name stringlengths 8 25 | category stringclasses 9
values | family stringclasses 4
values | scored bool 2
classes | filename stringclasses 2
values | content stringlengths 0 1.36k | why_a_pass_is_unearned stringlengths 31 212 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
empty_json_object | empty | any | true | case.json | {} | an object with no members: there is no property here to check |
empty_json_array | empty | any | true | case.json | [] | zero records; any 'all records satisfy P' is vacuously true |
empty_file | empty | any | true | case.jsonl | zero bytes; a verifier that reports success has verified nothing | |
whitespace_only | empty | any | true | case.jsonl | no records, but not zero bytes — a naive length check passes this | |
empty_graph | empty | graph | true | case.json | {} | no nodes: 'no cycle exists' is true and says nothing about your system |
zero_bindings | empty | certificate | true | case.json | {
"bindings": [],
"checked": 0
} | nothing was bound, so nothing was compared |
chain_tail_removed | truncated | chain | true | case.jsonl | { "decision": "admit", "hash": "9d820cafe552ad3e28728cac1927198be0e9267a584d6a7db076d73bc9c884ac", "prev": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", "seq": 0}
{ "decision": "admit", "hash": "ed64379c2eb4ee2f809fd905476548bff93724da63d851745029341984d9693a", "prev": "9d820cafe552ad3e2872... | a prefix of a hash chain verifies PERFECTLY; only an anchor reveals the missing tail |
chain_last_record_cut | truncated | chain | true | case.jsonl | { "decision": "admit", "hash": "9d820cafe552ad3e28728cac1927198be0e9267a584d6a7db076d73bc9c884ac", "prev": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", "seq": 0}
{ "decision": "admit", "hash": "ed64379c2eb4ee2f809fd905476548bff93724da63d851745029341984d9693a", "prev": "9d820cafe552ad3e2872... | the final record is cut mid-JSON: a line-wise reader may simply drop it |
json_truncated_mid_object | truncated | certificate | true | case.json | {
"bound": 0.01,
"records" | invalid JSON that begins validly; a streaming parser can emit a partial result |
chain_without_anchor | no_anchor | chain | true | case.jsonl | { "decision": "admit", "hash": "9d820cafe552ad3e28728cac1927198be0e9267a584d6a7db076d73bc9c884ac", "prev": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", "seq": 0}
{ "decision": "admit", "hash": "ed64379c2eb4ee2f809fd905476548bff93724da63d851745029341984d9693a", "prev": "9d820cafe552ad3e2872... | internally consistent and tied to nothing; self-consistency is not authenticity |
cert_unsigned | no_anchor | certificate | true | case.json | {
"bound": 0.001,
"schema": "example/v1",
"signature": null,
"verdict": "PASS"
} | a verdict with no signature and no pinned key: nothing attests to it |
self_referential_root | no_anchor | certificate | true | case.json | {
"index": {
"root": "abc123"
},
"root": "abc123",
"verified_against": "index"
} | the artifact is checked against a value it itself supplies |
single_record | sound_pass | chain | false | case.jsonl | { "anchor": { "sth": "9d820cafe552ad3e28728cac1927198be0e9267a584d6a7db076d73bc9c884ac", "witnessed_by": "example-log" }, "decision": "admit", "hash": "9d820cafe552ad3e28728cac1927198be0e9267a584d6a7db076d73bc9c884ac", "prev": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", "seq": 0} | one record with a valid genesis pointer. A chain of length one has no LINK to check, but it is a well-formed chain and accepting it is defensible. |
single_node_graph | sound_pass | graph | false | case.json | {
"a": []
} | one node waiting on nothing. A verifier MAY pass this: a system where nobody waits genuinely cannot wedge. Listed so over-refusal is visible, not scored. |
bound_of_one | degenerate | certificate | true | case.json | {
"false_pass_bound": 1.0,
"n": 0,
"verdict": "PASS"
} | a bound of 1.0 excludes nothing; passing under it is not evidence |
sample_size_zero | degenerate | certificate | true | case.json | {
"failures": 0,
"rate": 0.0,
"trials": 0
} | 0 failures in 0 trials is a rate of nothing, not a rate of zero |
all_cases_skipped | degenerate | certificate | true | case.json | {
"failed": 0,
"passed": 0,
"skipped": 12,
"tests": 12
} | every case was skipped; a green result here means nobody ran anything |
not_json | malformed | any | true | case.json | this is not json at all
| the correct response is a diagnosis naming the expected shape, not a verdict |
