. The analysis of these dialogs underlined the use of discursive evidence: vocabulary, reformulation, implicit or explicit expression of user intentions, conversational sequences, etc. A model of artificial agent is proposed. It leads the user in its information search by proposing to him examples, assistance and choices. This model was implemented and integrated in the CISMeF system. ---- Cet article d\'ecrit le projet Cogni-CISMeF qui propose un module de dialogue Homme-Machine \`a int\'egrer dans le syst\`eme d'indexation de connaissances m\'edicales CISMeF (Catalogue et Index des Sites M\'edicaux Francophones). Nous avons adopt\'e une d\'emarche de mod\'elisation cognitive en proc\'edant \`a un recueil de corpus de dialogues entre un utilisateur (jouant le r\^ole d'un patient) d\'esirant une information m\'edicale et un expert CISMeF af inant cette demande pour construire la requ\^ete. Nous avons analys\'e la structure des dialogues ainsi obtenus et avons \'etudi\'e un certain nombre d'indices discursifs : vocabulaire employ\'e, marques de reformulation, commentaires m\'eta et \'epilinguistiques, expression implicite ou explicite des intentions de l'utilisateur, encha\^inement conversationnel, etc. De cette analyse, nous avons construit un mod\`ele d'agent artificiel dot\'e de capacit\'es cognitives capables d'aider l'utilisateur dans sa t\^ache de recherche d'information. Ce mod\`ele a \'et\'e impl\'ement\'e et int\'egr\'e dans le syst\`eme CISMeF.

Commonsense intelligence in machines is often assessed by static benchmarks that compare a model's output against human-prescribed correct labels. An important, albeit implicit, assumption of these labels is that they accurately capture what any human would think, effectively treating human common sense as homogeneous. However, recent empirical work has shown that humans vary enormously in what they consider commonsensical; thus what appears self-evident to one benchmark designer may not be so to another. Here, we propose a novel method for evaluating common sense in artificial intelligence (AI), specifically in large language models (LLMs), that incorporates empirically observed heterogeneity among humans by measuring the correspondence between a model's judgment and that of a human population. We first find that, when treated as independent survey respondents, most LLMs remain below the human median in their individual commonsense competence. Second, when used as simulators of a hypothetical population, LLMs correlate with real humans only modestly in the extent to which they agree on the same set of statements. In both cases, smaller, open-weight models are surprisingly more competitive than larger, proprietary frontier models. Our evaluation framework, which ties commonsense intelligence to its cultural basis, contributes to the growing call for adapting AI models to human collectivities that possess different, often incompatible, social stocks of knowledge.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

In this position paper, we argue that instead of morally aligning LLMs to specific set of ethical principles, we should infuse generic ethical reasoning capabilities into them so that they can handle value pluralism at a global scale. When provided with an ethical policy, an LLM should be capable of making decisions that are ethically consistent to the policy. We develop a framework that integrates moral dilemmas with moral principles pertaining to different foramlisms of normative ethics, and at different levels of abstractions. Initial experiments with GPT-x models shows that while GPT-4 is a nearly perfect ethical reasoner, the models still have bias towards the moral values of Western and English speaking societies.

Of primary importance in formulating a response to the increasing prevalence and power of artificial intelligence (AI) applications in society are questions of ontology. Questions such as: What "are" these systems? How are they to be regarded? How does an algorithm come to be regarded as an agent? We discuss three factors which hinder discussion and obscure attempts to form a clear ontology of AI: (1) the various and evolving definitions of AI, (2) the tendency for pre-existing technologies to be assimilated and regarded as "normal," and (3) the tendency of human beings to anthropomorphize. This list is not intended as exhaustive, nor is it seen to preclude entirely a clear ontology, however, these challenges are a necessary set of topics for consideration. Each of these factors is seen to present a 'moving target' for discussion, which poses a challenge for both technical specialists and non-practitioners of AI systems development (e.g., philosophers and theologians) to speak meaningfully given that the corpus of AI structures and capabilities evolves at a rapid pace. Finally, we present avenues for moving forward, including opportunities for collaborative synthesis for scholars in philosophy and science.

Artificial intelligence (AI) technologies should adhere to human norms to better serve our society and avoid disseminating harmful or misleading information, particularly in Conversational Information Retrieval (CIR). Previous work, including approaches and datasets, has not always been successful or sufficiently robust in taking human norms into consideration. To this end, we introduce a workflow that integrates ethical alignment, with an initial ethical judgment stage for efficient data screening. To address the need for ethical judgment in CIR, we present the QA-ETHICS dataset, adapted from the ETHICS benchmark, which serves as an evaluation tool by unifying scenarios and label meanings. However, each scenario only considers one ethical concept. Therefore, we introduce the MP-ETHICS dataset to evaluate a scenario under multiple ethical concepts, such as justice and Deontology. In addition, we suggest a new approach that achieves top performance in both binary and multi-label ethical judgment tasks. Our research provides a practical method for introducing ethical alignment into the CIR workflow. The data and code are available at https://github.com/wanng-ide/ealm .

Recent large language models (LLMs) have shown indications of mathematical reasoning ability. However it has not been clear how they would fare on more challenging competition-level problems. And while self-generated verbalizations of intermediate reasoning steps (i.e., chain-of-thought prompting) have been shown to be helpful, whether LLMs can make use of helpful side information such as problem-specific hints has not been investigated before. In this paper, we propose a challenging benchmark dataset for enabling such analyses. The Concept and Hint-Annotated Math Problems (CHAMP) consists of high school math competition problems, annotated with concepts, or general math facts, and hints, or problem-specific tricks. These annotations allow us to explore the effects of additional information, such as relevant hints, misleading concepts, or related problems. This benchmark is difficult, with the best model only scoring 58.1% in standard settings. With concepts and hints, performance sometimes improves, indicating that some models can make use of such side information. We further annotate model-generated solutions for their correctness. Using this corpus, we find that models often arrive at the correct final answer through wrong reasoning steps. In addition, we test whether models are able to verify these solutions, and find that most models struggle. The dataset and code are available on the project website.

Against all attempts that consider virtuality as a substance (a parallel or alternative reality) or as a modality (like potentiality or possibility), we want to defend the pragmatic point of view that it is rather a dynamic cognitive and sensitive interaction with reality. More precisely, we show that the ``virtus'' is an operating capacity that produces simulations of real and fictional contexts to experiment with their effects. Based on Peirce's semiotics, we define virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) as mixed realities made of ``symbolic assemblies'', that is to say, structures of signs assembled by processes of computation and meaning (semiosis). We show that VR can be defined as a synesthetic experiment that does not reshape reality itself, but rather the senses and understanding we already have about it. In conclusion, we criticize David Chalmer's extended mind theory by distinguishing between knowledge and information, and we try to redefine AR as a hermeneutic device that extends not the mind itself, but the activity of thought by adding symbols to read in the world.

"Thinking is for Doing." Humans can infer other people's mental states from observations--an ability called Theory-of-Mind (ToM)--and subsequently act pragmatically on those inferences. Existing question answering benchmarks such as ToMi ask models questions to make inferences about beliefs of characters in a story, but do not test whether models can then use these inferences to guide their actions. We propose a new evaluation paradigm for large language models (LLMs): Thinking for Doing (T4D), which requires models to connect inferences about others' mental states to actions in social scenarios. Experiments on T4D demonstrate that LLMs such as GPT-4 and PaLM 2 seemingly excel at tracking characters' beliefs in stories, but they struggle to translate this capability into strategic action. Our analysis reveals the core challenge for LLMs lies in identifying the implicit inferences about mental states without being explicitly asked about as in ToMi, that lead to choosing the correct action in T4D. To bridge this gap, we introduce a zero-shot prompting framework, Foresee and Reflect (FaR), which provides a reasoning structure that encourages LLMs to anticipate future challenges and reason about potential actions. FaR boosts GPT-4's performance from 50% to 71% on T4D, outperforming other prompting methods such as Chain-of-Thought and Self-Ask. Moreover, FaR generalizes to diverse out-of-distribution story structures and scenarios that also require ToM inferences to choose an action, consistently outperforming other methods including few-shot in-context learning.

Proactive dialogue systems, related to a wide range of real-world conversational applications, equip the conversational agent with the capability of leading the conversation direction towards achieving pre-defined targets or fulfilling certain goals from the system side. It is empowered by advanced techniques to progress to more complicated tasks that require strategical and motivational interactions. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive overview of the prominent problems and advanced designs for conversational agent's proactivity in different types of dialogues. Furthermore, we discuss challenges that meet the real-world application needs but require a greater research focus in the future. We hope that this first survey of proactive dialogue systems can provide the community with a quick access and an overall picture to this practical problem, and stimulate more progresses on conversational AI to the next level.