wrong_root_type | malformed | any | true | case.json | "a bare string" | a string where an object was required |
nan_bound | malformed | certificate | true | case.json | {"verdict": "PASS", "false_pass_bound": NaN} | NaN compares false against every threshold, so a naive `bound < t` check rejects it, but a naive `not (bound > t)` check ACCEPTS it |
negative_count | malformed | certificate | true | case.json | {
"records": -5,
"verdict": "PASS"
} | a negative count is not a count |
bom_and_crlf | malformed | chain | true | case.jsonl | { "prev": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", "seq": 0}
| a byte-order mark ahead of the first record breaks strict parsers silently |
future_schema_version | out_of_distribution | certificate | true | case.json | {
"fields_you_do_not_know": true,
"schema": "example/v99",
"verdict": "PASS"
} | a schema version from the future: 'I do not recognise this' is the honest answer |
unknown_verdict_value | out_of_distribution | certificate | true | case.json | {
"bound": 0.01,
"schema": "example/v1",
"verdict": "PROBABLY_FINE"
} | an unrecognised verdict string must not be coerced to the nearest known one |
cyclic_where_dag_expected | out_of_distribution | graph | true | case.json | {
"a": [
"b"
],
"b": [
"a"
]
} | a cyclic graph handed to something expecting a DAG; infinite loop or wrong answer |
seq_repeats | out_of_distribution | chain | true | case.jsonl | { "prev": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", "seq": 0}
{ "prev": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", "seq": 1}
{ "prev": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", "seq": 1}
{ "prev": "00000000000000000000000000000000000000... | a repeated sequence number: two records claim the same position |
rtl_and_unicode_ids | sound_pass | graph | false | case.json | {
"\u0645\u0633\u062a\u062e\u062f\u0645": [],
"\u202eadmin": [
"\u0645\u0633\u062a\u062e\u062f\u0645"
]
} | identifiers containing a right-to-left override RENDER deceptively, but the graph is genuinely acyclic. Passing it is correct; the defect is in display, not the verdict, so scoring it would be a false accusation. |
valid_chain_with_anchor | positive_control | chain | false | case.jsonl | { "decision": "admit", "hash": "9d820cafe552ad3e28728cac1927198be0e9267a584d6a7db076d73bc9c884ac", "prev": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", "seq": 0}
{ "decision": "admit", "hash": "ed64379c2eb4ee2f809fd905476548bff93724da63d851745029341984d9693a", "prev": "9d820cafe552ad3e2872... | a well-formed anchored chain: a working verifier SHOULD accept this |
valid_acyclic_graph | positive_control | graph | false | case.json | {
"a": [
"b"
],
"b": [
"c"
],
"c": []
} | a genuine acyclic wait-for graph with three nodes and two edges |
valid_certificate | positive_control | certificate | false | case.json | {
"false_pass_bound": 0.001,
"n": 4000,
"schema": "example/v1",
"scope": "the enumerated domain",
"signature": "deadbeef",
"verdict": "PASS"
} | a complete certificate with a finite bound, a scope and a signature |
broken_chain_link | negative_control | chain | false | case.jsonl | { "decision": "admit", "hash": "9d820cafe552ad3e28728cac1927198be0e9267a584d6a7db076d73bc9c884ac", "prev": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", "seq": 0}
{ "decision": "admit", "hash": "ed64379c2eb4ee2f809fd905476548bff93724da63d851745029341984d9693a", "prev": "9d820cafe552ad3e2872... | record 3's back-pointer is wrong: a working verifier SHOULD reject this |
cyclic_graph | negative_control | graph | false | case.json | {
"a": [
"b"
],
"b": [
"a"
]
} | a two-cycle: a working deadlock checker SHOULD reject this |
Abstain Corpus — inputs a verifier must not pass
32 inputs for testing whether a verifier claims success on something it could not possibly have checked. 24 are scored; 8 are controls that make the score mean anything.
Every verifier — a linter, an SBOM scanner, an attestation checker, a policy engine, a deadlock detector — has the same tempting shape: return success unless you find a problem. Hand one an empty file, a truncated log, or an artifact with no trust anchor and it finds no problem, so it reports success. It has verified nothing, and said so in green.
This corpus is the input side of that test. The harness that scores against it is
abstain-bench; the data is published
separately so it is reusable by anyone building a verifier, in any language.