We propose a novel application of prompting Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs) to generate analogies and study how to design effective prompts for two task settings: generating a source concept analogous to a given target concept (aka Analogous Concept Generation or ACG), and generating an explanation of the similarity between a given pair of target concept and source concept (aka Analogous Explanation Generation or AEG). We found that it is feasible to prompt InstructGPT to generate meaningful analogies and the best prompts tend to be precise imperative statements especially with a low temperature setting. We also systematically analyzed the sensitivity of the InstructGPT model to prompt design, temperature, and injected spelling errors, and found that the model is particularly sensitive to certain variations (e.g., questions vs. imperative statements). Further, we conducted human evaluation on 1.4k of the generated analogies and found that the quality of generations varies substantially by model size. The largest InstructGPT model can achieve human-level performance at generating meaningful analogies for a given target while there is still room for improvement on the AEG task.

Since the launch of ChatGPT, a powerful AI Chatbot developed by OpenAI, large language models (LLMs) have made significant advancements in both academia and industry, bringing about a fundamental engineering paradigm shift in many areas. While LLMs are powerful, it is also crucial to best use their power where "prompt'' plays a core role. However, the booming LLMs themselves, including excellent APIs like ChatGPT, have several inherent limitations: 1) temporal lag of training data, and 2) the lack of physical capabilities to perform external actions. Recently, we have observed the trend of utilizing prompt-based tools to better utilize the power of LLMs for downstream tasks, but a lack of systematic literature and standardized terminology, partly due to the rapid evolution of this field. Therefore, in this work, we survey related prompting tools and promote the concept of the "Prompting Framework" (PF), i.e. the framework for managing, simplifying, and facilitating interaction with large language models. We define the lifecycle of the PF as a hierarchical structure, from bottom to top, namely: Data Level, Base Level, Execute Level, and Service Level. We also systematically depict the overall landscape of the emerging PF field and discuss potential future research and challenges. To continuously track the developments in this area, we maintain a repository at https://github.com/lxx0628/Prompting-Framework-Survey, which can be a useful resource sharing platform for both academic and industry in this field.

Recent work has highlighted the culturally-contingent nature of commonsense knowledge. We introduce AMAMMER{epsilon}, a test set of 525 multiple-choice questions designed to evaluate the commonsense knowledge of English LLMs, relative to the cultural contexts of Ghana and the United States. To create AMAMMER{epsilon}, we select a set of multiple-choice questions (MCQs) from existing commonsense datasets and rewrite them in a multi-stage process involving surveys of Ghanaian and U.S. participants. In three rounds of surveys, participants from both pools are solicited to (1) write correct and incorrect answer choices, (2) rate individual answer choices on a 5-point Likert scale, and (3) select the best answer choice from the newly-constructed MCQ items, in a final validation step. By engaging participants at multiple stages, our procedure ensures that participant perspectives are incorporated both in the creation and validation of test items, resulting in high levels of agreement within each pool. We evaluate several off-the-shelf English LLMs on AMAMMER{epsilon}. Uniformly, models prefer answers choices that align with the preferences of U.S. annotators over Ghanaian annotators. Additionally, when test items specify a cultural context (Ghana or the U.S.), models exhibit some ability to adapt, but performance is consistently better in U.S. contexts than Ghanaian. As large resources are devoted to the advancement of English LLMs, our findings underscore the need for culturally adaptable models and evaluations to meet the needs of diverse English-speaking populations around the world.

Large language models (LLMs) are currently at the forefront of intertwining AI systems with human communication and everyday life. Therefore, it is of great importance to evaluate their emerging abilities. In this study, we show that LLMs like GPT-3 exhibit behavior that strikingly resembles human-like intuition - and the cognitive errors that come with it. However, LLMs with higher cognitive capabilities, in particular ChatGPT and GPT-4, learned to avoid succumbing to these errors and perform in a hyperrational manner. For our experiments, we probe LLMs with the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) as well as semantic illusions that were originally designed to investigate intuitive decision-making in humans. Our study demonstrates that investigating LLMs with methods from psychology has the potential to reveal otherwise unknown emergent traits.

It has been shown that Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) may not *say what they think*: they do not always volunteer information about how certain parts of the input influence their reasoning. But it is one thing for a model to *omit* such information and another, worse thing to *lie* about it. Here, we extend the work of Chen et al. (2025) to show that LRMs will do just this: they will flatly deny relying on hints provided in the prompt in answering multiple choice questions -- even when directly asked to reflect on unusual (i.e. hinted) prompt content, even when allowed to use hints, and even though experiments *show* them to be using the hints. Our results thus have discouraging implications for CoT monitoring and interpretability.

Investigating NLP through a philosophical lens has recently caught researcher's eyes as it connects computational methods with classical schools of philosophy. This paper introduces a philosophical approach inspired by the Hegelian Dialectic for LLMs' self-reflection, utilizing a self-dialectical approach to emulate internal critiques and then synthesize new ideas by resolving the contradicting points. Moreover, this paper investigates the effect of LLMs' temperature for generation by establishing a dynamic annealing approach, which promotes the creativity in the early stages and gradually refines it by focusing on the nuances, as well as a fixed temperature strategy for generation. Our proposed approach is examined to determine its ability to generate novel ideas from an initial proposition. Additionally, a Multi Agent Majority Voting (MAMV) strategy is leveraged to assess the validity and novelty of the generated ideas, which proves beneficial in the absence of domain experts. Our experiments show promise in generating new ideas and provide a stepping stone for future research.

In this paper, we investigate whether Large Language Models (LLMs) actively recall or retrieve their internal repositories of factual knowledge when faced with reasoning tasks. Through an analysis of LLMs' internal factual recall at each reasoning step via Knowledge Neurons, we reveal that LLMs fail to harness the critical factual associations under certain circumstances. Instead, they tend to opt for alternative, shortcut-like pathways to answer reasoning questions. By manually manipulating the recall process of parametric knowledge in LLMs, we demonstrate that enhancing this recall process directly improves reasoning performance whereas suppressing it leads to notable degradation. Furthermore, we assess the effect of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, a powerful technique for addressing complex reasoning tasks. Our findings indicate that CoT can intensify the recall of factual knowledge by encouraging LLMs to engage in orderly and reliable reasoning. Furthermore, we explored how contextual conflicts affect the retrieval of facts during the reasoning process to gain a comprehensive understanding of the factual recall behaviors of LLMs. Code and data will be available soon.

Polis is a platform that leverages machine intelligence to scale up deliberative processes. In this paper, we explore the opportunities and risks associated with applying Large Language Models (LLMs) towards challenges with facilitating, moderating and summarizing the results of Polis engagements. In particular, we demonstrate with pilot experiments using Anthropic's Claude that LLMs can indeed augment human intelligence to help more efficiently run Polis conversations. In particular, we find that summarization capabilities enable categorically new methods with immense promise to empower the public in collective meaning-making exercises. And notably, LLM context limitations have a significant impact on insight and quality of these results. However, these opportunities come with risks. We discuss some of these risks, as well as principles and techniques for characterizing and mitigating them, and the implications for other deliberative or political systems that may employ LLMs. Finally, we conclude with several open future research directions for augmenting tools like Polis with LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) have majorly advanced NLP and AI, and next to their ability to perform a wide range of procedural tasks, a major success factor is their internalized factual knowledge. Since Petroni et al. (2019), analyzing this knowledge has gained attention. However, most approaches investigate one question at a time via modest-sized pre-defined samples, introducing an ``availability bias'' (Tversky&Kahnemann, 1973) that prevents the analysis of knowledge (or beliefs) of LLMs beyond the experimenter's predisposition. To address this challenge, we propose a novel methodology to comprehensively materialize an LLM's factual knowledge through recursive querying and result consolidation. Our approach is a milestone for LLM research, for the first time providing constructive insights into the scope and structure of LLM knowledge (or beliefs). As a prototype, we build GPTKB, a knowledge base (KB) comprising 101 million relational triples for over 2.9 million entities from GPT-4o-mini. We use GPTKB to exemplarily analyze GPT-4o-mini's factual knowledge in terms of scale, accuracy, bias, cutoff and consistency, at the same time. GPTKB is accessible at https://gptkb.org

Text-to-image diffusion models have demonstrated an unparalleled ability to generate high-quality, diverse images from a textual concept (e.g., "a doctor", "love"). However, the internal process of mapping text to a rich visual representation remains an enigma. In this work, we tackle the challenge of understanding concept representations in text-to-image models by decomposing an input text prompt into a small set of interpretable elements. This is achieved by learning a pseudo-token that is a sparse weighted combination of tokens from the model's vocabulary, with the objective of reconstructing the images generated for the given concept. Applied over the state-of-the-art Stable Diffusion model, this decomposition reveals non-trivial and surprising structures in the representations of concepts. For example, we find that some concepts such as "a president" or "a composer" are dominated by specific instances (e.g., "Obama", "Biden") and their interpolations. Other concepts, such as "happiness" combine associated terms that can be concrete ("family", "laughter") or abstract ("friendship", "emotion"). In addition to peering into the inner workings of Stable Diffusion, our method also enables applications such as single-image decomposition to tokens, bias detection and mitigation, and semantic image manipulation. Our code will be available at: https://hila-chefer.github.io/Conceptor/