Load it
from datasets import load_dataset
ds = load_dataset("nickh007/abstain-corpus", split="train")
print(len(ds)) # 32
scored = ds.filter(lambda r: r["scored"]) # 24
print(scored[0]["name"], scored[0]["why_a_pass_is_unearned"])
Or regenerate it from source — the corpus is constructed, not stored, so every case is reproducible:
pip install abstain-bench
abstain-bench export ./cases
Fields
| field | meaning |
|---|---|
name |
stable identifier |
category |
which way this input has nothing to check (below) |
family |
chain, graph, certificate, or any |
scored |
whether passing it counts as an unearned pass |
filename |
the name to write it as (.json / .jsonl matters to some parsers) |
content |
the artifact itself, verbatim |
why_a_pass_is_unearned |
the reason, in a sentence |
Categories
| category | n | why a pass is unearned |
|---|---|---|
empty |
6 | zero records, nodes or bindings. all([]) is True |
malformed |
5 | not the thing it claims to be; the right answer is a diagnosis, not a verdict |
out_of_distribution |
4 | a schema, version or shape the verifier does not know |
truncated |
3 | a hash chain's prefix verifies perfectly; only an anchor reveals the missing tail |
no_anchor |
3 | internally consistent, tied to nothing. Self-consistency is not authenticity |
degenerate |
3 | structurally valid, semantically vacuous: a bound of 1.0, a sample of size zero |
The 8 unscored rows, and why they exist
positive_control (3) — valid artifacts a working verifier should accept, one per family.
negative_control (2) — clearly broken artifacts it should reject.
These are not decoration. A verifier that exits non-zero on absolutely everything scores a perfect zero unearned passes and is completely useless. Any harness using this corpus must refuse to report a score until the subject accepts a positive control and rejects a negative one — otherwise the headline number is an artefact of the harness rather than a property of the tool.
sound_pass (3) — cases a verifier may legitimately pass, scored in neither direction.
These exist because the first live run of the associated benchmark accused a correct verifier
of two unearned passes. {"a": []} — one node waiting on nothing — genuinely cannot deadlock. An
acyclic graph whose identifiers contain a right-to-left override is still acyclic; the deception
is in how a terminal renders the name, not in the verdict. Both were moved out of the
numerator. A corpus that manufactures findings is exactly as untrustworthy as the unearned passes
it exists to measure. They are kept and still run, because over-refusal is a real defect too — it
is just not this one.
Family scoping matters
A graph checker handed a truncated hash chain will refuse it — because it is not a graph. That is a free correct answer for a reason unrelated to truncation, and counting it inflates the score. Score a subject only on the families whose positive control it accepted.
Honest scope
A 0% unearned-pass rate against this corpus means: on these inputs, in the families the subject demonstrated it handles, it never claimed success on something it could not check. It does not mean the verifier is correct — this covers one failure mode, not soundness — and the corpus is not exhaustive. It covers six ways of having nothing to check; there are certainly others. With 24 scored cases, report an exact binomial interval rather than a bare proportion: 0 of 24 is not "0% ± 0%".
Licence
Apache-2.0. Generated by abstain-bench
(abstain_bench.corpus.build_corpus).
The rest of the portfolio
25 artifacts, one idea: a measurement you cannot check is a press release. Every tool here reports; none of them gates.
Tools
abstain-bench |
how often does a verifier pass input it could not check? |
evidence |
run the whole portfolio over your repo — the weakest leg, never the mean |
floorgen |
what must your system remember? an exact lower bound |
formal-proof-mcp |
a proof kernel for your coding agent |
gatecount |
exactly how many states does removing this check admit? |
gridlock |
certify a wait-for relation cannot wedge |
honestbench |
measure your CI's escape rate |
kvleak |
cross-tenant leak scanner |
kvprobe |
model-substitution detector with a measured FPR |
preregister |
refuses to seal a plan whose conclusion is already fixed |
proof-carrying-ci |
the whole portfolio as one CI check, with SARIF |
proof-to-code-drift |
fail the build when the proof stops matching |
sf-verify |
re-derive admission decisions offline |
signoff-cert |
certificates that carry their own false-pass bound |
tokencount |
a token count both parties can recompute |
Benchmarks — each recomputes one of our own published numbers from its certificate
illusion-bench |
how many broken kernels does your oracle admit? |
kv-reuse-econ-bench |
recompute our economics headline |
llm-tenant-isolation-bench |
recompute our isolation figures |
Datasets
abstain-corpus |
32 inputs a verifier must NOT pass ← you are here |
kv-reuse-econ-traces |
per-workload reuse accounting + the closed form |
kv-tenant-isolation-bench |
isolation observations, uninterpretable rows included |
llm-precision-fingerprints |
precision-labelled logprobs with a negative control |
Try it in a browser — no install, no GPU
negative-results-atlas |
ten claims we took back |
tenant-leak-demo |
the residency calculator |
wait-for-visualiser |
paste a wait-for graph, see the cycle |
Documentation
Everything above, explained in one place: https://nickharris808.github.io/evidence-docs/ —
the tutorial,
what this proves and what it does not,
and a CLI reference generated by
running --help on every published command.
The commercial edition
Everything above is measure-only and Apache-2.0: it tells you what is true and never acts on it. The enforcement side — binding a partition key at the admission decision, the compiled gate corpus, and the certificate-issuing faucet — is covered by filed patents and licensed separately.
Reading is free. Enforcing is licensed.
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