Consciousness stands as one of the most profound and distinguishing features of the human mind, fundamentally shaping our understanding of existence and agency. As large language models (LLMs) develop at an unprecedented pace, questions concerning intelligence and consciousness have become increasingly significant. However, discourse on LLM consciousness remains largely unexplored territory. In this paper, we first clarify frequently conflated terminologies (e.g., LLM consciousness and LLM awareness). Then, we systematically organize and synthesize existing research on LLM consciousness from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. Furthermore, we highlight potential frontier risks that conscious LLMs might introduce. Finally, we discuss current challenges and outline future directions in this emerging field. The references discussed in this paper are organized at https://github.com/OpenCausaLab/Awesome-LLM-Consciousness.

Conceptual combination is a cognitive process that merges basic concepts, enabling the creation of complex expressions. During this process, the properties of combination (e.g., the whiteness of a peeled apple) can be inherited from basic concepts, newly emerge, or be canceled. However, previous studies have evaluated a limited set of properties and have not examined the generative process. To address this gap, we introduce the Conceptual Combination with Property Type dataset (CCPT), which consists of 12.3K annotated triplets of noun phrases, properties, and property types. Using CCPT, we establish three types of tasks to evaluate LLMs for conceptual combination thoroughly. Our key findings are threefold: (1) Our automatic metric grading property emergence and cancellation closely corresponds with human judgments. (2) LLMs, including OpenAI's o1, struggle to generate noun phrases which possess given emergent properties. (3) Our proposed method, inspired by cognitive psychology model that explains how relationships between concepts are formed, improves performances in all generative tasks. The dataset and experimental code are available at https://github.com/seokwon99/CCPT.git.

Recent works have extended notions of feature importance to semantic concepts that are inherently interpretable to the users interacting with a black-box predictive model. Yet, precise statistical guarantees, such as false positive rate control, are needed to communicate findings transparently and to avoid unintended consequences in real-world scenarios. In this paper, we formalize the global (i.e., over a population) and local (i.e., for a sample) statistical importance of semantic concepts for the predictions of opaque models, by means of conditional independence, which allows for rigorous testing. We use recent ideas of sequential kernelized testing (SKIT) to induce a rank of importance across concepts, and showcase the effectiveness and flexibility of our framework on synthetic datasets as well as on image classification tasks using vision-language models such as CLIP.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been successfully used in many natural-language tasks and applications including text generation and AI chatbots. They also are a promising new technology for concept-oriented deep learning (CODL). However, the prerequisite is that LLMs understand concepts and ensure conceptual consistency. We discuss these in this paper, as well as major uses of LLMs for CODL including concept extraction from text, concept graph extraction from text, and concept learning. Human knowledge consists of both symbolic (conceptual) knowledge and embodied (sensory) knowledge. Text-only LLMs, however, can represent only symbolic (conceptual) knowledge. Multimodal LLMs, on the other hand, are capable of representing the full range (conceptual and sensory) of human knowledge. We discuss conceptual understanding in visual-language LLMs, the most important multimodal LLMs, and major uses of them for CODL including concept extraction from image, concept graph extraction from image, and concept learning. While uses of LLMs for CODL are valuable standalone, they are particularly valuable as part of LLM applications such as AI chatbots.

We present a way to learn novel concepts by only using their textual description. We call this method Knowledge Transfer. Similarly to human perception, we leverage cross-modal interaction to introduce new concepts. We hypothesize that in a pre-trained visual encoder there are enough low-level features already learned (e.g. shape, appearance, color) that can be used to describe previously unknown high-level concepts. Provided with a textual description of the novel concept, our method works by aligning the known low-level features of the visual encoder to its high-level textual description. We show that Knowledge Transfer can successfully introduce novel concepts in multimodal models, in a very efficient manner, by only requiring a single description of the target concept. Our approach is compatible with both separate textual and visual encoders (e.g. CLIP) and shared parameters across modalities. We also show that, following the same principle, Knowledge Transfer can improve concepts already known by the model. Leveraging Knowledge Transfer we improve zero-shot performance across different tasks such as classification, segmentation, image-text retrieval, and captioning.

We introduce Drivelology, a unique linguistic phenomenon characterised as "nonsense with depth", utterances that are syntactically coherent yet pragmatically paradoxical, emotionally loaded, or rhetorically subversive. While such expressions may resemble surface-level nonsense, they encode implicit meaning requiring contextual inference, moral reasoning, or emotional interpretation. We find that current large language models (LLMs), despite excelling at many natural language processing (NLP) tasks, consistently fail to grasp the layered semantics of Drivelological text. To investigate this, we construct a small but diverse benchmark dataset of over 1,200 meticulously curated examples, with select instances in English, Mandarin, Spanish, French, Japanese, and Korean. Annotation was especially challenging: each of the examples required careful expert review to verify that it truly reflected Drivelological characteristics. The process involved multiple rounds of discussion and adjudication to address disagreements, highlighting the subtle and subjective nature of the Drivelology. We evaluate a range of LLMs on classification, generation, and reasoning tasks. Our results reveal clear limitations of LLMs: models often confuse Drivelology with shallow nonsense, produce incoherent justifications, or miss the implied rhetorical function altogether. These findings highlight a deeper representational gap in LLMs' pragmatic understanding and challenge the assumption that statistical fluency implies cognitive comprehension. We release our dataset and code to facilitate further research in modelling linguistic depth beyond surface-level coherence.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in generating human-like text and exhibiting personality traits similar to those in humans. However, the mechanisms by which LLMs encode and express traits such as agreeableness and impulsiveness remain poorly understood. Drawing on the theory of social determinism, we investigate how long-term background factors, such as family environment and cultural norms, interact with short-term pressures like external instructions, shaping and influencing LLMs' personality traits. By steering the output of LLMs through the utilization of interpretable features within the model, we explore how these background and pressure factors lead to changes in the model's traits without the need for further fine-tuning. Additionally, we suggest the potential impact of these factors on model safety from the perspective of personality.

We argue that enabling human-AI dialogue, purposed to support joint reasoning (i.e., 'inquiry'), is important for ensuring that AI decision making is aligned with human values and preferences. In particular, we point to logic-based models of argumentation and dialogue, and suggest that the traditional focus on persuasion dialogues be replaced by a focus on inquiry dialogues, and the distinct challenges that joint inquiry raises. Given recent dramatic advances in the performance of large language models (LLMs), and the anticipated increase in their use for decision making, we provide a roadmap for research into inquiry dialogues for supporting joint human-LLM reasoning tasks that are ethically salient, and that thereby require that decisions are value aligned.

A key component of successfully reading a passage of text is the ability to apply knowledge gained from the passage to a new situation. In order to facilitate progress on this kind of reading, we present ROPES, a challenging benchmark for reading comprehension targeting Reasoning Over Paragraph Effects in Situations. We target expository language describing causes and effects (e.g., "animal pollinators increase efficiency of fertilization in flowers"), as they have clear implications for new situations. A system is presented a background passage containing at least one of these relations, a novel situation that uses this background, and questions that require reasoning about effects of the relationships in the background passage in the context of the situation. We collect background passages from science textbooks and Wikipedia that contain such phenomena, and ask crowd workers to author situations, questions, and answers, resulting in a 14,322 question dataset. We analyze the challenges of this task and evaluate the performance of state-of-the-art reading comprehension models. The best model performs only slightly better than randomly guessing an answer of the correct type, at 61.6% F1, well below the human performance of 89.0%.

The AI community has been pursuing algorithms known as artificial general intelligence (AGI) that apply to any kind of real-world problem. Recently, chat systems powered by large language models (LLMs) emerge and rapidly become a promising direction to achieve AGI in natural language processing (NLP), but the path towards AGI in computer vision (CV) remains unclear. One may owe the dilemma to the fact that visual signals are more complex than language signals, yet we are interested in finding concrete reasons, as well as absorbing experiences from GPT and LLMs to solve the problem. In this paper, we start with a conceptual definition of AGI and briefly review how NLP solves a wide range of tasks via a chat system. The analysis inspires us that unification is the next important goal of CV. But, despite various efforts in this direction, CV is still far from a system like GPT that naturally integrates all tasks. We point out that the essential weakness of CV lies in lacking a paradigm to learn from environments, yet NLP has accomplished the task in the text world. We then imagine a pipeline that puts a CV algorithm (i.e., an agent) in world-scale, interactable environments, pre-trains it to predict future frames with respect to its action, and then fine-tunes it with instruction to accomplish various tasks. We expect substantial research and engineering efforts to push the idea forward and scale it up, for which we share our perspectives on future research directions.